Gordon v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 8, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-01618·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 KATARINA G., 8 Plaintiff, Case No. C23-1618 RSM 9 v. ORDER AFFIRMING AND 10 DISMISSING THE CASE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 11 Defendant. 12

13 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her applications for Supplemental Security Income 14 and Disability Insurance Benefits. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by rejecting her symptom 15 testimony and Dr. Knapp’s medical opinion. Dkt. 8. As discussed below, the Court AFFIRMS 16 the Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISSES the case with prejudice. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff is 27 years old, has a limited education, and has worked as a kitchen helper. 19 Admin. Record (AR) 26–27. In September 2020, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging 20 disability as of April 9, 2019. AR 64, 72, 81, 100. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially 21 and on reconsideration. AR 71, 79, 97, 116. The ALJ conducted a hearing in June 2022, where 22 Plaintiff’s mother testified on her behalf. AR 35–61. In July 2022, the ALJ issued a decision 23 finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 14–34. 1 DISCUSSION 2 The Court may reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is legally erroneous or not supported 3 by substantial evidence of record. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). The Court 4 must examine the record but cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the 5 ALJ’s. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When evidence is susceptible to 6 more than one interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s interpretation if rational. Ford, 7 950 F.3d at 1154. Also, the Court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error 8 that is harmless.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 9 1. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 10 Plaintiff’s mother testified that Plaintiff is no longer able to work because of her seizures,

11 anxiety, and fear of being around others. AR 42–47. She explained that even when Plaintiff was 12 working in isolation, she often needed time to calm herself for 10 to 15 minutes, and that these 13 issues continued even after she stopped working. AR 50–52. Plaintiff’s mother explained that 14 Plaintiff cannot function without assistance from others, and the only reason Plaintiff was able to 15 work was because she knew her sister was working in the same place. See AR 55. Plaintiff’s 16 mother also stated that her daughter’s mental health treatments have not been effective. AR 56. 17 Where, as here, an ALJ determines a claimant has presented objective medical evidence 18 establishing underlying impairments that could cause the symptoms alleged, and there is no 19 affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only discount the claimant’s testimony as to 20 symptom severity by providing “specific, clear, and convincing” reasons supported by

21 substantial evidence. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “The standard 22 isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that 23 it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). 1 In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s mother’s statements regarding the intensity and 2 limiting effects of her daughter’s impairment not entirely supported by her record. AR 24. The 3 ALJ noted Plaintiff’s conservative treatment, which included therapy and medication. Id. 4 “[E]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding 5 severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson 6 v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). The record shows Plaintiff reported to the 7 emergency department after her first seizure in September 2019. AR 449. An evaluation 8 revealed Plaintiff’s seizure was “not consistent with new or dormant seizure disorder,” but was 9 consistent with “pseudoseizures in the setting of increasing stress and anxiety and lack of mental 10 health resources,” so Plaintiff was provided resources for mental health services. See AR 452.

11 Plaintiff started therapy in November 2019, and she reported her panic attacks were triggered by 12 sounds from childhood and her anxiety caused by family, increased stress due to loss of her job, 13 and lack of financial security. AR 620–21, 625, 818, 825. Plaintiff again reported to the 14 emergency department in January 2020, where she also had a witnessed seizure. AR 539. Her 15 neurologic exam showed no deficits, and she was instructed to schedule an appointment for 16 further evaluation. Id. In June 2020, Plaintiff underwent a 48-hour electroencephalogram (EEG) 17 monitoring, which revealed evidence of epileptiform activity but no electrographic seizure. AR 18 555. Plaintiff’s therapy notes show that by June 2021, her anxiety and panic attacks were 19 resolving more quickly, and she had better mood and improved motivation. AR 827. Plaintiff 20 also denied having had a seizure since her appointment from the previous month. Id. Plaintiff’s

21 mental status examinations mirrored her reports, showing improvement in anxiety and mood 22 with medication, which Plaintiff expressed wanting to continue at her current dose. AR 828–29. 23 In July 2021, Plaintiff again reported doing better, partly due to her medications and use of her 1 coping skills. AR 833. She also discussed how her post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms 2 were less frequent. Id. Plaintiff was hospitalized again in November 2021 and underwent 3 another EEG monitoring. AR 842–43. Treatment notes from the following month show the 4 medication Plaintiff had been taking improved her EEG results, so Plaintiff was recommended to 5 continue taking them. See AR 843. Treatment notes also show Plaintiff had not had a seizure 6 since she was hospitalized the month prior. AR 844. The latest treatment notes from February 7 2022 similarly show Plaintiff “has had no more seizures.” AR 867. The ALJ also highlighted 8 Plaintiff’s therapy notes update from March 2022, which state that she does not have the inability 9 to live in an independent or family setting without supervision. AR 896. They also state 10 Plaintiff does not have a dysfunction in role performance and is therefore able to work, attend

11 school, or meet other developmentally appropriate responsibilities and does not require structures 12 or supervised work or school setting. See AR 55, 896. Overall, the evidence cited by the ALJ 13 undermine the testimony provided by Plaintiff’s mother regarding the severity of her daughter’s 14 symptoms, the ineffectiveness of her daughter’s mental health treatment, and her daughter’s 15 inability to function without the assistance of others. 16 Plaintiff argues the treatment notes show the severity of her seizures and frequency of her 17 anxiety attacks. Dkt. 8 at 4. But the majority of the records Plaintiff cite simply recite her 18 medical history or are from prior to her counseling or medication, which, as discussed, have 19 helped in decreasing her symptoms. See, e.g. AR 449 (treatment note from her emergency 20 department visit in September 2019), 474 (same), 478 (same), 517 (same), 521 (same). Plaintiff

21 also argues the overall record “does not express any real improvement in her condition,” 22 especially with regard to her panic attacks. Dkt. 8 at 4.

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