GORDON C. ANDREWS v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF HALIFAX & Others (And Two Consolidated Cases).

Massachusetts Appeals Court·Decided August 1, 2024·No. 23-P-0120·Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-120

GORDON C. ANDREWS

vs.

ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF HALIFAX & others1 (and two consolidated cases2).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

These consolidated cases concern a proposed twelve-unit,

multifamily project in the town of Halifax, known as Amanda's

Estates. A judge of the Land Court concluded that the site plan

approval issued in 2014 required the trustees of the Party Trust

(developer) to formally subdivide the property, and the 2019

modified plan submitted by the developer did not comply with the

town's zoning bylaw (bylaw), which also required formal

subdivision of the site. Judgments entered directing revocation

of building permits issued by the town's building inspector in 2020, along with a certificate of occupancy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for the entry of orders directing the zoning board of appeals (board) to reinstate the 2020 building permits and the certificate of occupancy.

Background. 1. The site and the bylaw. The site is in the town's agricultural-residential (AR) zoning district and contains 12.5 acres. The developer proposes to construct twelve units of multifamily housing, which are allowed by special permit in the AR district. The units will be accessed from Elm Street, a public way, by Amanda's Way, a private way or driveway shown on the plan as terminating in a large cul-de-sac. At the heart of this controversy are several pivotal provisions of the bylaw applicable to multifamily developments. We set them out in detail.

The definition section of the bylaw defines a "multifamily dwelling" as "[a] building intended and designed to be occupied by more than one (1) family, living independently in separate units." It defines "multifamily development" as a "development of three (3) or more dwelling units on a single lot of land under one (1) ownership of not less than ten (10) acres in size" (emphasis added). The bylaw defines "lot" as "[a] single area

of land in one (1) ownership defined by metes and bounds or boundary lines in a recorded deed or recorded plan" (emphasis added).3 After listing "multifamily dwellings" as a use allowed in the AR district by special permit in its schedule of use regulations, § 167-7(D)(2) of the bylaw more specifically provides that "multifamily developments" are also allowed by special permit from the board in the town's AR district. Section 167-12(A) of the bylaw provides density restrictions for multifamily developments, including that "[t]he number of units in a multifamily development shall not exceed the number of acres in the parcel on which they are to be built," and that "[t]he minimum parcel size shall be ten (10) acres" -- the same as provided in the definition of "multifamily development." In addition, minimum front and rear setbacks are set at seventyfive feet and one hundred feet, respectively, and "there shall be at least one hundred (100) feet between any two (2) buildings."4 There is no express frontage requirement. Section

167-12(A)(7)(c), however, requires "adequate space" in front of each building, for fire apparatus to approach.

To summarize, by definition "a multifamily development"

must be three or more units; on a "single lot of land" of at least ten acres and described in a recorded deed or recorded plan; the number of units may not exceed the number of acres of the parcel; and there must be one hundred feet between buildings.

To complicate matters, the term "multifamily development complex" is introduced for the first time in § 167-7(D)(2)(a), which the judge and parties refer to as "[s]ubsection (a)." Subsection (a) provides that "any multifamily development complex proposed hereunder shall locate each building on an individual lot which shall have continuous frontage on a public or private way." The term "complex" is not defined in the bylaw and the few references in the bylaw to a "multifamily development complex" shed little light on its definition.

2. Procedural history. The procedural history is undisputed. The proposed project first received site plan approval from the town's planning board on September 18, 2014, and a special permit from the board in 2015, neither of which was appealed. Although the original plans showed one large lot and six duplex-buildings, at the request of the planning board,

the site plan was amended to show, with solid lines, each building on an individual lot (Lots A-F). However, there exists no recorded plan showing those lots. The board issued a special permit pursuant to a revised site plan that moved the sidewalk along Amanda's Way away from the Andrews property, but still showed Lots A-F.

After considerable site work including construction of Amanda's Way had been accomplished in reliance on the site plan approval and special permit, the building inspector granted four building permits for two duplexes in May 2017. The plaintiff, abutter Gordon C. Andrews, appealed to the board from the grant of the building permits, arguing that Lots A-F were not legal lots because they were not shown on a plan recorded in the registry of deeds and that the lot had to be formally subdivided. Andrews also requested that the building inspector enforce the zoning bylaw which, he asserted, required legal lots. The building inspector upheld the building permits and denied Andrews's enforcement request, and the board affirmed both decisions. Thereafter, Andrews commenced an action in the Land Court against the board and the building inspector, seeking review of those decisions (action 17 MISC 000507). The developer was allowed to intervene. Without waiting for the

results of that appeal, the developer proceeded to construct four units (two duplexes).

The judge remanded to the board for consideration of two issues, (1) whether the 2014 site plan and 2015 special permit required the developer to locate each proposed building on a "separate lot" and (2) whether the project meets the bylaw's definition of a "multifamily development." The board's decision after remand concluded that the proposed project meets the definition of a "multifamily development;" that neither the bylaw, the site plan approval, nor the special permit require that the property be formally subdivided into individual lots; and that the individual-lot requirement contained in the bylaw is only to demonstrate that the project does not exceed the number of dwellings allowed.

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GORDON C. ANDREWS v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF HALIFAX & Others (And Two Consolidated Cases)., (Mass. Ct. App. 2024).

GORDON C. ANDREWS v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF HALIFAX & Others (And Two Consolidated Cases). (GORDON C. ANDREWS v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF HALIFAX & Others (And Two Consolidated Cases).) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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