Goodwin v. Bode

189 N.W. 130, 177 Wis. 275, 1922 Wisc. LEXIS 297
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedMay 9, 1922
StatusPublished

This text of 189 N.W. 130 (Goodwin v. Bode) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goodwin v. Bode, 189 N.W. 130, 177 Wis. 275, 1922 Wisc. LEXIS 297 (Wis. 1922).

Opinion

Jones, J.

It is very clear that by the transactions detailed in the statement of facts Mrs. Bode lost $25,000, and if the trial judge had seen his way clear to afford relief in a legal manner and without injustice to creditors and stockholders he doubtless would have availed himself of the opportunity, and that is our attitude, but clearly there are very serious obstacles in the way.

The first claim to be considered is that for $25,000* against the Art Company. During all the transactions of the Art Company and Lithographing Company under consideration up to the commencement of the proceedings for winding up the Lithographing Company, Alfred von Cotz-hausen, son-in-law of Mrs. Bode, seems to have largely dominated the "affairs of the two companies. He was made her trustee in an agreement dated February 3, 1906, substantially as follows: It was recited that Mrs. Bode was the holder of notes to the amount of $25,000 executed by the Michigan Company and indorsed by the Art Company; that they had not been paid at maturity; that Mrs. Bode had accepted 250 shares of stock of the Michigan Company in full satisfaction and discharge of the debt created by the notes; that the said shares of stock had been transferred to Alfred von Cotzhausen in trust for Mrs. Bode; that it was agreed that Mrs. Bode consented to accept said shares in full satisfaction and discharge of the Michigan Company as maker and the Art Company as indorser, and in consideration thereof the Art Company agreed to pay her interest at six per cent, per annum, quarterly, upon $25,000, the face value of said shares of stock, until the stock should be [283]*283disposed of as thereinafter stated. It was agreed that all dividends should be paid to the Art Company; and the Art Company further agreed to purchase within twelve months after notice or demand given by said trustee all or any of the shares held in trust, and to pay full value, and in the event of failing to pay within twelve months after such notice or demand, the trustee might, without further demand or any tender bf the certificates, commence an action to recover of the Art Company, or might, without further notice, at public or private sale, dispose of said shares, and if the proceeds should be insufficient to pay the face value the Art Company would pay the deficiency. There was an addition to this agreement which for the purposes of this case need not be stated.

The language of this contract is perfectly clear that she then accepted 250 shares of the Michigan Company stock, to be held by von Cotzhausen as trustee, in satisfaction of the notes she held and of her claim against the Art Company as indorser. In consideration of such release she accepted the promise of the Art Company, not that it would pay the principal of the notes, but interest on the sum of $25,000, the face value of the shares, of stock taken in exchange.

Although this agreement is criticised by appellant’s counsel, he admits its validity and that the liability of the Art Company as indorser was discharged. There is no claim that it was obtained by fraud, and there seems no reason to believe that it was not entered into in good faith. Appellant’s counsel claims, however, that although the liability as indorser then ceased, the indebtedness of the Art Company continued, and that this was. admitted by the payment of interest for a period of seven year's. Such payment of interest might well be regarded as an admission of liability for the principal, except that the obligation of the parties was plainly expressed by the written agreement. By that agreement she plainly released her demand against the [284]*284Michigan Company as maker and the Art Company as in-dorser and accepted instead the certificates of stock of the Michigan Company to be left in charge of her trustee. There still remained certain obligations of the Art Company, contingent, however, on certain notices to be given by the trustee as prescribed in the agreement. No such notice was ever given.

It is argued by appellant’s, counsel that Alfred von Cotz-hausen, being the dominating head of the Art Company, was not a proper person to act as trustee, and that Mrs. Bode was not chargeable with his default. During the nine years which intervened between the execution of the agreement and the beginning of this action, von Cotzhausen continued to act as trustee, and through him Mrs. Bode held the stock of the Michigan Company. If she had been dissatisfied with his conduct of affairs she was at liberty to apply to the court for the appointment of another trustee. Meanwhile the rights, of other persons, creditors of the Art Company, had intervened, and we agree with the trial court that she was estopped from asserting her claim as, against them.

Counsel for respondents argue that the agreement of February, 1906, was void under sub. 3, sec. 1775, Stats., since it was established that no such consent of stockholders of each corporation as the statute requires was ever given. It is also argued that if Mrs. Bode had any claim against the Art Company it was barred by her failure to file and present it in the receivership action for winding- up the affairs of the Art Company. Since, we place our decision on another ground, it is unnecessary to consider these claims.

Since we hold that no cause of action in favor of Mrs. Bode had accrued or existed when her claim was filed, it becomes unnecessary to discuss at length another claim, which is that the Lithographing Company became a debtor of Mrs. Bode when the company bought and took over the [285]*285assets of the Art Company. It is argued that since the latter company turned over all its assets to the former company and remained a “mere shell,” there was a merger of the two companies and that the Lithographing Company assumed all the • liabilities of the other. The evidence is undisputed that there was no express agreement for any such assumption of liability. It is part of the history of this long litigation that on November 5, 1918, an interlocutory decree was made in the circuit court in which it was adjudged that Alfred von Cotzhausen had committed gross frauds upon the Lithographing Company and, among other things, had caused to be transferred to it the assets of the Art Company, and had caused the Lithographing Company to pay. therefor a grossly excessive price. It is res adjudicata as determined in the interlocutory decree, affirmed by this court, that the sale was not void as to creditors of the Art Company. The fraud practiced by Alfred von Cotzhausen was upon the Lithographing Company, and lay reason of the excessive price paid the assets of the Art Company were increased while those of the Lithographing Company were diminished to the detriment of its stockholders and creditors. In a finding by the referee it was determined:

“That the status quo ante as to the transactions between the American Fine Art Company and the Milwaukee Lithographing Company cannot be restored; that the latter company should keep what it obtained from the former company. That the loss and damage to be allowed to this latter company should be as in these findings otherwise provided.”

This finding was sustained by the trial court. The effect was an adjudication that the transaction between the Art Company and the Lithographing Company should stand according to its terms. Although Mrs. Bode was made a party defendant and had the right to litigate any demand she might have against the Lithographing Company aris[286]

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Bluebook (online)
189 N.W. 130, 177 Wis. 275, 1922 Wisc. LEXIS 297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goodwin-v-bode-wis-1922.