Gookin v. United States

707 F. Supp. 1156, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 304, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15906, 1988 WL 150602
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedNovember 10, 1988
DocketC-85-9420-DLJ
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 707 F. Supp. 1156 (Gookin v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gookin v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 1156, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 304, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15906, 1988 WL 150602 (N.D. Cal. 1988).

Opinion

ORDER

JENSEN, District Judge.

On November 9, 1988, this Court considered defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the papers. Defendant is represented by David Denier. Plaintiff is appearing pro se. For the following reasons, this Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

*1157 I. BACKGROUND FACTS

In his first amended complaint, plaintiff sought monetary damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and the refund of a $500.00 civil penalty imposed on plaintiff, under 26 U.S.C. § 6682, for claiming excessive withholding allowances on his Form W-4.

On February 17,1987, this Court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing the Bivens action against defendant. Defendant now seeks summary judgment on plaintiffs remaining claim for a refund of the penalty. The events leading up to the assessment of this penalty are as follows.

In February 1979, plaintiff obtained a charter agreement from the Universal Life Church (ULC) for the Omnipresent Church of Life (ULC Charter). During all times relevant to this case, the ULC Charter was located at plaintiff’s residence.

In March 1979, plaintiff opened a checking and savings account at Crocker National Bank in the name of the ULC Charter church. Plaintiff also maintained a personal checking account at the bank.

During 1979, 1980, and 1981, plaintiff withdrew funds from his personal account, deposited the funds into the ULC Charter account, and claimed charitable contributions to the ULC on his federal tax returns for the years in the amounts of $7,250.00, $7,150.00, and $9,350.00, respectively.

In 1979, funds from the Charter account in the amount of $6,592.17 were paid directly to plaintiff and used by him to pay for his rent, utilities, food, and clothing for persons living with him.

In 1980 and 1981, funds from the Charter account in the amount of $4,413.71 and $1,962.42, respectively, were paid directly to plaintiff and used by him to pay for rent, utilities, and gym dues.

Starting in May or June 1983, plaintiff sent money to the ULC Charter through the ULC Receipts and Disbursement Program (the Program). Plaintiff received interest on money deposited with the Program, periodic statements, and disbursement checks whenever he requested money.

With the exception of rent, the funds deposited by plaintiff in the Program were used to pay the same expenses as the funds in the ULC Charter account in 1979, 1980, and 1981. Specifically, utilities, mileage, food, gym dues, and clothing for persons living with plaintiff.

When plaintiff first became involved with the ULC, he knew that the IRS questioned claimed deductions for contributions to ULC congregations in 1981 and 1982. An IRS appeals officer provided plaintiff with case law explaining why his ULC contributions were not deductible. In Gookin v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1985-502 the Tax Court upheld the IRS’ disallowance of plaintiff’s claimed deductions for 1979, 1980, and 1981.

In September 1983, plaintiff submitted a Form W-4 to his employer, the State of California, in which he claimed 23 withholding exemptions. Plaintiff was employed full time by the State as an engineer. The claimed 23 exemptions were based in part on ULC contributions that plaintiff intended to claim, and did claim, as a charitable deduction on his 1983 federal income tax return.

II. DISCUSSION

Both parties agree that two issues are presented by defendant’s motion for summary judgment. First, whether the Form W-4 submitted by plaintiff to his employer, in 1983, resulted in a lesser amount of income tax actually deducted and withheld than was properly allowable. Second, whether there was a reasonable basis for plaintiff to claim 23 withholding allowances on his Form W-4.

A. Amount of Income Tax Deducted and Withheld

As a result of the Form W-4 submitted by plaintiff to his employer in 1983, $1,575.90 was actually deducted and withheld from plaintiff’s paychecks in the 1983 tax year. However, plaintiff’s actual federal income tax liability for 1983, after *1158 disallowance of $6,350.00 in claimed contributions to the ULC, was $1,750.00. Plaintiff claimed 23 withholding allowances when he was only entitled to 14.

Plaintiff does not contest the fact that claimed contributions to the ULC resulted in a lesser amount of income tax withheld than was properly allowable. Instead, plaintiff contends that the amount of the underpayment was insignificant and that section 6682 was therefore invoked only to penalize him because of his religious association.

This Court is not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument for two reasons. First, section 6682(a)(1) requires only that the Form W-4 submitted by plaintiff result in a lesser amount of income tax actually deducted and withheld than was properly allowable. 26 U.S.C. § 6682(a)(1). Second, plaintiff offers no support for his claim that the IRS invoked section 6682 only to penalize him for his religious association.

B. Reasonable Basis for Claiming Withholding Allowance

Under 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1), a deduction is allowed for charitable contributions made within the taxable year. In pertinent part, section 170(c) defines a charitable contribution as:

... a contribution or gift to or for the use of—
(2) a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation—
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes ...
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual

26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(BMC).

In the statutory tax sense, a gift must proceed from a detached and disinterested generosity or out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1196-97, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960). When a gift is given with the expectation of “certain specified direct economic benefits within the power of the recipient to bestow directly or indirectly, which might not otherwise be forthcoming,” the gift will not be exempt from taxation. Collman v. Commissioner,

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707 F. Supp. 1156, 63 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 304, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15906, 1988 WL 150602, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gookin-v-united-states-cand-1988.