Gorham v. United States

119 F. Supp. 409, 127 Ct. Cl. 750, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 70
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 2, 1954
DocketCongressional No. 17865
StatusPublished

This text of 119 F. Supp. 409 (Gorham v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gorham v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 409, 127 Ct. Cl. 750, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 70 (cc 1954).

Opinion

JoNes, Chief Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

This is a Congressional reference case.

The plaintiffs are all of the former common and preferred stockholders and debenture holders of the Goshen Yeneer Company, hereinafter referred to as Goshen.

The petition alleges that the United States is responsible for the loss of the entire assets of the company. Plaintiffs claim $509,434.92, plus interest, which they allege represents the value of the stock and debentures on July 31, 1942.

The Goshen Yeneer Company was established in 1892 by Myron C. Dow and Charles E. Gorham and was operated as a partnership until it was incorporated in 1900. The ownership of the firm and all its stock remained in the hands of the organizers or their families up to April 1944. Since its inception Goshen has engaged in the manufacture of hardwood veneer and plywood. It was a pioneer in the production of hardwood plywood, had a most complete plywood manufacturing plant, and was one of the first to develop the hotpress technique for cementing veneer with thermo-setting resins. The average net sales for the years 1936 to 1941 was $558,200, with average net profits of $26,300, or 5 percent of sales.

A number of grounds are asserted as a basis for the claim. There is little agreement between the parties as to the facts of this case. The accounting records are badly mixed and are incomplete. Numerous items are involved, and it has been difficult to properly analyze the somewhat jumbled facts.

This case arises from transactions between Goshen, The First Bank and Trust Company of South Bend, Indiana (hereinafter called the Bank), The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (hereinafter the Federal Reserve), and the War Department during the period from the spring of 1942 through the summer of 1944.

Six of the main actors in the relationship among these institutions died prior to the trial. These included the officers of the Bank who had most to do with the negotiations of the loans; Mr. D. C. Folger, of the firm of Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison, Inc., Management Engineers, (hereinafter SJH) and Mr. R. B. Agler, to whom plaintiffs at[754]*754tributed mismanagement; and the company’s accountant and attorney. The absence of the testimony of these men is especially unfortunate since assertions of oral representations and undocumented activities are prominent in plaintiffs’ evidence. To get a clear picture of the company’s situation from 1942 to 1944 when its contracts with the Government were in operation would require extensive analysis of the company’s management and financial position during that period. The accounting and other records in evidence are entirely inadequate for such an undertaking.1

We are primarily concerned here with the period mid-1942 to mid-1944. During this time Goshen entered into Y-loan arrangements with the First Bank and Trust Company of South Bend, which were guaranteed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, as fiscal agent for the War Department, as follows: May 22, 1942, $100,000; August 22, 1942, $600,000 (consolidating the prior loan); March 25, 1943, $1,000,000, incorporating the two prior loans. It is on the dealings of the parties in connection with these loans that plaintiffs base their claims.

It is the gist of plaintiffs’ claim that at the special urging and request by procurement officers of the armed forces Goshen was required by law to convert to war production of military aircraft plywood in the summer of 1942; that as a result of these demands and of such conversion Goshen borrowed money from the Bank under the V-loan2 program; that these loans were made upon the alleged representation by government officials that under this method of financing the company would be free to operate without any restric[755]*755tion; that the loan arrangements were in fact unduly restrictive and that in the administration of the loan the Bank exercised such an unwarranted degree of control of Goshen that in January 1943 a constructive trust arose in favor of the plaintiffs. There are also allegations of mismanagement which plaintiffs contend are the responsibility of the defendant. The contention is also made that when, in April 1944, at which time the outstanding notes totaled over $960,-000, the plaintiffs conveyed all their stock and interest in Goshen to the Federal Reserve and the Federal Reserve released two members of the families from personal guarantees on loans, they did so upon the oral representation of defendant’s agents that the Corporation would be returned to them at the end of the war. It is plaintiffs’ position that the action of the Federal Reserve, as agent of the War Department, with regard to Goshen amounted to a taking of their property for which they are entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. For reasons which appear below we think plaintiffs have considerably overstated their case.

The first claim that Goshen had no alternative but to convert to war production, and that it was in reliance upon the representations of the procurement officers that financing-programs would be arranged under which the company could operate without any restriction, and that these representations caused Goshen to enter into the loan agreement which proved to be its undoing, is not entirely supported by the record before us.

On March 10, 1942, Mr. J. J. Snoke, general manager of Goshen, advised the Army Air Force procurement officers by letter of Goshen’s availability for plywood manufacturing and offered its services in that regard. The evidence does not establish that agents of the War Department solicited the services of Goshen directly prior to the first Y-loan of May 22, 1942. It also appears that on May 6, 1942, the company had prime or subcontracts with various agencies of the Government totaling $354,5003 and a subcontract estimated at $600,000 was in the process of nego[756]*756tiation with, the Bell Aircraft Company, who had a contract with the United States Army Air Forces. Goshen was contacted by representatives of the War Department during the summer of 1942 and the necessity of peak production for the war effort was stressed. It is significant, however, that the “puffing” by procurement officers which plaintiffs contend misled the management of Goshen as to the lack of restrictions included in V-loan financing occurred after the company had entered into the V-loan agreement for $100,000 revolving credit on May 22, 1942. Plaintiffs place great stress on a letter received from a Major Lyon with reference to V-loans. However, this letter which is before us only as quoted in the Report of the House Judiciary Connnittee, is dated July 29, 19424 Admittedly, this letter contains some rather broad assertions and reflects the need for stepped-up production which was urgent at that time. It must, however, be considered in the light of the fact that Goshen had then been operating for two months trader the same type loan arrangement as the two subsequently en[757]*757tered into. The loan agreements of August 22, 1942, and March 25, 1943, differed from the former one only in that additional security provisions were added commensurate with the additional credit extended. Plaintiffs point out that the conditions attached to subsequent agreements were progressively more restrictive. This is true but the credit extended was 5 and 9 times as great, respectively.

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Bluebook (online)
119 F. Supp. 409, 127 Ct. Cl. 750, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gorham-v-united-states-cc-1954.