Gorsline v. Nevada Department of Corrections

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 AJA GORSLINE, Case No. 3:21-cv-00019-MMD-CLB

Plaintiff, 7 ORDER v.

8 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 This action arises from an inmate attack on a case worker, who is employed by 13 the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), that took place in October 2020 at the 14 Lovelock Correctional Center (“LCC”). Plaintiff Aja Gorsline, the case worker, has filed a 15 first amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several NDOC employees1 16 (“Defendants”) and Doe Defendants. (ECF No. 4 (“FAC”).) Before the Court is 17 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC.2 (ECF No. 6 (“Motion”).) Because the Court 18 agrees with Defendants, and as further explained below, Defendants’ Motion is granted. 19 However, the Court also grants Plaintiff leave to amend the FAC. 20 1NDOC employees include Charles Daniels (NDOC Director), Tim Garrett (LCC 21 Acting Warden), Kara LeGrand (LCC Associate Warden), Kirk Widmar (LCC Acting Associate Warden and Correctional Lieutenant), Bobby Preston (LCC Correctional 22 Lieuten ant), and Jason Chicone (LCC Shift Commander). (ECF No. 4 at 2-3.) Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff names the State of Nevada and the 23 NDOC as defendants in the caption but not in the body of her first amended complaint. (Id. at 1.) The Court construes this as a § 1983 action that is being brought against 24 Nevada and the NDOC. However, with respect to federal court cases, Nevada does not waive its sovereign immunity. See NRS § 41.031(3). Generally, Nevada and arms of the 25 state cannot be sued in federal court. See O'Connor v. State of Nev., 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that “Nevada has explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit 26 under the eleventh amendment . . . The Supreme Court has made it clear that section 1983 does not constitute an abrogation of the eleventh amendment immunity of the 27 states”). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the State of Nevada and the NDOC from this case with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. 28 2Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 10) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 11). 2 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s FAC. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff began 3 working at LCC in 2016, first as a correctional officer trainee, then as a full correctional 4 officer. (Id. at 4.) On June 29, 2020, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of a case 5 worker where she was responsible for “annual inmate reviews, reclassification reviews, 6 inmate screenings, file audits, and researching and addressing inmate grievances.” (Id. 7 at 5.) 8 As a case worker, Plaintiff worked in Unit 2B, which was routinely understaffed 9 and often lacked a floor officer because the officer would have to cover both Units 2B 10 and 2A. (Id.) Unit 2B had cameras for remote observations but they were not working, 11 which Defendants knew about. (Id.) Additionally, there were not enough radios for case 12 workers, and a case worker had expressed this concern to the warden. (Id.) The case 13 worker also complained about understaffing, and a lack of weapons and equipment. 14 (Id.) As a response, a corrections officer made a duty belt and tools out of cardboard 15 and left it on the case worker’s desk. (Id.) 16 On October 29, 2020, at approximately 9:30 a.m., an inmate came into Unit 2B 17 where Plaintiff was working to ask a question. (Id. at 6.) The inmate had been convicted 18 of kidnapping, sexual assault, and use of a deadly weapon. (Id. at 7.) While he was in 19 prison, the inmate had additional incidents of sexual misconduct. (Id. at 8.) Defendants 20 knew the inmate was dangerous and guilty of sexually inappropriate conduct towards 21 staff. (Id.) 22 There was no floor officer assigned to Units 2B or 2A on the morning the inmate 23 came in to ask Plaintiff a question. (Id. at 5.) At some point that day, the inmate returned 24 to Unit 2B a third time and sat on the opposite side of Plaintiff’s desk. (Id. at 6.) When 25 Plaintiff went to pick up a handball the inmate had dropped, the inmate rushed around 26 the desk, grabbed Plaintiff, slammed her to the floor, and body-slammed her. (Id.) The 27 inmate held a pen to Plaintiff’s throat and Plaintiff screamed for help. (Id.) After the 28 inmate was unable to stab Plaintiff with the pen, he proceeded to try to strangle her, 2 able to run out of Unit 2B and yell for help. (Id. at 7.) She states that “she believed she 3 was about to be raped and/or killed.” (Id. at 6.) Due to the attack, Plaintiff has suffered 4 significant physical injuries that include contusions, bruising of her face and body, and a 5 broken nose. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also suffered emotional harm, and is being treated for 6 anxiety and sleep disruption. (Id. at 8-9.) 7 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 8 Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to maintain the integrity of her 9 body without due process of law. (Id. at 9.) She alleges that Defendants had a duty 10 under Administrative Regulation 105 (“AR 105”) and certain Operating Procedures to 11 provide a safe and secure working environment. (Id. at 2-3, 9.) But instead, Defendants 12 created the dangerous conditions, failed to ameliorate the danger, and failed to protect 13 her. (Id.) Therefore, Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to her right under the 14 Fourteenth Amendment. 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Defendants make several arguments in their Motion. (ECF No. 6 at 5-12.) 17 Because the Court finds Defendants’ first argument to be dispositive, the Court will 18 address only this argument below.3 19 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against each individual 20 Defendant. (ECF No. 6 at 5-6.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegation 21 merely “lumps” all seven individual Defendants together, which prevents the Court from 22 drawing a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable for the alleged 23 misconduct. (Id.) Plaintiff counters that she has sufficiently pled allegations against each 24

25 3The last of Defendants’ arguments is that injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent cause of action. (Id. at 11-12.) The Court notes that Count 2 of the FAC 26 seeks injunctive relief. (ECF No. 4 at 10-11.) The Court agrees with Defendants and dismisses Plaintiff’s standalone injunctive relief claim, but Plaintiff can pursue injunctive 27 relief in connection with her other claim. See, e.g., Raudelunas v. City of Vallejo, Case No. 2:21-cv-00394-KJM-JDP, 2022 WL 329200, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2022) 28 (articulating that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a standalone cause of action, and that a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief can be granted). 2 intentionally created dangerous work conditions and acted with deliberate indifference 3 to Plaintiff’s right to maintain her body integrity; (2) Brian Williams and Tim Garrett failed 4 to implement or develop Operational Procedures, or the Operational Procedures they 5 are implementing do not meet required standards; (3) and Kara LeGrand, Kirk Widmar, 6 Bobby Preston, and Jason Chacon were out of compliance with the Operational 7 Procedures because the attacked occurred. (Id.) The Court disagrees with Plaintiff. 8 A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which 9 relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must 10 provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 11 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 12 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels 13 and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual 15 allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 16 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 17 matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 18 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 19 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified the two-step approach 20 district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court 21 must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal 22 conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See id. at 678. Mere recitals of 23 the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not 24 suffice. See id. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in 25 the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. See id. at 679. A claim is facially 26 plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a 27 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. at 28 678. Where the complaint does not permit the Court to infer more than the mere 2 pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 3 and citation omitted). That is insufficient. When the claims in a complaint have not 4 crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. See 5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 6 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her right to maintain the integrity 7 of her body when they were deliberately indifferent to their duty to provide a safe and 8 secure working environment pursuant to AR 105 and certain Operational Procedures. 9 (ECF No. 4 at 9-10.) Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the attack at LCC, however, are 10 devoid of any specific attribution of actions taken by each Defendant and, notably, the 11 allegations do not mention any Defendant by name. The only alleged actions of an LCC 12 employee are that of an unnamed corrections officer who left a duty belt and tools made 13 from cardboard on a case worker’s desk. (Id. at 5.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges certain 14 facts were “known” to Defendants such as: staff shortages, lack of functioning cameras 15 in Unit 2B, Plaintiff worked alone, and the inmate was guilty of sexually inappropriate 16 conduct towards staff. (Id. at 5, 8.) But these allegations are mere conclusions and they 17 do not “rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does Plaintiff’s 18 direct reference to each Defendant, as offered in her opposition, direct the Court to the 19 factual allegations that would allow the Court to draw a “reasonable inference that the 20 defendant[s] are liable for the alleged misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As such, the 21 Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 22 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants’ Motion is therefore granted. 23 However, the Court has discretion to grant leave to amend and should freely do 24 so “when justice so requires.” Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 25 1990) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Because the Court does not find that amendment 26 is futile, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her FAC. 27 /// 28 /// 1 || IV. CONCLUSION 2 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 3 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 4 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 5 || motion before the Court. 6 It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) is granted. 7 It is further ordered that the State of Nevada and the NDOC are dismissed with 8 || prejudice from this action as amendment would be futile. 9 It is further ordered that Plaintiff is given leave to amend her FAC (ECF No. 4) 10 || within 30 days. Failure to file a second amended complaint will result in the dismissal of 11 || this action with prejudice. 12 DATED THIS 28" Day of February 2022. 13 14

16 MIRANDA □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 7 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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