1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TERRY GORDON, Case No. 24-cv-03267-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL 9 v. WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
10 PAUL A. DELUCCHI, et al., Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in Alameda County Jail proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case 14 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state court judge, his defense attorney, and two deputies working 15 at the jail. He is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. For the reasons 16 discussed below, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 17 ANALYSIS 18 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 21 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 22 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 24 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 25 Cir. 1990). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the 1 which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 2 in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's 3 obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and 4 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 5 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 7 must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. 8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 9 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 10 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 11 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 B. LEGAL CLAIMS 13 1. Claim One 14 Plaintiff alleges on November 29, 2023, unnamed deputies required him to go to court 15 while he was on quarantine and recovering from spinal surgery.1 Where the inmate-patient is a 16 pretrial detainee rather than a convicted prisoner, his rights derive from the Fourteenth 17 Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 18 Punishments Clause. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) 19 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). That is, deliberate indifference to a pretrial 20 detainee’s serious medical needs violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 21 Although a deliberate indifference test applies to a pretrial detainee’s claim, it is an objective 22 deliberate indifference test, rather than the subjective deliberate indifference test applicable to a 23 prisoner’s claim. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). 24 There are no facts alleged that plausibly show how being required go to court exacerbated, 25 endangered, or otherwise disregarded his medical needs related to being on quarantine or 26 recovering from spinal surgery. In addition, Plaintiff does not name the individuals who required 27 1 him to go. For these two reasons, this claim is not cognizable. 2 2. Claim Two 3 Plaintiff alleges that in transporting Plaintiff to the courthouse, a deputy and a sergeant in 4 the Alameda County Sherriff’s Department forced him out of his wheelchair and onto the floor, 5 where they handcuffed his wrists and ankles. He alleges this caused him “a lot of physical pain 6 and suffering.” He complained to a nearby nurse and asked her to stop them from hurting him. 7 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial 8 detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 9 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). To prove an 10 excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the “force purposely 11 or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 12 389, 397 (2015). A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of 13 the force used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of 14 force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit 15 the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived 16 by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. Plaintiff alleges no facts 17 regarding the need (if any) to use force, the extent of injury (if any), efforts (if any) by the officers, 18 threats (if any) reasonably perceived by the officers, whether he was resisting, or other factors that 19 may indicate excessive force. Absent such allegations, he has not alleged a plausible claim that 20 these officers violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force. In addition, Plaintiff does 21 not provide the names of these officers, which he must do in order to sue them and have the 22 Marshal serve them. For these reasons, claim two does not state a cognizable claim for relief. 23 3. Claim Three 24 The allegations in Plaintiff’s third claim consist of a narrative of a series of events at the 25 courthouse, him being forced into a conference room by unnamed officers, a court proceeding held 26 in his absence, and various grievances filed by Plaintiff. It is not clear from these allegations 27 what claim he is trying to make. The only allegations relating to named defendants are that 1 “court proceeding” in a “confidential attorneys booth” in Plaintiff’s absence at which they set trial 2 and pretrial dates, and Plaintiff asserts this “interfered with my confidential relationship between 3 me and this attorney [Bryden].” There are no facts alleged that if true, plausibly explain how 4 holding such a conference violated Plaintiff’s attorney-client confidentiality or privilege. Plaintiff 5 also does not allege how any such violation adversely affected his defense or otherwise impacted 6 him. 7 4. Claim Four 8 In his fourth claim, Plaintiff alleges an unnamed deputy “assaulted” him while Plaintiff 9 was on a bus hydraulic lift for transportation from the courthouse.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TERRY GORDON, Case No. 24-cv-03267-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL 9 v. WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
10 PAUL A. DELUCCHI, et al., Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in Alameda County Jail proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case 14 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state court judge, his defense attorney, and two deputies working 15 at the jail. He is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. For the reasons 16 discussed below, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 17 ANALYSIS 18 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 21 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 22 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 24 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 25 Cir. 1990). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the 1 which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 2 in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's 3 obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and 4 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 5 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 7 must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. 8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 9 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 10 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 11 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 B. LEGAL CLAIMS 13 1. Claim One 14 Plaintiff alleges on November 29, 2023, unnamed deputies required him to go to court 15 while he was on quarantine and recovering from spinal surgery.1 Where the inmate-patient is a 16 pretrial detainee rather than a convicted prisoner, his rights derive from the Fourteenth 17 Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 18 Punishments Clause. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) 19 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). That is, deliberate indifference to a pretrial 20 detainee’s serious medical needs violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 21 Although a deliberate indifference test applies to a pretrial detainee’s claim, it is an objective 22 deliberate indifference test, rather than the subjective deliberate indifference test applicable to a 23 prisoner’s claim. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). 24 There are no facts alleged that plausibly show how being required go to court exacerbated, 25 endangered, or otherwise disregarded his medical needs related to being on quarantine or 26 recovering from spinal surgery. In addition, Plaintiff does not name the individuals who required 27 1 him to go. For these two reasons, this claim is not cognizable. 2 2. Claim Two 3 Plaintiff alleges that in transporting Plaintiff to the courthouse, a deputy and a sergeant in 4 the Alameda County Sherriff’s Department forced him out of his wheelchair and onto the floor, 5 where they handcuffed his wrists and ankles. He alleges this caused him “a lot of physical pain 6 and suffering.” He complained to a nearby nurse and asked her to stop them from hurting him. 7 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial 8 detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 9 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). To prove an 10 excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the “force purposely 11 or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 12 389, 397 (2015). A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of 13 the force used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of 14 force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit 15 the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived 16 by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. Plaintiff alleges no facts 17 regarding the need (if any) to use force, the extent of injury (if any), efforts (if any) by the officers, 18 threats (if any) reasonably perceived by the officers, whether he was resisting, or other factors that 19 may indicate excessive force. Absent such allegations, he has not alleged a plausible claim that 20 these officers violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force. In addition, Plaintiff does 21 not provide the names of these officers, which he must do in order to sue them and have the 22 Marshal serve them. For these reasons, claim two does not state a cognizable claim for relief. 23 3. Claim Three 24 The allegations in Plaintiff’s third claim consist of a narrative of a series of events at the 25 courthouse, him being forced into a conference room by unnamed officers, a court proceeding held 26 in his absence, and various grievances filed by Plaintiff. It is not clear from these allegations 27 what claim he is trying to make. The only allegations relating to named defendants are that 1 “court proceeding” in a “confidential attorneys booth” in Plaintiff’s absence at which they set trial 2 and pretrial dates, and Plaintiff asserts this “interfered with my confidential relationship between 3 me and this attorney [Bryden].” There are no facts alleged that if true, plausibly explain how 4 holding such a conference violated Plaintiff’s attorney-client confidentiality or privilege. Plaintiff 5 also does not allege how any such violation adversely affected his defense or otherwise impacted 6 him. 7 4. Claim Four 8 In his fourth claim, Plaintiff alleges an unnamed deputy “assaulted” him while Plaintiff 9 was on a bus hydraulic lift for transportation from the courthouse. None of the named Defendants 10 are alleged to be involved in this assault, nor does Plaintiff allege any facts regarding the 11 circumstances of this incident, such as the amount of force used, injuries sustained, or other factors 12 that, if true, would indicate the use of force was in fact an “assault” (as opposed to an accident) or 13 excessive under the Due Process Clause. Consequently, this is not a cognizable claim for relief. 14 5. Claim Five 15 Plaintiff alleges that approximately four months later, in March 2024, while he was waiting 16 outside the jail’s medical clinic, Defendant Deputy Arnold forced him out of his wheelchair and 17 onto the ground to handcuff his wrists and ankles “for no reason.” While he was on the ground, 18 Arnold put his knee on Plaintiff’s back and pushed his head to the ground. When liberally 19 construed, these allegations state a cognizable claim for the use of excessive force by Deputy 20 Arnold. 21 6. Claim Six 22 Plaintiff claims Defendant Deputy Hewison retaliated against him on March 11, 2024. He 23 alleges Hewison told him that a court order required him to transport Plaintiff to court. Hewison 24 allegedly did not allow Plaintiff to see the order in its entirety. Plaintiff alleges he had seen 25 doctors who concluded he should remain in his cell due to his pain, but Hewison insisted and told 26 Plaintiff that if he did not comply, “we can handle it like we did last time.” Plaintiff complied and 27 was transported to court. retaliated against him. 1 elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 2 because of (3) that [inmate]’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 3 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 4 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 5 The Court is aware of not authority that Plaintiff had a First Amendment right to not 6 follow a court order to go to court. Consequently, the allegedly retaliatory conduct –- transporting 7 him to court pursuant to such an order and against the medical opinion of examining doctors –- 8 was not for Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, an essential element of a cognizable 9 First Amendment claim. Plaintiff does not state a cognizable retaliation claim. 10 CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, 11 1. With the exception of claim five, described above, the claims are DISMISSED with 12 leave to amend. 13 2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before August 13, 2024. The 14 amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (No. C 24- 15 3267 JSW (PR)) and the words “COURT-ORDERED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the 16 first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, see Ferdik 17 v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992), Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the 18 original by reference; he must include in his amended complaint all the claims he wishes to 19 pursue. Failure to amend within the designated time and in accordance with this order, including 20 curing the deficiencies in the claims described above, will result in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s 21 claims except claim five. 22 3. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 23 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 24 Change of Address.” She also must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion, although 25 she may request an extension of time provided it is accompanied by a showing of good cause and 26 it is filed on or before the deadline he wants to extend. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal 27 of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. a) 2 || Dated: July 15, 2024 fo | ) { 3 haus □□□□ HEEDEY HITE ‘ /Uniteld StateyDistrict Judge 5 7 8 9 10 11 a 12
© 15 16
it
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 2 If Defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. 3 A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if 4 granted, end your case. 5 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 6 Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-- 7 that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 8 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your 9 case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly 10 supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your 11 complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to 12 interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts 13 shown in Defendant's declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of 14 material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, 15 if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be 16 dismissed and there will be no trial. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27