Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board

330 F. Supp. 1119, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12326
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJuly 22, 1971
DocketNo. 10902
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 330 F. Supp. 1119 (Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 330 F. Supp. 1119, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12326 (W.D. La. 1971).

Opinion

EDWIN F. HUNTER, Jr., District Judge:

The target of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases from Brown I to the present has been the dual system. Jefferson Davis Parish has uprooted that system “root and branch”. Concededly the system is unitary.1 There has been no abandonment, no fragmentation.

The case was remanded on June 28, 1971, 5 Cir., 446 F.2d 266:

“ * * * with directions for the district court to promptly conduct hearings, and thereon make findings and conclusions as to whether or not the closing of Jefferson Davis High School and Ward Elementary School by the appellee Board was in fact racially motivated. Such findings and conclusions, accompanied by the transcript of the proceeding below, shall be returned to this Court within thirty (30) days for final decision on the question presented.”

A hearing was held on July 9, 1971, at which all parties were afforded full opportunity to present evidence. Pursuant to mandate, we enter findings and conclusions. The case may be illuminated by setting forth its nature as it originally seemed to me and as it takes shape after remand.

1. The school authorities did not wish to close either of the two schools (approximately 67% of the black children were already attending predominantly white schools.2 They preferred to keep both open under a “freedom of choice” plan. No white students elected to attend and this court order[1120]*1120ed them to take whatever steps necessary to create a unitary, non-racial system.
2. It was in response to that order that the Board, in good faith, presented a plan that had real prospects of dismantling the dual system immediately. The plan worked and Jefferson Davis Parish moved from a totally segregated past to a totally integrated present, while preserving a disciplined atmosphere in which a meaningful education for both races is being afforded.
3. The primary motive of the school authorities in closing the two schools was to bring about a unitary school system. Both schools had presented vestiges of segregation.

“It is the responsibility of local authorities and district courts to see to it that future school construction and abandonment is not used and does not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual system. * * * The target of the cases from Brown I to the present was the dual school system. The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, although desegregation of schools ultimately will have impact on other forms of discrimination.” Swann et al. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, et al, (Supreme Court, decided April 20, 1971), 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554. (Emphasis added).

AFTER REMAND

The words “racial motivation” are not merely pious phrases devoid of practical significance. Simplistic arguments have been rejected. A black student in Charlotte, North Carolina might well argue: you are excluding me from School A, two blocks from my home, because I am black, and for no other reason. How can you do that when the Supreme Court in Swann declares:

“Our objective in dealing with the issues presented by these cases is to see that school authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or indirectly, on account of race.”

The judicial answer, as enunciated by the Fifth Circuit, is that true non-discrimination may be attained, paradoxically, only by taking race into consideration. Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, 5 Cir., 430 F.2d 625 (1970), and cases cited therein. The Supreme Court itself has consistently recognized that in the remedial process of school desegregation, race must invariably be considered. Any other approach would severely hamper authorities in their efforts to deal effectively with the task of uprooting the dual system and destroying all vestiges of it.

The remand directs our attention to several cases. Two of these are from this Circuit. In Carr v. Montgomery County, 5 Cir., 429 F.2d 382 (1970), plaintiffs presented the contention that the closing of three specific schools, each of which were operated in the past as all black schools, placed the burden of integration on the black students rather than on white students. The Court held that the record did not support the position of plaintiffs and indicated that each of the three schools had an inferior physical plant or capacity. Moreover, in response to the plaintiffs’ argument, the Court noted that the plan also included the closing of some predominantly white schools. The conclusion reached was:

“We therefore conclude that the closing of the three schools here involved is simply a reasonable part of a workable plan of desegregation.”

In Wright v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 431 F.2d 1200 (1970), the problem again arose concerning the discontinuance of two formerly all Negro schools. One was con[1121]*1121verted into a pupil development center and the court held that there were ample educational reasons to discontinue the other as a high school and to transfer its students to a previously all white high school.

Since the remand on June 28, 1971, our Court of Appeals has handed down two more decisions involving formerly all black schools. In Lee v. Macon County (1971), 448 F.2d 746, Judge Wisdom, speaking for the majority, stated:

“Closing formerly black school facilities for racial reasons would be such a prohibited form of discrimination. ‘Such a plan places the burden of desegregation upon one racial group.’ ”

The Court proceeded to state that the primary reason for closing the schools was the County Board’s conclusion that the use of the black facilities would cause whites to withdraw from the public system. It should be noted, however, that in Lee we were not dealing with a unitary school system. Over 45% of the district’s Negro students were still in all black, or virtually all black, schools.

In Bell v. West Point Municipal School District (1971), 446 F.2d 1362, the Court of Appeals, in remanding a case to the district court, stated:

“While it is undisputed that a particular school may be terminated for sound educational reasons, an otherwise useful building may not be closed merely because the school board speculates that whites will refuse to attend the location.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hill v. Greene County School District
848 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Mississippi, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
330 F. Supp. 1119, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gordon-v-jefferson-davis-parish-school-board-lawd-1971.