F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 4 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
GREGORY S. GOODWIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 96-1096 v. (District of Colorado) (D.C. No. 94-D-1869) M.C.I. COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and MILES-LaGRANGE, District Judge. **
Defendant MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI) appeals the trial court’s
ruling in favor of plaintiff Gregory S. Goodwin on his employment discrimination
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange, District Judge for the Western District **
of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. claim, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
FACTS
Goodwin, an African-American, was employed by MCI from 1990 to 1994.
Goodwin began working for MCI in Pentagon City, Virginia, as a temporary
employee in the position of call analyst. In 1992, Goodwin became permanently
employed by MCI as a staff administrator in MCI’s Client Services Group, and in
1993, Goodwin was promoted to the position of supervisor. During 1993, MCI
was transferring its Client Services Group operation to Colorado Springs,
Colorado, from Pentagon City. Goodwin was offered a transfer to Colorado
Springs, which he accepted.
Goodwin permanently relocated to Colorado Springs in late 1993. As a
supervisor in Colorado Springs, Goodwin’s duties including supervising call
analysts and interviewing, hiring, and training temporary employees for the
position of call analyst. In early 1994, Goodwin was terminated. MCI’s records
indicate that at the time of his termination, Goodwin was informed he was being
discharged because he had engaged in conduct that was unethical and
nonconducive to the work environment by dating a temporary employee, seeking
to date another temporary employee, and falsifying a time card for one of these
employees.
-2- Goodwin brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that MCI’s termination of his employment was
racially motivated. MCI responded that Goodwin was terminated for legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. MCI asserted it had reasonable grounds to believe
that Goodwin had sexually harassed female employees and had authorized the
signing of a falsified time card. At the bench trial, MCI introduced evidence that
Goodwin dated one temporary employee, Lori Briggs, and that this relationship
created disruption in the workplace. MCI also introduced evidence that Goodwin
sexually harassed a second temporary employee, Jeannie Segui, by repeatedly
asking her out on what she perceived to be dates and by making other improper
comments.
The trial court found that Goodwin’s relationship with Ms. Briggs had
caused disruption in the workplace, and that Goodwin had sexually harassed Ms.
Segui by making unwanted overtures over a period of months, creating a hostile
working environment. The trial court further found, however, that under MCI’s
employment policies and procedures, Goodwin’s conduct did not warrant
automatic termination but only progressive discipline, as was employed by MCI
with respect to nonminority employees who committed similar infractions. The
trial court also found that Bill Weiland, a director at MCI during the relevant
period, was the primary decision maker in the decision to terminate Goodwin and
-3- that Weiland bore racial animus toward African-Americans. The trial court found
that this racial animus was “a factor in [Weiland’s] decision to terminate Mr.
Goodwin.” Based on these findings, the trial court determined that MCI had
terminated Goodwin on the basis of race in violation of Title VII and that the
nondiscriminatory “reasons asserted by MCI are merely pretextual to cover up the
racial animus that Mr. W[ei]land directed towards Mr. Goodwin.” The trial court
awarded Goodwin back pay, emotional distress damages, and attorney fees, and
ordered Goodwin’s reinstatement to the position of call analyst or some other
equivalent position. MCI appeals.
ANALYSIS
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
“discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). In race discrimination cases, this circuit follows the burden-
shifting format set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). See Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1995). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. See 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima face case of
discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must show that he is a member of a
protected class, that he was discharged for violating a work rule, and that
-4- similarly situated nonminority employees were treated differently. See EEOC v.
Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1992).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”
for the employee’s termination. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. Upon such a
showing, the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie case
“simply drops out of the picture,” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
510-11 (1993), and the plaintiff “assumes the normal burden of any plaintiff to
prove his or her case at trial,” Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1316. The plaintiff can carry
the burden of showing the defendant discriminated on the basis of race “‘either
directly by proving the employer acted with a discriminatory motive’” or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.
Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530 (quoting Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1316). “In the final
analysis, the court is required to weigh all the evidence and to assess the
credibility of witnesses in order to determine whether the plaintiff was the victim
of intentional discrimination based upon protected class characteristics.” Flasher,
986 F.2d at 1317.
In this case, because there was a full trial on the merits, the burden-shifting
McDonnell Douglas analysis has dropped out of consideration and “we are left
with the single overarching issue whether plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 4 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
GREGORY S. GOODWIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 96-1096 v. (District of Colorado) (D.C. No. 94-D-1869) M.C.I. COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and MILES-LaGRANGE, District Judge. **
Defendant MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI) appeals the trial court’s
ruling in favor of plaintiff Gregory S. Goodwin on his employment discrimination
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange, District Judge for the Western District **
of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. claim, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
FACTS
Goodwin, an African-American, was employed by MCI from 1990 to 1994.
Goodwin began working for MCI in Pentagon City, Virginia, as a temporary
employee in the position of call analyst. In 1992, Goodwin became permanently
employed by MCI as a staff administrator in MCI’s Client Services Group, and in
1993, Goodwin was promoted to the position of supervisor. During 1993, MCI
was transferring its Client Services Group operation to Colorado Springs,
Colorado, from Pentagon City. Goodwin was offered a transfer to Colorado
Springs, which he accepted.
Goodwin permanently relocated to Colorado Springs in late 1993. As a
supervisor in Colorado Springs, Goodwin’s duties including supervising call
analysts and interviewing, hiring, and training temporary employees for the
position of call analyst. In early 1994, Goodwin was terminated. MCI’s records
indicate that at the time of his termination, Goodwin was informed he was being
discharged because he had engaged in conduct that was unethical and
nonconducive to the work environment by dating a temporary employee, seeking
to date another temporary employee, and falsifying a time card for one of these
employees.
-2- Goodwin brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that MCI’s termination of his employment was
racially motivated. MCI responded that Goodwin was terminated for legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. MCI asserted it had reasonable grounds to believe
that Goodwin had sexually harassed female employees and had authorized the
signing of a falsified time card. At the bench trial, MCI introduced evidence that
Goodwin dated one temporary employee, Lori Briggs, and that this relationship
created disruption in the workplace. MCI also introduced evidence that Goodwin
sexually harassed a second temporary employee, Jeannie Segui, by repeatedly
asking her out on what she perceived to be dates and by making other improper
comments.
The trial court found that Goodwin’s relationship with Ms. Briggs had
caused disruption in the workplace, and that Goodwin had sexually harassed Ms.
Segui by making unwanted overtures over a period of months, creating a hostile
working environment. The trial court further found, however, that under MCI’s
employment policies and procedures, Goodwin’s conduct did not warrant
automatic termination but only progressive discipline, as was employed by MCI
with respect to nonminority employees who committed similar infractions. The
trial court also found that Bill Weiland, a director at MCI during the relevant
period, was the primary decision maker in the decision to terminate Goodwin and
-3- that Weiland bore racial animus toward African-Americans. The trial court found
that this racial animus was “a factor in [Weiland’s] decision to terminate Mr.
Goodwin.” Based on these findings, the trial court determined that MCI had
terminated Goodwin on the basis of race in violation of Title VII and that the
nondiscriminatory “reasons asserted by MCI are merely pretextual to cover up the
racial animus that Mr. W[ei]land directed towards Mr. Goodwin.” The trial court
awarded Goodwin back pay, emotional distress damages, and attorney fees, and
ordered Goodwin’s reinstatement to the position of call analyst or some other
equivalent position. MCI appeals.
ANALYSIS
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
“discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). In race discrimination cases, this circuit follows the burden-
shifting format set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). See Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1995). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. See 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima face case of
discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must show that he is a member of a
protected class, that he was discharged for violating a work rule, and that
-4- similarly situated nonminority employees were treated differently. See EEOC v.
Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1992).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”
for the employee’s termination. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. Upon such a
showing, the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie case
“simply drops out of the picture,” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
510-11 (1993), and the plaintiff “assumes the normal burden of any plaintiff to
prove his or her case at trial,” Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1316. The plaintiff can carry
the burden of showing the defendant discriminated on the basis of race “‘either
directly by proving the employer acted with a discriminatory motive’” or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.
Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530 (quoting Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1316). “In the final
analysis, the court is required to weigh all the evidence and to assess the
credibility of witnesses in order to determine whether the plaintiff was the victim
of intentional discrimination based upon protected class characteristics.” Flasher,
986 F.2d at 1317.
In this case, because there was a full trial on the merits, the burden-shifting
McDonnell Douglas analysis has dropped out of consideration and “we are left
with the single overarching issue whether plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to
-5- warrant [the court’s] determination that adverse employment action was taken
against him on the basis of [race]." Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743,
744 (10th Cir. 1991). The ultimate determination of “whether there was
intentional discrimination against a protected class is considered a question of
fact for the district court to decide.” Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1317.
We review the trial court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard. See id. “Under this standard, we may uphold any determination falling
within a broad range of permissible conclusions. Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in
the record or if, after reviewing all the evidence, [this court] is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Elmore, 58 F.3d at
530-31 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
On appeal, MCI argues the trial court’s ultimate determination that
Goodwin’s discharge was racially motivated is clearly erroneous because the trial
court’s underlying findings are unsupported by the record. MCI specifically
challenges two of the trial court’s factual findings. First, MCI challenges the trial
court’s finding that the customary practice at MCI was to employ progressive
discipline except in extreme cases of improper conduct, such as in situations of
“fraud, theft, [or] use of weapons.”
-6- Our review of the record shows there is support for the trial court’s
progressive discipline finding. Several witnesses testified that although MCI’s
handbook stated that there was no such policy, there was in fact a mandatory
progressive discipline policy at MCI, which was followed except in cases of fraud
and theft. Witnesses further testified that Goodwin’s termination was inconsistent
with MCI’s progressive discipline policies and procedures.
MCI asserts, however, that this testimony was insufficient to support the
trial court’s progressive discipline finding because those witnesses testifying
about such a policy worked in the Virginia office and so could not testify about
the discipline policy at the Colorado Springs office where Goodwin was employed
at the time of his discharge. MCI further points to the testimony of several
witnesses who disputed that there was a mandatory discipline policy at MCI. In
addition, MCI notes there was testimony that, even if a progressive discipline
policy was employed in Virginia, things were different in Colorado Springs.
The trial court recognized the testimony concerning the issue of progressive
discipline was conflicting. Based, however, on the testimony of the witnesses
who described a progressive discipline policy employed at MCI in Virginia and
who claimed this policy was mandatory at MCI, the trial court was permitted to
infer that MCI had a company-wide policy of employing progressive discipline.
In fact, in its closing argument, MCI’s attorney recognized this was one possible
-7- inference of the testimony presented, although the attorney argued the trial court
should not accept this inference. The trial court’s finding was therefore not
clearly erroneous, and the trial court was permitted to rely on this finding in
making its ultimate determination of intentional discrimination. See Elmore, 58
F.3d at 531 (stating where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous); see also Flasher,
986 F.2d at 1320 (“[A] fact finder may, upon an appropriate record, infer that an
illegal discriminatory motive lies behind otherwise irrational business conduct
[i.e., conduct that cannot be explained on the basis of company policies] that
disadvantages a protected status employee.”).
MCI next challenges the trial court’s finding that progressive discipline had
been employed with respect to similarly situated nonminority employees who
were accused of, or commonly known to have engaged in, sexual harassment.
MCI argues there is “no evidence in the record from which any reasonable fact
finder could have concluded that the allegedly comparable employees cited by
Goodwin were in fact similarly situated.” We need not, however, decide whether
the trial evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding concerning
similarly situated employees because we conclude that, based on the trial court’s
remaining findings, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
court’s ultimate determination that Goodwin’s discharge was racially motivated.
-8- MCI has not challenged the remaining findings underlying the trial court’s
ultimate determination of racial discrimination. Primary among these findings are
those concerning Mr. Weiland, including that Weiland was the primary decision
maker in the termination decision, that he bore racial animus toward African-
Americans, and that he exhibited such racial animus in Goodwin’s termination.
Mr. Weiland testified that he was not the sole decision maker, but that
Gordon Gray, a vice president at MCI, and Susan Geller, the senior manager over
Goodwin, also participated in the decision. Weiland further testified that in
making the decision, they relied on reports and recommendations from MCI’s
Human Resources department and from Nancy Casados, a Human Resources
representative. Weiland also testified that the decision to terminate Goodwin was
not racially motivated but was based on Goodwin’s alleged sexual harassment of a
subordinate and other disruptive conduct in the workplace.
The testimony of other witnesses, however, conflicted with Weiland’s
testimony. The trial court’s findings concerning Weiland, as well as the court’s
ultimate determination that “the reasons asserted by MCI [for Goodwin’s
discharge] are merely pretextual to cover up the racial animus that Mr. W[ei]land
directed towards Mr. Goodwin,” indicate that the court found Weiland’s
testimony not to be credible and chose instead to credit the testimony of other
witnesses. In reviewing the trial court’s findings, as well as its ultimate
-9- determination of discrimination, we give deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985). The trial court’s apparent disbelief of
Weiland’s account of Goodwin’s discharge is significant. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “The fact finder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity)
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; see also Randle v. City of
Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451-52 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating plaintiff may satisfy burden
of persuading the court he was the victim of intentional discrimination by
showing employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence).
The trial court’s findings concerning Weiland are supported by the record.
The trial court could infer from evidence presented at trial that Weiland was the
primary decision maker, and that in making the decision to discharge Goodwin,
Weiland had followed a decision process contrary to usual practice. Gordon Gray
testified the decision to terminate Goodwin was a “joint decision” made by
Weiland and himself, but he also testified that he relied on Weiland and on
Casados’ report to provide him with the facts of Goodwin’s situation. Gray also
testified, however, that he did not participate in, or supervise, the investigation
-10- made by Nancy Casados, and that neither the Human Resources department nor
Casados made any recommendations of the appropriate disciplinary action to take.
There was also testimony that Ken Lincoln and Susan Geller, the manager
and senior manager directly over Goodwin, would normally have been included in
the decision-making process, but that contrary to this usual practice they were
largely excluded by Weiland from participating in the decision. In addition,
witnesses testified that both Geller and Lincoln had stated they believed Goodwin
should not have been fired, and that Geller had indicated that “once it went to Bill
[Weiland], . . . it got out of control.”
There was also substantial evidence of Weiland’s racial animus toward
Goodwin and toward African-Americans in general. A number of witnesses
testified Weiland had on several occasions exhibited racial animus toward
African-Americans. Several witnesses testified in particular of certain comments
made by Weiland during a management meeting held in part to discuss concerns
over the terminations of Goodwin and another African-American employee which
took place within a short time frame in the Colorado Springs office. These
comments included a statement by Weiland that if he were in a room full of black
men, he would be “uncomfortable” or “scared,” and a comment that he was
“disgusted” by Goodwin’s relationship with an employee who was white. These
statements, made by the primary decision maker and in the context of discussing
-11- Goodwin’s termination, support an inference that Weiland was motivated by
discriminatory intent in terminating Goodwin. Cf. Cone v. Longmont United
Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating isolated comments,
unrelated to the challenged action and made by non-decision makers, are
insufficient to show discriminatory animus in termination decisions); Rea v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the trial court’s ultimate
determination that Goodwin’s discharge was racially motivated is not clearly
erroneous. 1 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
1 MCI also argues that, given the trial court’s finding that Goodwin sexually harassed one employee, the trial court’s judgment in Goodwin’s favor is contrary to the public policy underlying Title VII’s strict prohibition on workplace sexual harassment. MCI argues this public policy requires that employers be free to discharge, rather than merely discipline, employees who sexually harass. We do not address this argument, however, as the trial court found that Goodwin was discharged because of racial discrimination, not because of sexual harassment.
-12-