Goodman v. Morgan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Goodman v. Morgan

251 A.D. 861, 297 N.Y.S. 226, 1937 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7997

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 25, 1937

StatusPublished

This text of 251 A.D. 861 (Goodman v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Goodman v. Morgan, 251 A.D. 861, 297 N.Y.S. 226, 1937 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7997 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1937).

Pincite

Opinion

— Appeal by petitioner from an order entered at Special Term, denying his application for a peremptory mandamus order to compel the respondent to issue a license to petitioner to peddle and to operate a pushcart in the Livonia Avenue Market in Brooklyn, discontinued by respondent, and to compel respondent to continue to operate and conduct the market. Order unanimously affirmed, with [862]*862costs, as a matter of law and not in the exercise of discretion. Attendance of pushcarts at the market in question fell off from 125 in November, 1932, to 11 in January, 1937, when respondent discontinued the market and offered petitioner a license in another market, in Blake avenue, two blocks away, in which there is adequate space for petitioner and the ten other peddlers who applied for licenses in the discontinued market. Respondent acted within authority specifically conferred upon him by the Legislature (Agriculture and Markets Law, § 261) and by the board of aldermen (Code of Ordinances of the City of New York, chap. 15, art. 1, § 1), and his exercise of discretion was not arbitrary, but sound, reasonable and lawful. Adel, Taylor and Close, JJ., concur; Lazansky, P. J., and Carswell, J., concur in result.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

— Appeal by petitioner from an order entered at Special Term, denying his application for a peremptory mandamus order to compel the respondent to issue a license to petitioner to peddle and to operate a pushcart in the Livonia Avenue Market in Brooklyn, discontinued by respondent, and to compel respondent to continue to operate and conduct the market. Order unanimously affirmed, with [862]*862costs, as a matter of law and not in the exercise of discretion. Attendance of pushcarts at the market in question fell off from 125 in November, 1932, to 11 in January, 1937, when respondent discontinued the market and offered petitioner a license in another market, in Blake avenue, two blocks away, in which there is adequate space for petitioner and the ten other peddlers who applied for licenses in the discontinued market. Respondent acted within authority specifically conferred upon him by the Legislature (Agriculture and Markets Law, § 261) and by the board of aldermen (Code of Ordinances of the City of New York, chap. 15, art. 1, § 1), and his exercise of discretion was not arbitrary, but sound, reasonable and lawful. Adel, Taylor and Close, JJ., concur; Lazansky, P. J., and Carswell, J., concur in result.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

251 A.D. 861, 297 N.Y.S. 226, 1937 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7997, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goodman-v-morgan-nyappdiv-1937.