Gordon v. Robinhood Financial LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 19, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00390
StatusUnknown

This text of Gordon v. Robinhood Financial LLC (Gordon v. Robinhood Financial LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gordon v. Robinhood Financial LLC, (E.D. Wash. 2020).

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 ISAAC GORDON, NO. 2:19-CV-0390-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 11 and ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC., a Delaware corporation, 12 Defendants. 13

14 BEFORE THE COURT are Defendants’ two Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 15 11, 12). These matters were submitted for consideration without oral argument. 16 The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, the completed briefing and is 17 fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss 18 (ECF Nos. 11, 12) are GRANTED. 19 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case concerns the “Refer a Friend” marketing feature of Defendants’

3 online investment brokerage application, which Plaintiff alleges violates the 4 Washington Consumer Protection Act by way of the Washington Commercial 5 Electronic Mail Act (“CEMA”). Plaintiff initially filed a Complaint against

6 Defendants in Spokane County Superior Court. ECF No. 1-1 at 5-16. Defendants 7 removed the action to federal court on the basis of class action diversity 8 jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). ECF No. 1 at 1-6. 9 Following removal, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which is the current

10 operative Complaint. ECF No. 9. Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss for 11 lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Robinhood Markets, Inc. (“Robinhood 12 Markets”). ECF No. 12. Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to

13 adequately allege a CEMA violation. ECF No. 11. 14 DISCUSSION 15 A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 16 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over

17 Defendant Robinhood Markets, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). ECF No. 12. 18 Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed Defendant Robinhood Markets, pursuant to 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). ECF No. 15. Robinhood Markets contends it is entitled

20 to attorney’s fees for prevailing on its Rule 12(b)(2) motion. ECF No. 17. 1 Washington law authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to a defendant who is 2 “personally served outside the state” and “prevails in the action.” RCW 4.28.185.

3 “Under this statute, courts are allowed to award attorney’s fees to defendants who 4 – after being hailed into court under the long-arm statute – prevail on a 12(b)(2) 5 motion to dismiss.” Hunter v. Ferebauer, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1259 (E.D. Wash.

6 2013) (citing Scott Fetzer Co., Kirby Co. Div. v. Weeks, 114 Wash. 2d 109, 114 7 (1990)). This statute authorizes an award of fees to a foreign defendant “when the 8 plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action.” Scott Fetzer Co., 114 Wash. 2d at 113 9 (citing Anderson v. Gold Seal Vineyards, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 863, 865 (1973)).

10 Here, Robinhood Markets is a foreign defendant who was voluntarily dismissed 11 without prejudice from the action. ECF No. 15. Accordingly, under RCW 12 4.28.185, Robinhood Markets is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.

13 B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 14 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to adequately 15 allege a CEMA violation. ECF No. 11. However, review of the parties’ briefing 16 on this issue has triggered this Court’s obligation to consider whether federal

17 subject-matter jurisdiction is present. 18 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian 19 Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “If the court determines at any

20 time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). If subject-matter jurisdiction is questionable, the court 2 must raise the issue sua sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,

3 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their 4 own initiative even at the highest level.”). 5 Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is the operative complaint. ECF No.

6 9. The Amended Complaint alleges federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists based 7 on the parties’ diversity of citizenship and that the amount-in-controversy exceeds 8 $75,000. ECF No. 9 at 4, ¶¶ 3.1-3.2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction 9 statute). However, further review of the Amended Complaint fails to support

10 Plaintiff’s allegation that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff’s 11 Amended Complaint proposes a class action. ECF No. 9 at 1. When a proposed 12 class action complaint alleges federal subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity

13 of citizenship, the amount-in-controversy should be calculated based only the 14 claims of the named plaintiffs. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 940-41 15 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff Gordon is the only named plaintiff in the case. 16 Plaintiff has alleged that he is entitled to recover $500 in statutory damages, $1,000

17 in exemplary damages, treble damages, and costs and attorney’s fees. ECF No. 9 18 at 24-25, ¶¶ 6.13-7.7. These alleged damages fall well below the $75,000 19 threshold required for federal diversity jurisdiction.

20 1 When Defendants removed the initial Complaint to federal court, that 2 removal was based on the aggregated amount-in-controversy alleged for the entire

3 proposed class. ECF No. 1 at 4-5, ¶¶ 11-14. Gibson instructs that analysis of the 4 full class’s claims is only appropriate after the class has been certified under Fed. 5 R. Civ. P. 23. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 940. However, even if this Court were to

6 consider the full proposed class’s claims, the Amended Complaint still would not 7 satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. 8 “In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be 9 aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

10 value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). In 11 alleging sufficient numerosity of the proposed class, Plaintiff states “Defendants 12 serve an actual and potential customer base of millions of individuals in

13 Washington to whom the Defendants regularly transmit or assist in the 14 transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic text messages.” ECF No. 9 at 6, 15 ¶ 4.5(a). However, in the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 16 alleges Defendants’ text messages were only actually sent to “hundreds of

17 Washington recipients.” ECF No. 9 at 21-22, ¶ 5.42. Assuming Plaintiff correctly 18 asserts that each class member would be entitled to $1,500 in damages, which 19 could then be trebled to $4,500 per class member, Plaintiff would still need to

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Related

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Anderson v. Gold Seal Vineyards, Inc.
505 P.2d 790 (Washington Supreme Court, 1973)
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks
786 P.2d 265 (Washington Supreme Court, 1990)
Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.
261 F.3d 927 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Hunter v. Ferebauer
980 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (E.D. Washington, 2013)

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Gordon v. Robinhood Financial LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gordon-v-robinhood-financial-llc-waed-2020.