Gordon v. Lowell

21 Me. 251
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedMay 15, 1842
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 21 Me. 251 (Gordon v. Lowell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gordon v. Lowell, 21 Me. 251 (Me. 1842).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court, on June 3, 1843, was delivered by

Whitman C. J.

— The bill sets forth, that, in 1835 and 1836, the defendant, Lowell, resided in Bangor; and did an [252]*252extensive business there as a dealer in merchandize ; and, in the time, became indebted to the plaintiffs to a large amount; that in October, 1839, they obtained judgment against him, on account thereof, for $3965 debt, and $9,54, costs of suit; on which execution was issued, and returned unsatisfied, there being no visible property of said Lowell whereon to levy it; that said Lowell ceased to do business, as a trader, in 1836 ; and, to defraud the plaintiffs and his other creditors, that he ceased to be the ostensible owner of any property, although he had sustained no losses; and yet in fact was the beneficial owner of property to a large amount; and, early in 1837, removed to the town of China; and there became possessed of a farm of the value of $4000; and had ever since continued to hold, occupy and enjoy the same; that he procured a conveyance of the same to be made to his father-in-law, the defendant, Tukey, in trust for the benefit of him the said Lowell, who paid the consideration for the same; therein combining with the said Tukey to defraud the plaintiffs, and the other creditors of him the said Lowell, by causing the said Tukey to be the ostensible owner, when he himself was secretly the beneficial owner; that subsequently, in April, 1839, the said Lowell confederating with the said Tukey, and also with the defendants, Shaw and Lincoln, in furtherance of the said fraudulent intent, procured the same farm to be conveyed by the said Tukey, for the pretended consideration of $2500, to them the said Shaw and Lincoln, to be by them held secretly for his use and benefit.

To the bill the defendants have put in their several answers, denying all fraud and collusion. Shaw and Lincoln declare, that they were bona fide purchasers, and had no knowledge but that Tukey was the bona fide, as well as the ostensible owner of the farm, when they purchased it of him. And the evidence, though strongly presumptive against their innocence, is not deemed entirely sufficient to outweigh their declarations under oath, in their answers, to the contrary; especially, not so that a Court would be authorized wholly to disbelieve them.

[253]*253With respect to the other defendants, Lowell and Tukey, the aspect of the case cannot be regarded otherwise than as strongly unfavorable to a conclusion that no sinister design existed between them. The evidence against them, though circumstantial, is such as cannot fairly leave a reasonable doubt that there was collusion in their negotiations in reference to the purchase of the farm. Their answers, under oath, so far as they are responsive to the bill, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, are to be taken as conclusive. But if circumstances be proved, by credible and disinterested witnesses, utterly irreconcilable with the truth of their statements, we must .come to the conclusion that their statements are not entitled to our credence.

in the first place, it must be regarded as undeniable, that the sum of twenty-eight hundred dollars and over was paid by Tukey, by the hands of Lowell, or by Lowell for himself, between sometime in September, 1836, and the first of February, 1837, for the farm in China. Lowell, in his answer, does not say directly, that he had the money of Tukey. He only denies that he “advanced the money, or furnished the security for the consideration of said purchase;” or that the consideration, expressed in said conveyances and assignments, was “ paid out of his own money.” He nowhere says directly, that he received the same from Tukey. Jle undoubtedly means that it should be so inferred by the Court, from his other statements; and if it were proper in the present case, and under the allegations in the bill, explicitly stating the fact to be otherwise, for us to infer, that he did so receive it, without an express affirmation on his part, that such was the fact, we might feel ourselves authorized to make the inference. It is certainly a very material fact to be established; and must have been seen by him to be so. Should it then have been left to be inferred merely? We cannot but think, if Tukey ever furnished him with the money, that this allegation should have been direct and explicit, to that effect; at the same time circumstantially setting forth the times when, the manner in which, and in what parcels, and under what circumstances he [254]*254received it, referring to documents evidencing the payments. It is surely not reasonable that we should believe, that such an amount of money was paid by Tukey to Lowell, the one living in Portland, and the other in Bangor, to buy a farm of such value, without some written evidence of the transaction. Yet nothing of the kind is alluded to as ever having existed.

Tukey’s answer is equally barren of any such detail. He contents himself with merely saying, that he paid to the said Shaw and Garland, out of his own money, in consideration of this conveyance, two thousand eight hundred and ten dollars and forty nine-cents. That he did this by his agent, Lowell, who was duly authorized for the purpose. How was he duly authorized ? No authorization is exhibited. Was it by letter,, power of attorney, or verbally? He says furthermore, that this purchase was in execution of “ a purpose or intention, long-before formed by him, of spending his remaining years upon a farm.” This farm, so purchased, and in execution of a purpose long before formed, of spending the remainder of his days upon, went immediately into the possession of Lowell, who occupied it precisely as if it had been his own, till April, 1839; when he sold it, as both of these defendants say, as agent for Tukey, to the defendants, Shaw and Lincoln. Tu-key never saw it, either before the purchase or afterwards. Lowell, while so occupying it, built thereon an expensive barn, supposed to have cost at least four hundred dollars, besides making other improvements. It is not even pretended that this was done, with money furnished by Tukey, or at his expense ; or that any account was kept or charge made to Tukey for it. How does all this comport with the pretence that this farm was purchased for Tukey, or with Tukey’s money, in pursuance of a design long since formed by him of spending the remnant of his days upon it ? A farm he had never seen before the purchase ! A farm while it stood apparently his, he never went to see; and which was sold without his ever seeing it!

His excuse for never going upon it, and for his final conclusion to sell it, is, that his health and strength, by reason of [255]*255long continued sickness, had become much impaired ; and his ability to occupy, manage and carry it on, thereby seriously affected. As to this, the evidence, aside from his answer, is incontrovertible, that he, being by trade a mason, for years before the purchase of this farm, had been rendered.unable to labor, by reason of a rupture; and had, in several years, claimed to have his poll taxes abated, which had been granted, on account of his inability to labor. There is no testimony, aside from his own declaration, that his infirmity had increased upon him in the years that the title to the farm stood in his name. If such a fact had existed, it must be believed that he would and could easily have proved it. ft could not have happened without the knowledge of those in daily habits of intercourse with him.

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Bluebook (online)
21 Me. 251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gordon-v-lowell-me-1842.