Goodwin v. Richardson

357 F. Supp. 540
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 22, 1973
DocketS72 C 13
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 357 F. Supp. 540 (Goodwin v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goodwin v. Richardson, 357 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Mo. 1973).

Opinion

357 F.Supp. 540 (1973)

Ola M. GOODWIN, Plaintiff,
v.
Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States Government, Defendant.

No. S72 C 13.

United States District Court, E. D. Missouri, Southeastern Division.

February 22, 1973.

*541 Frank Gillespie, Charleston, Mo., and Weber Gilmore, Sikeston, Mo., for plaintiff.

Daniel Bartlett, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Robert E. Grote, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

WANGELIN, District Judge.

This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 405(g), § 205(g) of the Social Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), for judicial review of the final decision of the defendant (hereinafter "the Secretary"). On October 10, 1968, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under §§ 416(i) and 423. This application was denied initially and on reconsideration. A second application for disability benefits was filed October 10, 1969, and denied December 3, 1969. A third application was filed June 12, 1970, and thereafter denied. Plaintiff requested reconsideration of this third application. On reconsideration this application was denied.

On July 21, 1971, pursuant to plaintiff's request a hearing was held. The hearing examiner denied plaintiff's application. The hearing examiner was upheld on administrative review by the Appeals Council on November 24, 1971, and the hearing examiner's decision became the final decision of the Secretary. (Tr. 7). The Appeals Council granted plaintiff additional time — until April 28, 1972 — in which to commence a civil action.

Plaintiff seeks by this action, filed April 17, 1972, a determination that she is entitled to disability benefits from and after May 1968. In his answer to plaintiff's complaint defendant alleged that the final decision is correct and supported by substantial evidence, and that plaintiff "has no claim upon which relief can be granted." Defendant, on September 26, 1972, moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On February 12, 1973, plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The action is before the Court upon these motions.

Judicial review of the Secretary's final decision is limited in scope in that the findings of the Secretary and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence upon the entire record. McCalip v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1972); Easttam v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 364 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1966); *542 Brasher v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1965).

Plaintiff is a female, born March 12, 1920. The application filed June 12, 1970, which is the subject of the instant final decision, states that she became disabled in May, 1968, due to diabetes and plaintiff maintains that she remains disabled. When plaintiff appeared before the hearing examiner she was unmarried, had been living with her ninety-year-old mother, and had been formally educated up to and including the seventh grade. She prosecuted her application through the administrative proceedings without aid of counsel.

When plaintiff filed the instant application for a determination of disability and disability benefits it became her burden to prove her entitlement. This burden does not shift. Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1972). In logical progression the elements of plaintiff's claim which she had to prove were that she "is under a disability", 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D), in that

(1) a disability is "any medically determinable physical or mental impairment," § 423(d)(1)(A),
(a) resulting "from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423(d)(3); and
(b) "which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months" § 423(d)(1)(A); and
(2) the "physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [plaintiff] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which [plaintiff] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or whether [she] would be hired if [she] applied for work," § 423(d)(2) (A).

Defendant found that plaintiff is suffering from diabetes mellitus and has been for many years. (Tr. 16). It clearly appears from the hearing examiner's discussion of the evidence that he considered plaintiff's diabetic condition to be an "impairment". (Tr. 16-17). He further found that "she has had many episodes of diabetic acidosis and hypoglycemic reactions." (Tr. 16). The record shows that plaintiff claimed other impairments, i. e. a diffuse goiter, a tumor excised from her left breast, right hip osteoarthropathy, peripheral neuropathy, and peripheral vascular insufficiency. However, the hearing examiner found them to be of insufficient severity to warrant a disability determination.

Regarding the effects of the diabetes mellitus, the examiner stated:

. . . Her diabetes has been characterized as being of the "brittle" type. It is noted that many of the episodes of acidosis and hypoglycemic reactions in the past requiring hospitalization were caused by claimant's failure to follow dietary instructions and other therapeutic measures suggested by her treating physician and, following a brief stay in the hospital, her diabetes was again under good control at the time of discharge. Claimant has worked for many years with her diabetic impairment.
* * * * * *
. . . It is concluded that the residual impairment of function caused by the impairments may preclude claimant from engaging in tasks requiring arduous physical effort but it is, nevertheless, clearly established by the medical findings and demonstrated residual capacity to engage in less strenuous activities with appreciable regularity that her physical and mental abilities have not been so severely impaired as to have rendered it impossible *543 for her to do any type of substantial gainful work.
The weight of the medical evidence clearly establishes that claimant retains the physical and mental capacity to engage in sedentary or light physical activity. Her past work experience includes such jobs as a stitching machine operator in the boot and shoe industry and Interviewer and Aide with the Office of Economic Opportunity.

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Related

Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
634 F. Supp. 967 (D. Massachusetts, 1984)
Lawrence v. Califano
470 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Missouri, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
357 F. Supp. 540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goodwin-v-richardson-moed-1973.