Goodison v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 1, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1243
StatusPublished

This text of Goodison v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Goodison v. Federal Bureau of Investigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goodison v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AISHA GOODISON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01243 (UNA) v. ) ) FEDERAL BUREAU ) OF INVESTIGATION, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The

Court grants the in forma pauperis Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses

this case without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Florida sues the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the

United States Department of Justice. See Compl. at 1–3. The Complaint is rambling and difficult

to follow, consisting predominantly of personal information and anecdotes spanning decades. See

generally id. To start, Plaintiff states that, in September 2005, she “sent a formal complaint to

then-FBI Director, Robert Mueller, at FBI headquarters, regarding the criminal misconduct of

singer Madonna,” and that later in 2025, she presented at the FBI, where she underwent interviews,

executed “FBI form-302[s],” and exchanged documents. See id. at 3–5. Plaintiff contends that,

in response to her complaint, the FBI conducted a criminal investigation into “Madonna and

Hollywood,” and informed Plaintiff that she would receive a copy of the investigation report, but

despite her inquiries, she never received a copy. See id. at 5. Given her lack of receipt, “a few

years later [Plaintiff] applied to receive the FBI files on the matter under the Freedom of Information Act, but the FBI lied in writing stating there are no files.” See id. And then, “years

later,” “[t]hen-Florida Senator Marco Rubio,” purportedly attempted to obtain the investigation

documents from the FBI on Plaintiff’s behalf, but he was refused. See id. at 6.

From there, the Complaint transitions into a list of a series of unfortunate events that

Plaintiff believes has been caused by the FBI’s refusal to acknowledge these investigation

documents, or the investigation itself, borne from a long-term conspiracy to conceal the agency’s

own criminal behavior. See id. at 6–10. For example, Plaintiff alleges that the FBI’s “arrogant”

actions have “cast an undeserved shadow over [her] name and life for years,” and that the FBI has

“endangered [her] life and safety, making her subject to death threats, threats of violence, threats

of sexual assault, threats of kidnapping, and acts of aggravated harassment and assault.” See id. at

6–7. She further alleges that the FBI has caused her to suffer copyright infringement, that she has

been stalked by an FBI informant, and that this informant also poisoned her mother and tampered

with her mother’s health insurance. See id. at 6–8.

The Complaint is at its most cognizable where the Plaintiff alleges that FBI has failed to

conduct adequate searches, respond, and release documents to her under the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”). See id. at 11–13. Nevertheless, as presented, fundamental details

regarding Plaintiff’s putative submission of a FOIA request are missing. FOIA jurisdiction

extends to claims arising from an agency’s improper withholding of records requested in

accordance with agency rules. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), (4)(B)(1); McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d

1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,

445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980)); see also Marcusse v. U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Info. Policy, 959

F. Supp. 2d 130, 140 (D.D.C. 2013) (An “agency’s disclosure obligations are triggered by its

receipt of a request that ‘reasonably describes [the requested] records’ and ‘is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed.’”)

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)). Plaintiff does not make clear when she sent her FOIA request,

how she sent it, to whom she sent it, what materials she specifically requested, nor is it clear that

she complied with the FBI’s FOIA regulations during that process. And the Complaint neither

references a FOIA request number nor contains any other information, e.g, a copy of the actual

request submitted, or the responses received.

As here, “the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are

unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,

1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nor must the court accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not sufficient to state a claim. Id.

Here, Plaintiff has presented only threadbare recitals with respect to her FOIA request.

Second, “[a] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” is

frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a “complaint plainly abusive of the

judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir.

1981). Again, instead of focusing on the facts supporting the FOIA claim itself, Plaintiff largely

concentrates on her belief in multiple conspiracies, orchestrated against her and others––by the

government, in Hollywood, and elsewhere. But such allegations that are “so attenuated and

unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37

(1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining

cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was

subjected to a campaign of surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins.”); see

also Webb v. Dep’t of Army, No. 22-cv-02236, 2022 WL 17851470, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2022)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for alleged FOIA violations predicated on a government

conspiracy against him), aff’d, No. 22-5292, 2023 WL 2564344, (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (per

curiam).

Accordingly, for all of the stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s Motion for CM/ECF Password, ECF No. 3, is denied as moot. A separate Order

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: June 1, 2026 /s/ CHRISTOPHER R.

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Related

Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport
193 U.S. 561 (Supreme Court, 1904)
Hagans v. Lavine
415 U.S. 528 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Tooley v. Napolitano
556 F.3d 836 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Salvatore G. Crisafi v. George E. Holland
655 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Circuit, 1981)
Charles Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation
16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Circuit, 1994)

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