Goodrich v. Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 10, 2020
• Docket: 3:18-cv-00562
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 WAYNE C. GOODRICH, Case No. 3:18-cv-00562-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 9 INSURANCE COMPANY d\b\a USAA,

10 Defendant. 11 12 This matter stems from an insurance coverage dispute. Defendant Garrison 13 Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Garrison”) has filed an objection to 14 Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin’s order denying Garrison’s motion for protective order 15 (ECF Nos. 40, 51) in part and granting it in part (“Objection”). (ECF No. 53.) The 16 underlying motion for protective order challenged 18 deposition topics Plaintiff Wayne C. 17 Goodrich seeks to pursue. (See generally ECF No. 40; ECF No. 40-1 at 1–6.) Garrison 18 instantly objects to Judge Baldwin’s rulings on topics 1–6, 10–12, 13, 16 and 17. (ECF 19 No. 53 at 6–12.) The Court overrules Garrison’s Objection.1 20 In reviewing a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive pretrial order, the magistrate’s 21 factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see 22 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is 23 evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence is left with the definite 24 and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Ressam, 593 25 F.3d 1095, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). A magistrate judge’s pretrial order 26 issued under § 636(b)(1)(A) is not subject to de novo review, and the reviewing court 27 28 1The Court has also considered Plaintiff’s response to the Objection (ECF No. 1 “may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & 2 County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). Applying this standard, the 3 Court finds Judge Baldwin did not clearly err in rendering her decisions on the noted 4 topics. 5 Garrison essentially raises the same objection to Judge Baldwin’s ruling on topics 6 1–6, 10–12 and 16—not challenging the topics as irrelevant but claiming that, as to 7 these topics, Goodrich need not depose a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness—to be 8 produced by Garrison. (ECF No. 53.) Garrison specifically argues that allowing Goodrich 9 to depose such a witness in addition to two percipient witnesses would be duplicative 10 and not proportional in light of the allegations and issues presented by this case and is 11 counter to the 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b).2 (E.g., id. at 4–9.) 12 At minimum, Garrison’s proportionality objections as couched in the 2015 13 amendments are vague and lacks specificity. See, e.g., Carr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 14 Ins. Co., 312 F.R.D. 459, 468 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (“[T]he amendments to Rule 26(b) and 15 Rule 26(c)(1) do not alter the basic allocation of the burden on the party resisting 16 discovery to – in order to prevail on a motion for protective order or successfully resist a 17 motion to compel – specifically object and show that the requested discovery does not 18 fall within Rule”). The proportionality contentions are also contrary to law—to the extent 19 Garrison seeks to preclude testimony by a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent. See, e.g., Int’l Game 20 Tech. v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 2:16-cv -02792-APG-NJK, 2017 WL 5505039, at *6–7 21 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2017) (“[C]ourts have rejected the argument that a Rule 30(b)(6) 22 deposition and a percipient witness deposition are unnecessary or cumulative of one 23 another based simply on the similarity of topics covered.”); Kelly v. Provident Life & Acc. 24 Ins. Co., No. 04CV807-AJB BGS, 2011 WL 2448276, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2011) 25 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“Plaintiff is entitled to the knowledge of the 26 corporation and the corporation’s positions on matters clearly relevant and discoverable 27 /// 28 1 in this phase of the case . . . Without having a witness or witnesses who can testify and 2 bind the corporation, the deposing party is left at an unfair disadvantage, having no 3 understanding of what the corporation’s position is as to many areas of inquiry.”).3 4 Garrison’s position otherwise provides no basis for the Court to conclude that Judge 5 Baldwin clearly erred in permitting the requested depositions on the above topics. The 6 Court will therefore overrule Garrison’s objection as to deposition topics 1–6, 10–12 and 7 16. 8 That leaves Judge Baldwin’s rulings on topics 13 and 17, which the Court finds 9 are likewise void of error. As to these topics, Garrison’s contestation is again largely that 10 it should not have to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent on these topics. (ECF No. 53 at 11 9–11.) Besides Garrison’s unsupportable and curious insistence, Garrison claims that 12 topic 13 amounts to a fishing expedition. (Id. at 9.) The Court disagrees. 13 Topic 13 specifically states: 14 In the five years of time prior to Plaintiff’s claim, the frequency with which Garrison paid Crawford and Company to inspect and report on the property of Garrison’s 15 insureds for the purpose of processing Nevada property claims. 16 17 (ECF No. 40-1 at 4.) Judge Baldwin concluded that the topic went to Goodrich’s 18 contention of bad faith. (See ECF No. 52 (Transcript) at 11.) The Court is unpersuaded 19 by Garrison’s logic in attempting to undermine Judge Baldwin’s conclusion. (See ECF 20 No. 53 at 9.) Instead, the Court agrees with Goodrich that topic 13 supports his 21 contention that Garrison acted in bad faith in relying on its hired-inspector’s findings 22 where Garrison knew of a different cause of the relevant damage—yet denied 23 Goodrich’s insurance claim on an improper basis. (ECF No. 54 at 13–14.) 24 Garrison’s objection to topic 17 is no more appealing. That topic concerns bonus 25 compensation (ECF No. 40-1 at 5) and Judge Baldwin’s order recognized Goodrich’s 26 27 3See also Aerojet Rocketydyne, Inc. v. Glob. Aerospace, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01515- KJM-AC, 2019 WL 246628, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2019) (“[I]n an insurance coverage 28 case, topics addressing an insurer’s coverage position and claims handling are 1 || concession to have the topic address only such compensation to “claims handlers and 2 || employees” (ECF No. 51 at 1). As to this topic, Garrison rehashes its averments made in 3 || the underlying motion explaining bonus compensation, ignores the conceded limitations 4 || to the request—to nonetheless state the request is overbroad, and claims that a Rule 5 || 30(b)(6) deponent is not needed where Garrison may respond in a verified interrogatory. 6 || (ECF No. 53 at 10.) To the extent Garrison’s contentions are not moot, they provide 7 || insufficient reasons to alter Judge Baldwin’s determination regarding the need to obtain 8 || testimony from Garrison’s Rule 30(b)(6) deponent. See, e.g., Colony Ins. Co. v. 9 || Sanchez, No. 2:18-cv-01950-JCM-NJK, 2019 WL 3241160, at *2—*3 (D. Nev. July 18, 10 || 2019) (collecting cases) (internal citations omitted) (“It has long been clear that written 11 || discovery and depositions are not equivalent forms of discovery that may be easily 12 || substituted for one another. Written discovery responses are drafted through calm 13 || reflection with the aid of attorneys, while depositions probe the facts while witnesses are 14 || under the scrutiny of examination.”); Kelly, 2011 WL 2448276, at *4 (“[A]ny testimony 15 || provided by employees as individuals does not satisfy the need for Plaintiff to obtain 16 || binding testimony from the corporate entity.”). 17 In sum, the Court finds Garrison’s various objections insufficient to undermine 18 || Judge Baldwin’s rulings regarding the objected to topics. 19 It is therefore ordered that Garrison’s Objection (ECF No. 53) is overruled. The 20 || parties may proceed with discovery as set forth by Judge Baldwin. 21 DATED THIS 10" day of January 2020. LGD 23 LO — MIRANDA M. DU 24 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28