NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff, No. C 20-06754 WHA
v.
SONOS, INC., OMNIBUS ORDER RE MOTIONS TO SEAL Defendant.
This order addresses pending motions to seal filed in connection with the patent showdown procedure, including Sonos’s claim construction brief (Dkt. No. 203), Sonos’s patent showdown motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 209, 247–48, 273), Sonos’s accompanying motion to strike (Dkt. Nos. 220, 253, 265), Google’s patent showdown motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 210, 221, 252, 276–77), related submissions by both parties (Dkt. Nos. 296, 313, 321–22, 329), and responses to the Court’s order to show cause (Dkt. Nos. 346–48, 350). 1. THE LEGAL STANDARD. There is a strong public policy in favor of openness in our court system and the public is entitled to know to whom we are providing relief (or not). See Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, access to motions and their attachments that are “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case” may be sealed only LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2016). But a good cause standard applies to the sealing of documents that are unrelated or only tangentially related to the underlying claim. Id. at 1098–99. “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, sealing motions filed in this district must contain a specific statement that explains: (1) the legitimate private or public interests that warrant sealing; (2) the injury that will result should sealing be denied; and (3) why a less restrictive alternative to sealing is not sufficient. The material requested to be sealed must be “narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c). For example, “[t]he publication of materials that could result in infringement upon trade secrets has long been considered a factor that would overcome [the] strong presumption” in favor of access and provide compelling reasons for sealing. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). Compelling reasons may also warrant sealing for “sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing,” especially where the public has “minimal interest” in the information because it “is not necessary to the public’s understanding of the case.” See Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Finally, “[s]upporting declarations may not rely on vague boilerplate language or nebulous assertions of potential harm but must explain with particularity why any document or portion thereof remains sealable under the applicable legal standard.” Bronson v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2019 WL 7810811, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2019) (citing Civ. L.R. 79-5). “Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(c). 2. SONOS’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF. Sonos, with Google’s support, filed conditionally under seal an exhibit to its claim construction brief containing Google’s responses to Sonos’s first set of interrogatories (Dkt. redactions (Dkt. Nos. 213–14). The redactions, however, are directed toward the term “videoID” and related information that was central to the merits in the Court’s order on summary judgment and claim construction (see Dkt. No. 316 at 8–9). Moreover, Google has merely offered generic, boilerplate explanations as to why public disclosure of this information would result in competitive harm. The public interest in understanding the merits of this case therefore outweighs Google’s asserted interested in confidentiality. The motion is DENIED. 3. SONOS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Both parties have filed motions to seal in connection with Sonos’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 209, 247–48, 273). Upon review, this order rules as follows: Dkt. Document to be Result Reasoning No. Sealed 209-2 Sonos’s Motion for DENIED. Google seeks to seal general, technical Summary information regarding its systems (Dkt. Judgment Nos. 215–16). Google’s support for sealing is insufficient because it is overbroad and nonspecific. Given the nature of the information at issue, Google does not describe with particularity how disclosure of this general information would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of Google’s products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” (Ma Decl. ¶ 5). Google further references source code, but there is none in the document. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). This information goes to the very heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Google’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 209-3 Almeroth Decl. GRANTED IN The request is GRANTED as to the DENIED IN 25, 143–44, and 158–59, which contain PART. source code. The request is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-2. 209-4 Exh. B to Smith DENIED. Google asks to seal redacted portions of Decl. its response to Sonos’s interrogatories on the grounds it contains confidential information regarding its systems. The response describes Google’s speaker group system in generic terms. Google does not adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause Google competitive harm. 209-5 Exh. D to Smith GRANTED. Google seeks to seal detailed, Decl. confidential information regarding Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm. 209-6 Exh. F to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-7 Exh. G to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-8 Exh. H to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. However, Decl. the exhibit should be resubmitted with Google’s proposed tailored redactions. See Dkt. No. 216-2. 209-9 Exh. I to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-10 Exh. L to Smith DENIED. Google asks to seal its responses to Decl. Sonos’s requests for admission on the grounds they contain confidential information regarding its systems. The request is overbroad. Moreover, Google’s responses describe Google’s speaker group system in generic terms. Google does not adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause Google competitive harm. 209-11 Exh. M to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-12 Exh. N to Smith DENIED. Google seeks seeks to seal this transcript Decl. on the grounds it contains confidential information regarding its systems and that it is subject to a protective order in a described the system in generic terms. Google does not adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause Google competitive harm. Moreover, the request is clearly overbroad. That the information is subject to a protective order alone is insufficient to warrant sealing. 209-13 Exh. O to Smi
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff, No. C 20-06754 WHA
v.
SONOS, INC., OMNIBUS ORDER RE MOTIONS TO SEAL Defendant.
This order addresses pending motions to seal filed in connection with the patent showdown procedure, including Sonos’s claim construction brief (Dkt. No. 203), Sonos’s patent showdown motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 209, 247–48, 273), Sonos’s accompanying motion to strike (Dkt. Nos. 220, 253, 265), Google’s patent showdown motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 210, 221, 252, 276–77), related submissions by both parties (Dkt. Nos. 296, 313, 321–22, 329), and responses to the Court’s order to show cause (Dkt. Nos. 346–48, 350). 1. THE LEGAL STANDARD. There is a strong public policy in favor of openness in our court system and the public is entitled to know to whom we are providing relief (or not). See Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, access to motions and their attachments that are “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case” may be sealed only LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2016). But a good cause standard applies to the sealing of documents that are unrelated or only tangentially related to the underlying claim. Id. at 1098–99. “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, sealing motions filed in this district must contain a specific statement that explains: (1) the legitimate private or public interests that warrant sealing; (2) the injury that will result should sealing be denied; and (3) why a less restrictive alternative to sealing is not sufficient. The material requested to be sealed must be “narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c). For example, “[t]he publication of materials that could result in infringement upon trade secrets has long been considered a factor that would overcome [the] strong presumption” in favor of access and provide compelling reasons for sealing. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). Compelling reasons may also warrant sealing for “sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing,” especially where the public has “minimal interest” in the information because it “is not necessary to the public’s understanding of the case.” See Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Finally, “[s]upporting declarations may not rely on vague boilerplate language or nebulous assertions of potential harm but must explain with particularity why any document or portion thereof remains sealable under the applicable legal standard.” Bronson v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2019 WL 7810811, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2019) (citing Civ. L.R. 79-5). “Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(c). 2. SONOS’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF. Sonos, with Google’s support, filed conditionally under seal an exhibit to its claim construction brief containing Google’s responses to Sonos’s first set of interrogatories (Dkt. redactions (Dkt. Nos. 213–14). The redactions, however, are directed toward the term “videoID” and related information that was central to the merits in the Court’s order on summary judgment and claim construction (see Dkt. No. 316 at 8–9). Moreover, Google has merely offered generic, boilerplate explanations as to why public disclosure of this information would result in competitive harm. The public interest in understanding the merits of this case therefore outweighs Google’s asserted interested in confidentiality. The motion is DENIED. 3. SONOS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Both parties have filed motions to seal in connection with Sonos’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 209, 247–48, 273). Upon review, this order rules as follows: Dkt. Document to be Result Reasoning No. Sealed 209-2 Sonos’s Motion for DENIED. Google seeks to seal general, technical Summary information regarding its systems (Dkt. Judgment Nos. 215–16). Google’s support for sealing is insufficient because it is overbroad and nonspecific. Given the nature of the information at issue, Google does not describe with particularity how disclosure of this general information would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of Google’s products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” (Ma Decl. ¶ 5). Google further references source code, but there is none in the document. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). This information goes to the very heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Google’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 209-3 Almeroth Decl. GRANTED IN The request is GRANTED as to the DENIED IN 25, 143–44, and 158–59, which contain PART. source code. The request is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-2. 209-4 Exh. B to Smith DENIED. Google asks to seal redacted portions of Decl. its response to Sonos’s interrogatories on the grounds it contains confidential information regarding its systems. The response describes Google’s speaker group system in generic terms. Google does not adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause Google competitive harm. 209-5 Exh. D to Smith GRANTED. Google seeks to seal detailed, Decl. confidential information regarding Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm. 209-6 Exh. F to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-7 Exh. G to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-8 Exh. H to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. However, Decl. the exhibit should be resubmitted with Google’s proposed tailored redactions. See Dkt. No. 216-2. 209-9 Exh. I to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-10 Exh. L to Smith DENIED. Google asks to seal its responses to Decl. Sonos’s requests for admission on the grounds they contain confidential information regarding its systems. The request is overbroad. Moreover, Google’s responses describe Google’s speaker group system in generic terms. Google does not adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause Google competitive harm. 209-11 Exh. M to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-12 Exh. N to Smith DENIED. Google seeks seeks to seal this transcript Decl. on the grounds it contains confidential information regarding its systems and that it is subject to a protective order in a described the system in generic terms. Google does not adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause Google competitive harm. Moreover, the request is clearly overbroad. That the information is subject to a protective order alone is insufficient to warrant sealing. 209-13 Exh. O to Smith DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-12. Decl. 209-14 Exh. P to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 209-15 Exh. Q to Smith GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 209-5. Decl. 247-3; Google’s GRANTED IN Google asks to seal portions of its 248-3 Opposition PART AND opposition brief. Google also asks to DENIED IN seal portions of its opposition on behalf PART. of Sonos, but Sonos clarified in a later filing that it “does not seek to redact or file under seal any portion of Google’s Opposition” (Dkt. No. 260 at ¶ 7). Google’s request is GRANTED as to Google’s discussion of its confidential presentation on pages 24–25, disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm.
The request is otherwise DENIED. Google seeks to seal general, technical information regarding its systems. Google’s support for sealing this additional material is insufficient because it is overbroad and nonspecific. Given the nature of the information at issue, Google does not describe with particularity how disclosure of this general information would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of Google’s products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” references source code, but there is none in the document. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). This information goes to the very heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Google’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 247-4 Schonfeld Decl. GRANTED IN The request is GRANTED as to the image PART AND of source code in paragraphs 36 and 40, DENIED IN disclosure of which may cause Google PART. competitive harm. The request is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 247-3.
247-5 Exh. 1 to Kaplan DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 247-3. Decl. 247-6; Exh. 4 to Kaplan GRANTED. Both parties seek to seal detailed, 248-5 Decl. confidential information regarding Google and Sonos systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google and Sonos competitive harm. 247-7 Exh. 5 to Kaplan GRANTED. Google seeks to seal detailed, Decl. confidential information regarding Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm. 247-8 Exh. 8 to Kaplan GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 247-7. Decl. 247-9 Exh. 9 to Kaplan GRANTED IN The request is GRANTED as to the image Decl. PART AND of source code on page 323, disclosure of DENIED IN which may cause Google competitive PART. harm. The request is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 247-3. 247-10 Exh. 10 to Kaplan GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 247-7. Decl. 248-4 Exh. 3 to Kaplan DENIED. Google filed a motion to seal this exhibit Decl. on behalf of Sonos, but Sonos clarified in its supporting declaration that it does not seek to seal this material (Dkt. Nos. 260– 61). 248-6 Exh. 7 to Kaplan DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 248-4. Decl. 273-1 Exh. R DENIED. Google’s support for sealing this additional material is insufficient because it is overbroad and nonspecific. Given the nature of the information at issue, Google does not describe with particularity how disclosure of this general information would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of Google’s products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” (Ma Decl. ¶ 5). Google further references source code, but there is none in the document. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). This information goes to the very heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Google’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 273-2 Exh. S DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 273-1. 273-4 Sonos’s Reply DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 273-1. 4. GOOGLE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Both parties have filed motions to seal in connection with Google’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 210, 221, 252, 276–77). Upon review, this order rules as follows:
Dkt. Document to be Result Reasoning No. Sealed 210-3 Exh. 1 DENIED Google asks to seal the entirety of its WITHOUT fifty-four page expert report (Hefazi PREJUDICE. Decl.). This is overbroad, particularly as swaths of the report go to the merits of Google’s motion and Google has merely offered a boilerplate justification for sealing. The request is denied without prejudice. Google may file a renewed submission with narrowly tailored redactions, but should bear in mind that a specific, compelling reasons for sealing is likely to be rejected. 210-4 Exh. 2 GRANTED. Google seeks to seal detailed, confidential information regarding Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm (Hefazi Decl. ¶ 4). 210-5 Exh. 3 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-6 Exh. 4 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-7 Exh. 5 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-8 Exh. 6 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-9 Exh. 8 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-10 Exh. 10 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-11 Exh. 11 DENIED. Google asks to seal a declaration from one of its engineers. This declaration was discussed in the Court’s order on summary judgment, so there is a strong interest in public disclosure. Moreover, the information revealed in the declaration relates to generic technical information from technology that is more than a decade old. Further, the declaration merely includes locations of source code and not source code itself. In light of the foregoing, Google’s boilerplate justification for sealing is not sufficient to warrant sealing. The request is denied. 210-12 Exh. 13 (Schonfeld GRANTED IN The request is GRANTED as to the image Decl.) PART AND of source code in paragraphs 28 and 29, DENIED IN disclosure of which may cause Google PART. competitive harm. The request is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-15. 210-13 Exh. 19 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-14 Exh. 20 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 210-4. 210-15 Google’s Motion GRANTED IN First, Google asks to seal a quote from a for Summary PART AND Sonos engineer on the first page of its Judgment DENIED IN motion. Google does not offer any PART. compelling justification for this request. The request is denied. Second, Google generally seeks to seal technical information regarding its systems (Hefazi Decl). The request is the “Cloud Queue API” on pages 14:10– 15:4, public disclosure of which could cause Google competitive harm.
The request is otherwise DENIED as to the remainder of the brief. Google’s support for sealing is insufficient because it is overbroad and nonspecific. Given the nature of the information at issue, Google does not describe with particularity how disclosure of this general information would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of Google’s products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” (Hefazi Decl. ¶ 4). Google further references source code, but there is none in the document other than that described above. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick).
Were the Court to seal this information, the motion would be virtually incomprehensible to the public. Moreover, much of the information was central to the Court’s order on summary judgment (Dkt. No. 316). In short, this information goes to the very heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Google’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 221-3 Google’s Corrected GRANTED IN See entry for Dkt. No. 210-15. Motion PART AND DENIED IN 252-2 Sonos’s Opposition DENIED. Google seeks to seal descriptions of technical information regarding its systems (Ma Decl.). Google’s support for sealing is insufficient because it is nature of the information at issue, Google does not describe with particularity how disclosure of this general information would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of Google’s products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” (Ma Decl. ¶ 5). Google further references source code, but there is none in the document. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable, particularly as much of the information relates to technology that is more than a decade old. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick).
Were the Court to seal this information, the motion would be virtually incomprehensible to the public. Moreover, much of the information was central to the Court’s order on summary judgment (Dkt. No. 316). In short, this information goes to the very heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Google’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 252-3 Exh. 1 to Boyea DENIED Google asks to seal significant swaths of Decl. (Schmidt WITHOUT Sonos’s expert report (Ma Decl.). The Decl.) PREJUDICE. request is overbroad, particularly as much of the report go to the merits of Google’s motion and Google has merely offered a boilerplate justification for sealing. The request is denied without prejudice. Google may file a renewed submission with narrowly tailored redactions, but should bear in mind that a renewed request that fails to offer specific, compelling reasons for sealing is likely to be rejected.
252-4 Exh. 2 to Boyea GRANTED. Google seeks to seal detailed, Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm (Ma Decl. ¶ 5). 252-5 Exh. 3 to Boyea GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-4. Decl. 252-6 Exh. 4 to Boyea GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-4. Decl. 252-7 Exh. 7 to Boyea GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-4. Decl. 252-8 Exh. 9 to Boyea DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. Decl. 252-9 Exh. 10 to Boyea GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-4. Decl. 252-10 Exh. 11 to Boyea DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. Decl. 252-11 Exh. 12 to Boyea DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. Decl. 252-12 Exh. 13 to Boyea DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. Decl. 252-13 Exh. 14 to Boyea DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. Decl. 252-14 Exh. 15 to Boyea DENIED. Sonos filed a motion to seal this exhibit Decl. on behalf of Google, but Google clarified in its supporting declaration that it does not seek to seal this material (Dkt. No. 262). 252-15 Exh. 16 to Boyea DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. Decl. 276-3 Google’s Reply DENIED. Google’s justifications for sealing portions of its reply do not warrant sealing for the same reasons described above with respect to its motion and Sonos’s opposition. See entry for Dkt. No. 252-2. 276-4; Exh. 1 to Hefazi DENIED. Sonos and Google both seek to redact 277-3 Decl. portions of Google’s expert declaration. The redactions sought to be sealed describe Sonos and Google’s systems in generic terms. Neither Sonos nor Google adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause either party competitive harm. The information is also central to the merits of Google’s motion. The public’s interest in disclosure therefore outweighs the 276-5 Exh. 2 to Hefazi GRANTED. Google seeks to seal detailed, Decl. confidential information regarding Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm (Hefazi Decl.). 276-6 Exh. 3 to Hefazi DENIED Google asks to seal a transcript Decl. WITHOUT describing its system in generic terms. PREJUDICE. Google’s boilerplate justification is not sufficient to warrant sealing. Google may file a renewed submission with narrowly tailored redactions, but should bear in mind that a renewed request that fails to offer specific, compelling reasons for sealing is likely to be rejected. 276-7 Exh. 4 to Hefazi DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 276-4. Decl. 276-8 Exh. 7 to Hefazi GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 276-5. Decl. 277-4 Exh. 6 to Hefazi GRANTED. Sonos seeks to seal detailed, confidential Decl. information regarding Google’s systems, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm (Richter Decl.). 277-5 Exh. 8 to Hefazi DENIED. Sonos does not seek to seal this Decl. information (Richter Decl.). 5. SONOS’S MOTION TO STRIKE. Both parties have filed motions to seal in connection with Sonos’s April 2022 motion to strike (Dkt. Nos. 220, 253, 265). Upon review, this order rules as follows: Dkt. Document to be Result Reasoning No. Sealed 220-2 Sonos’s Motion to GRANTED IN The motion is GRANTED as to the Strike PART. reference to source code and its file location on page 12, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm.
The motion is otherwise DENIED. The information Google seeks to seal is generic. Google fails to adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail merits of the Court’s order on the motion to strike (Dkt. No. 315). Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable, particularly as much of the information relates to technology that is more than a decade old. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). The public’s interest in disclosure therefore outweighs Google’s interest in sealing.
220-3 Exh. A to Caridis GRANTED. Google asks to seal redacted portions of Decl. its invalidity claim chart, public disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm (Dkt. No. 235–36). 253-2 Google’s GRANTED IN The motion is GRANTED as to the Opposition PART. screenshots of Google’s contentions on pages 5 and 16 and the discussion of Google’s source code and associated file locations on pages 19:6–20:2, public disclosure of which may cause Google harm.
The motion is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 220-2. 253-3 Exh. 2 GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 220-3. 253-4 Exh. 6 DENIED Google asks to seal “portions highlighted WITHOUT in green” of a 281-page document, the PREJUDICE. vast majority of which is evidently not highlighted. Google may file a renewed submission that identifies the exact locations of its proposed redactions. 253-5 Exh. 9 DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 220-2. 253-6 Hefazi Decl. in GRANTED. See entry for Dkt. No. 220-3. Support of Opposition 265-2 Sonos’s Reply GRANTED IN The motion is GRANTED as to the PART. discussion of Google’s source code and associated file locations on page 11, public disclosure of which may cause Google harm.
The motion is otherwise DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 220-2. 6. RELATED SUBMISSIONS. Google has filed motions to seal in connection with its notice of deposition testimony (Dkt. No. 296), its summary judgment presentation slides (Dkt. Nos. 321–22), and its motion to bifurcate (Dkt. No. 239). Sonos has filed a motion to seal in connection with its own summary judgment presentation slides (Dkt. No. 313). Upon review, this order rules as follows:
Dkt. Document to be Result Reasoning No. Sealed 296-2 Dep. Transcript GRANTED. Sonos asks to seal portions of a deposition of one its employees, public disclosure of which may cause Sonos harm (Dkt. Nos. 305–06). Moreover, the information sought to be sealed is only tangentially related to the merits. 313-2 Sonos Presentation GRANTED. Google asks to seal portions of the Slides presentation slides that Sonos used in its oral argument, disclosure of which may cause Google competitive harm (Dkt. No. 318). 321-3; Google GRANTED. Both parties ask to seal portions of 322-2 Presentation Slides presentation slides that Google used in its oral argument, disclosure of which may cause competitive harm to both parties (Dkt. Nos. 321, 331). 329-2 Motion to DENIED. Google filed a motion to seal portions of Bifurcate its brief and an exhibit on behalf of Sonos, but Sonos later filed a submission clarifying that it does not seek to seal that information (Dkt. No. 337). 329-3 Exh. 1 DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 329-2. // // 7. RESPONSES TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. Both parties filed motions to seal in connection with their responses to the Court’s order to show cause (Dkt. Nos. 346–47, 348, 350). Upon review, this order rules as follows: Dkt. Document to be Result Reasoning No. Sealed 346-2 Exh. 2 to Caridis DENIED. Sonos asks to seal an expert report on Decl. behalf of non-party Bose. Bose, however, did not file a supporting declaration as required by Local Rule 79- 5(f). The request is denied.
346-3 Exh. 3 to Caridis DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 346-2. Decl. 347-3; Exh. 6 (Part 1) DENIED. Google asks to seal general, technical 350-4 information regarding its systems (Kaplan Decl.). Google fails to adequately explain how disclosure of this high-level information could allow a third-party to understand its system in enough detail that it would cause it competitive harm. The information is also central to the merits of this case. Google cites no authority indicating why this high-level information is sealable, particularly as much of the information relates to technology that is more than a decade old. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). The public’s interest in disclosure therefore outweighs Google’s interest in sealing.
347-4; Exh. 6 (Part 2) GRANTED. Google asks to seal information related 350-5 to third-party license agreements, public disclosure of which may cause Google harm (Kaplan Decl.).
348-3 Exh. 4 to Caridis GRANTED. Sonos asks to seal confidential Decl. information regarding its systems, disclosure of which may cause Sonos harm (Richter Decl.). 350-2 Exh. 1 to Kaplan DENIED. Sonos seeks to seal general, technical Decl. information regarding its systems (Dkt. Nos. 356–37). Sonos’s support for sealing is insufficient because it is overbroad and nonspecific. Given the nature of the information at issue, Sonos does not describe with particularity how would cause it competitive harm. It merely provides the generic assertion that “public disclosure of such information may lead to competitive harm as Sonos’s competitors could use these details regarding the architecture and functionality of these products to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace with respect to their competing products” (Richter Decl. ¶ 7). The passages merely offer high-level descriptions of confidential information and/or references to variable names. Sonos cites no authority indicating why this high- level information is sealable. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2015 WL 5012679, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015) (Judge William H. Orrick). This information goes to the heart of this litigation, and the particularly strong public interest here outweighs Sonos’s interest in keeping the material sealed. 350-3 Exh. 3 to Kaplan DENIED Sonos asks to seal the entirety of a Decl. WITHOUT deposition transcript on the basis that it is PREJUDICE. subject to the Court’s protective order (Richter Decl. ¶ 8). That is not sufficient, on its own, to warrant sealing. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(c). Sonos may file a renewed submission with narrowly tailored redactions, but should bear in mind that a renewed request that fails to offer specific, compelling reasons for sealing is likely to be rejected. 350-4 Exh. 6 to (Part 1) GRANTED IN Sonos asks to seal portions of its expert Kaplan Decl. PART AND report (Dkt. No. 356). The request is DENIED IN DENIED as to paragraphs 192, 222, 223, PART. and 231, which convey high-level, generic information. Sonos’s boilerplate justification for sealing this information does not suffice. The motion is otherwise GRANTED as to Sonos’s remaining proposed redactions, public disclosure of which may cause Sonos harm (ibid.). I 350-5 Exh. 6 (Part 2) to DENIED. Sonos filed a submission indicating that Kaplan Decl. it does not seek to seal information in 2 this document (Dkt. No. 356). 350-6 | Exh. 9 to Kaplan See entry for Dkt. No. 350-5. 3 Decl. 350-7 Exh. 11 to Kaplan DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 350-5. 4 Decl. 5 350-8 Exh. 12 to Kaplan GRANTED. Sonos asks to seal specific technical Decl. information about its system, public 6 disclosure of which may cause Sonos harm (Richter Decl.). 7 350-9 Google’s Brief DENIED. See entry for Dkt. No. 350-2. 8 Showing Cause
The parties should please note that, in the future, at trial or otherwise, the sealing calculus
D may change with respect to any of the foregoing documents. With respect to motions to seal
B that this order denied without prejudice, revised requests may be submitted that justify sealing
4 any information that may still be confidential within FOURTEEN DAyYs. All other documents S 5 shall be refiled in full compliance with this order no later than MAY 30, 2023, at NOON.
16 & IT IS SO ORDERED. = 17
Z 18 19 Dated: February 22, 2023.
21 LLIAM ALSUP 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28