Goodrich v. Norman

100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2409
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedSeptember 25, 1979
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 100 Misc. 2d 33 (Goodrich v. Norman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2409 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1979).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Edith Miller, J.

The three issues before this court are (1) Does a petitioner father have the right to institute a paternity proceeding when he is not certain that he is the father; (2) Does the petitioner father have a right to a court order for the Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) test in addition to the standard ABO blood grouping test; and (3) Are the results of the HLA test admissible as evidence when the test does not exclude paternity. The history of the case is as follows.

On March 27, 1978 the Commissioner of Social Services filed a neglect petition in the Family Court in respect to a child born on October 31, 1976. Alice Norman, the mother of the child, was named as the respondent. Although the petition alleged that John Goodrich was the father of the child, Mr. Goodrich was not named as a' respondent. However, as a putative father he was given notice of the proceeding and was present in the courtroom. On May 25, 1978, after a fact-finding hearing, the court sustained the petition and ordered an investigation and report. At the dispositional hearing held on July 28, 1978, the court found that the emotional problems of the mother made it unlikely that she would be able to care for the child in the near future. Therefore, in the best interests of the child, the child was placed in foster care for a period of 18 months.

On November 27, 1978, John Goodrich filed a paternity petition in the Family Court. On December 19, 1978, the return date, the petitioner informed the court that he did not know whether or not he was the father of the child. Mr. Goodrich requested a hearing so that the paternity of the child could be adjudicated. However, the court dismissed the petition without prejudice on the ground that his statements [35]*35of uncertainty were inconsistent with his sworn statements contained in the petition alleging that he was the father of the child. The petitioner had appeared without counsel and was urged to consult an attorney concerning the very complex issues that are involved in a paternity proceeding.

On February 15, 1979, the petitioner through counsel filed a notice of motion for rehearing and the motion was granted. When the matter was brought before the court on June 25, the court appointed counsel to represent the respondent mother. Although the mother was not hospitalized, the court wanted to be certain that she understood the nature of the proceeding. An application was made by the Law Guardian who had represented the child in the neglect proceeding to be appointed to represent the child in the paternity proceeding. Ordinarily a child is not represented by counsel in this proceeding as a child is not deemed to be a necessary party inasmuch as an order of filiation is not binding upon the child (see Commissioner of Public Welfare v Koehler, 284 NY 260). However, because of the special facts and circumstances of this case, the court granted the application.

The petitioner, through counsel, indicated that he still was not certain whether or not he was the father of the child in question. However, the petitioner stated that if he was found to be the father of the child he was willing to accept his responsibilities. Section 523 of the Family Court Act requires that a verified petition be filed alleging that the petitioner is the father of the child in question. For a man to allege anything less might subject the mother of a child born out of wedlock to needless embarrassment and harassment in addition to the investment of time and money in a frivolous lawsuit. However, the court has considered that in the matter herein, the petitioner has been named as the father of the child in the Family Court records concerning the neglect petition. Moreover, his name appears as the father of this child in the records of the Department of Social Services. Although the mother of the child has a right pursuant to section 522 of the Family Court Act to institute a proceeding to establish the paternity of the child, she has not filed a petition against the respondent or any other man. The Commissioner of Social Services pursuant to the same section also has the right to institute said proceeding, but the commissioner also has failed to do so even though mandated by the Federal Government regulations (see 45 CFR 302.31). Such [36]*36inaction by interested parties had left the petitioner in a state of limbo in respect to his relationship to the child, if any. Moreover, the petitioner had consulted learned counsel and the court was satisfied that the petitioner recognized the full import of a paternity proceeding. Therefore, the court found that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing on the issue of paternity in the interest of justice, even though his signature on the verified petition alleging paternity was inconsistent with his court statement under oath that he is uncertain as to his alleged parentage.

In his moving papers, the attorney for the petitioner further requested that the court order the HLA test in addition to the standard blood grouping tests relying on the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Bar Association (ABA) joint report on the use of blood tests in paternity proceedings. (Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Fam LQ 247.) Section 532 of the Family Court Act provides in part as follows: "The court, on motion of any party, shall advise the parties of their right to a blood test and shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more blood grouping tests by a duly qualified physician to determine whether or not the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child, and the results of such tests may be received in evidence but only in cases where definite exclusion is established.”

At the time that this statute was enacted the standard blood grouping tests that were universally accepted were performed only on red blood cells. The three blood group systems, ABO, MN and RH do not constitute opinion evidence if there is a report of exclusion. The exclusion is a scientific fact of nature which can be demonstrated in the courtroom if necessary as the results of the test are visible ünder a microscope. (Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings [4th ed], § 9.13.) Therefore, in respect to both statutory and case law, an exclusion is deemed to be conclusive on the issue of paternity in all cases where the test has been properly administered. However, red blood cell testing involves only a limited number of variables. While the tests can prove that the petitioner herein is not the father of the child, they cannot prove that he is the father. A man who has been incorrectly named has only a 50-60% chance of being excluded conclusively, depending upon his blood type. Therefore, relying on [37]*37the standard tests alone would not assauge the doubts of the petitioner unless he was definitely excluded.

The HLA test is based on tissue typing of the white blood cells. This test is far more comprehensive because it involves a larger number of factors such as antigens in the white blood cells. It is widely accepted in scientific communities because in cases involving organ transplants it is used to match the donor and the recipient. Accuracy is essential when dealing with the lives of patients. The HLA test if far more expensive than the standard blood grouping tests and has not been used routinely by the courts in New York.

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Bluebook (online)
100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goodrich-v-norman-nycfamct-1979.