Gorsuch (Gregory) v. State

Nevada Supreme Court

Gorsuch (Gregory) v. State

DecidedJune 24, 2014

Docket62351

StatusUnpublished

This text of Gorsuch (Gregory) v. State (Gorsuch (Gregory) v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Gorsuch (Gregory) v. State, (Neb. 2014).

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Opinion

charged with felony possession, and moved to suppress the methamphetamine, which the district court denied. Gorsuch then pleaded guilty while maintaining the right to appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion, the subject of the instant appeal. In reviewing a district court decision on a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and the legal consequences of those facts, including the constitutionality of a search or seizure, de novo. State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. , 312 P.3d 467, 469 (2013); State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. „ 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013). Gorsuch asserts two reasons why the motion to suppress should have been granted. Gorsuch first argues that the justice court did not have the authority to order searches without any cause as a condition of his misdemeanor suspended sentence. The court need not reach this issue, however, because the justice court had authority to order, as a condition of Gorsuch's probation based on a suspended sentence, that he Islubmit to periodic tests to determine whether the offender is using a controlled substance or consuming alcohol." NRS 4.373(1)(h). Therefore, the justice court had authority to order Gorsuch to submit to periodic drug testing with DAS. Second, Gorsuch argues that, regardless of his probation conditions, the drug test was unreasonable. This court considers the overall reasonableness of a probationer search to determine whether it complies with the probationer's rights. Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 94-95, 590 P.2d 1152, 1155-56 (1979); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (looking to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable). And, a warrantless search of a

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A probationer may be reasonable if based on reasonable grounds and conducted pursuant to a reasonable probation condition. Seim, 95 Nev. at 94-95, 590 P.2d at 1155-56. Here, Gorsuch's underlying conviction was for drug possession, and he had previously violated his probation conditions twice by using methamphetamine before he was subjected to the at-issue drug test. Gorsuch's previous and known drug use resulting in probation violations gave DAS reasonable grounds to test Gorsuch. Furthermore, the condition here was reasonable and tailored to Gorsuch's underlying offense and subsequent behavior. The lower court ordered the periodic drug testing condition only after Gorsuch's second drug-related probation violation. And this condition furthered a legitimate underlying purpose of probation. See People v. Balestra, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83-84 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that drug testing at the probation officer's discretion was a valid condition of probation because it was intended "to aid the probation officer in ensuring the probationer is complying with the fundamental probation condition, to obey all laws"); Smith v. State, 298 S.E.2d 482, 483 (Ga. 1983) ("The requirement that a probationer, upon request, produce body fluid for analysis is reasonable as an aid in determining compliance with the prohibition upon the use of controlled substances."). In other words, as the district court held, "the condition was imposed because of the underlying crime and subsequent violations," and "the crime coupled with those violations are what gave rise to the officers' reasonable suspicions in the instant case." Thus, the warrantless drug

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A e test here was reasonable, and the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

01)6_ )1 74 Pickering

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cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge State Public Defender/Carson City Attorney General/Carson City Carson City District Attorney Carson City Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 kth 1947A e

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charged with felony possession, and moved to suppress the methamphetamine, which the district court denied. Gorsuch then pleaded guilty while maintaining the right to appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion, the subject of the instant appeal. In reviewing a district court decision on a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and the legal consequences of those facts, including the constitutionality of a search or seizure, de novo. State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. , 312 P.3d 467, 469 (2013); State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. „ 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013). Gorsuch asserts two reasons why the motion to suppress should have been granted. Gorsuch first argues that the justice court did not have the authority to order searches without any cause as a condition of his misdemeanor suspended sentence. The court need not reach this issue, however, because the justice court had authority to order, as a condition of Gorsuch's probation based on a suspended sentence, that he Islubmit to periodic tests to determine whether the offender is using a controlled substance or consuming alcohol." NRS 4.373(1)(h). Therefore, the justice court had authority to order Gorsuch to submit to periodic drug testing with DAS. Second, Gorsuch argues that, regardless of his probation conditions, the drug test was unreasonable. This court considers the overall reasonableness of a probationer search to determine whether it complies with the probationer's rights. Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 94-95, 590 P.2d 1152, 1155-56 (1979); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (looking to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable). And, a warrantless search of a

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A probationer may be reasonable if based on reasonable grounds and conducted pursuant to a reasonable probation condition. Seim, 95 Nev. at 94-95, 590 P.2d at 1155-56. Here, Gorsuch's underlying conviction was for drug possession, and he had previously violated his probation conditions twice by using methamphetamine before he was subjected to the at-issue drug test. Gorsuch's previous and known drug use resulting in probation violations gave DAS reasonable grounds to test Gorsuch. Furthermore, the condition here was reasonable and tailored to Gorsuch's underlying offense and subsequent behavior. The lower court ordered the periodic drug testing condition only after Gorsuch's second drug-related probation violation. And this condition furthered a legitimate underlying purpose of probation. See People v. Balestra, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83-84 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that drug testing at the probation officer's discretion was a valid condition of probation because it was intended "to aid the probation officer in ensuring the probationer is complying with the fundamental probation condition, to obey all laws"); Smith v. State, 298 S.E.2d 482, 483 (Ga. 1983) ("The requirement that a probationer, upon request, produce body fluid for analysis is reasonable as an aid in determining compliance with the prohibition upon the use of controlled substances."). In other words, as the district court held, "the condition was imposed because of the underlying crime and subsequent violations," and "the crime coupled with those violations are what gave rise to the officers' reasonable suspicions in the instant case." Thus, the warrantless drug