Gorsline v. Board of Supervisors

40 Pa. D. & C.5th 478
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lycoming County·Decided August 29, 2014·No. No. 14-000130·Published

Opinion

LOYECCfflO, J.,

Before the court is the appeal of Brian and Dawn Gorsline, and Paul and Michele Batkowski (appellants) to the decision of the board of Supervisors of Fairfield Township (Fairfield or the board), which granted a conditional use approval to Inflection Energy, LLC (Inflection) for the construction and use of an oil and gas well pad on property owned by Donald and Eleanor Shaheen and located in Fairfield Township.

Inflection filed a zoning and development permit application (application) to construct an oil and gas [480]*480well site on the Shaheen property. As described in its application, the proposed use of the property was as a site to “be used for the drilling, completion, production and operations of multiple gas wells.” Public hearings on the application were held before the board on October 7,2013 and November 4, 2013.

The well pad is proposed to measure approximately 300 feet by 350 feet initially and will ultimately measure 150 feet by 150 feet once completed. The well pad would be located on the Shaheen property which is located within a Residential Agricultural (RA) district. While there is only one residence that is located within a 1000 foot radius of the proposed well pad location, there is a large residential development, as well as many individual family homes located within a 3000 foot radius of the proposed well pad location.

On December 2, 2013, public action was taken by the board of Supervisors on the Conditional Use Application. In accordance with the provisions of 53 P.S. § 10908 (10), the board transmitted its final decision on December 18, 2013. On January 17, 2014, appellants filed a land use appeal from the written decision of the board. In their notice of appeal, appellants lodged numerous objections to the decision.

Arguments on the appeal and the issues raised therein were subsequently held before the court. The parties agreed that the court could hear and decide the appeal on the record without any further facts being presented. As well, the parties submitted written legal briefs in support of their respective positions.

[481]*481In opposition to the appeal, Fairfield, Inflection and the Shaheens first argue that appellants have waived any right to raise the issues at this juncture because these issues were not raised before the board.

During the oral argument on this matter, Fairfield, Inflection and the Shaheens submitted that the appeal is governed by the Local Agency Law and in particular 2 Pa. C.S.A. § 753. Appellants disagreed and argued that their appeal is governed by the applicable provisions of Pennsylvania’s Municipal Planning Code (MPC).

Conditional uses in Fairfield Township are governed by § 14.2 of the Fairfield Township Zoning Ordinance of 2007 (“ordinance”). The criteria for review and approval of a given conditional use are set forth in § 14.2.5 of the ordinance. The ordinance also establishes procedures for the application and mandates criteria that the board must consider in making a decision. In this matter and pursuant to § 14.2.6 of the ordinance, the board established findings of fact and issued a written decision within the prescribed time period after the last hearing. The board transmitted its written decision “in accordance with the provisions of 53 P.S. § 10908 (10).” Clearly, the board conducted the hearing and issued its decision pursuant to the MPC.

The appeal by appellants was styled as a “Land Use Notice of Appeal.” Land use appeals are specifically addressed in the MPC. 53 P.S. § 11001-A.

The argument by Fairfield, Inflection and the Shaheens that the provisions of the Local Agency Law apply to the exclusion of the MPC lacks merit. The board issued its decision pursuant to the MPC and Inflection and the [482]*482Shaheens intervened in the appeal pursuant to the MPC. 53 P.S. § 11004(A).

As appellants correctly note, the hearing and argument on the land use appeal is governed by the MPC and in particular 53 P.S. § 11005-A. That provision specifically notes that “[i]f the record below includes findings of fact made by the governing body, board or agency whose decision is brought up for review and the court does not take additional evidence, the findings of the governing body shall not be disturbed by the court if supported by substantial evidence.” 53 P.S. § 11005-A.

Pursuant to 53 P.S. § 11006-A, in a land use appeal, “the court shall have the power to declare any ordinance or map invalid and set aside or modify any action, decision or order of the governing body...brought up on appeal.”

There is no provision in the MPC that limits the court from addressing issues raised by appellants to only those issues that appellants raised before the board. Accordingly, the court dismisses the waiver argument of Fairfield, Inflection and the Shaheens.

Alternatively, even if the position of appellees and intervenors is deemed to have merit, the court agrees with appellants that the issues asserted by them in their appeal should be addressed for due cause shown. When the ordinance was adopted, it is safe to assume that neither the drafters, the municipality or the citizens contemplated the issues involved in oil and gas exploration. Moreover, and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.2d 901 (Pa. 2013), the issues raised by appellants have significant constitutional [483]*483import.

The first issue asaserted by appellants concerns whether Fairfield erred as a matter of law by reviewing the land use application as a “use provided for” under § 12.18 of the ordinance, rather than an application for “surface mining.”

Unfortunately, § 12.18 of the ordinance is inartfully drafted and confusing in part. The court will endeavor to apply the ordinance and its required criteria consistent with its language and intent. The first criterion that the applicant must establish is that the proposed use is neither specifically permitted nor denied “under [the] ordinance.” Clearly, the burden falls on Inflection to establish that its proposed use complies with the requirements of the ordinance. Aldridge v. Jackson Township, 983 A.2d 247, 253 (Pa. Commw. 2009).

Appellants argue that an oil and gas well pad and well drilling fall within the definition of surface mining which is permitted as a conditional use in the industrial district. They assert that the plain language of the ordinance provides that surface mining activities are authorized as a conditional use in the industrial district of Fairfield. Specifically, they further assert that the ordinance defines “surface mining” to include industrial surface activities aimed at extracting minerals from the ground and that the ordinance defines “minerals” to include “oil and natural gas.” They contend that an interpretation of “surface mining” that does not include natural gas extraction within its meaning would render the term “minerals” and the phrase “oil and natural gas” meaningless and superfluous.

While the court sees some merit in this argument, [484]*484given the specific language of the ordinance and the legal precedents governing the interpretation of ordinances in general, the court cannot agree with appellant’s position.

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Gorsline v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Pa. D. & C.5th 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).

40 Pa. D. & C.5th 478 (Gorsline v. Board of Supervisors) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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