Gordon v. The State University at Buffalo

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedOctober 11, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00640
StatusUnknown

This text of Gordon v. The State University at Buffalo (Gordon v. The State University at Buffalo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gordon v. The State University at Buffalo, (W.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ___________________________________

JAMEEL GORDON,

Plaintiff,

v. 23-CV-640-LJV ORDER THE STATE UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________________ On July 5, 2023, the pro se plaintiff, Jameel Gordon, filed a complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”). Docket Item 1. This Court previously granted Gordon permission to proceed in forma pauperis and screened his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Docket Item 3. In that screening order, the Court found that Gordon’s claims were subject to dismissal but gave him leave to amend those claims. Id. Gordon now has filed an amended complaint alleging that the defendants—a group of individuals and entities associated with the “State University [of New York] at Buffalo” (“UB” or the “University”)—violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Docket Item 4. The Court liberally construes the amended complaint as asserting claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and screens the amended complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B).1 For the following reasons, some of Gordon’s claims may proceed to service but others are dismissed under section 1915(e)(2)(B).

1 The amended complaint does not reassert a Title VI claim. See Docket Item 4. The Court therefore deems Gordon’s Title VI claim to be withdrawn. DISCUSSION

Section 1915 “provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Generally, the court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it

might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639; see also Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999))). But leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be “futile.” Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112.

I. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT In evaluating the complaint, the court accepts all factual allegations as true and draws all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). Although “a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations,” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even a pro se complaint “must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Shibeshi v. City of New York, 475 F. App’x 807, 808 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim will have ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In other words, although a pro se complaint need not provide every last detail in support of a claim, it must allege some facts that support the claim. See id. (concluding that district court properly dismissed pro se complaint under section 1915(e)(2) because complaint did not meet pleading standard in Twombly and Iqbal). And even pro se pleadings must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2004), and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Gordon has sued ten defendants: UB; the “State University of New York”; the “University at Buffalo Regional Institute”; “Blackstone Incorporated”; Rick Gardner, the “Associate Vice President for Economic Development at the University at Buffalo Business Entrepreneurship Partnership Department”; Keiah Shauku, the “Open4 Program Director at University of Buffalo Regional Institute”; Hadar Borden, the “Director of [t]he Blackstone Launchpad at [UB]; “Empire State Development”; “43 North”; and “NY Ventures.”2 Docket Item 4 at 2. He alleges that the defendants

2 The Court assumes that “Blackstone Incorporated” and the “Blackstone Launchpad” are the same entity. discriminated against him by not providing funding to his business venture and by promoting individuals of other races and genders as entrepreneurs. See id. at 3-4. A liberal reading of the amended complaint tells the following story. In August 2022, Gordon was accepted at UB and learned about the University’s

“entrepreneurship program,” called the “Blackstone Launchpad Program” (“Blackstone”). Id. at 3. “[M]embers of [Gordon’s] academic department” suggested that he participate in Blackstone because he “was interested in launching a business venture while completing [his] degree.” Id. Gordon met with defendant Borden, the Director of Blackstone, but she told Gordon that he was “‘too advanced’ of an entrepreneur for her to work with.” Id. Nevertheless, Borden “invited [Gordon] to participate in the program throughout the semester,” which Gordon did. Id. While he attended the Blackstone program, Gordon “continued [] networking” with members of the UB and broader Buffalo communities. Id. Eventually, he

“launch[ed] and hous[ed] [his] business venture within . . . the University’s Baird Research Center,” which was overseen by defendant Gardner. Id.

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Gordon v. The State University at Buffalo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gordon-v-the-state-university-at-buffalo-nywd-2023.