Goodin v. Overnight Transportation Co.

701 S.W.2d 131, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 295

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: December 19, 1985
• Status: Published

Opinions

LEIBSON, Justice.

The Hon. Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky, certifies to us for resolution the following question of law presently at issue in his court:

“Does the term ‘Use of a Motor Vehicle’ as defined in KRS 304.39-020(6) include within its definitional parameters the unloading of the trailer of a hitched but parked semi truck, where the injury occurs while inside said trailer to an individual who is unloading same.”

The Certification Order further specifies as “RELEVANTFACTS”:

“At the time of the injury here in question, Plaintiff was unloading goods from the inside of an unlit tractor-trailer when he stepped through a hole in the trailer bed. The hole in question had been covered by a board which, unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, had been removed by the driver of the truck to enable the goods heretofore mentioned to be removed.”

KRS 304.39-020 provides “Definitions” to be utilized in administration of Subtitle 39, the “Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA).” KRS 304.39-020 provides in pertinent part:

“(6) ‘Use of a motor vehicle’ means any utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle including occupying, entering into and alighting from it. It does not in-elude ... (ii) conduct in the course of loading and unloading the vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying, entering into, or alighting from it.”

(7) ‘Motor vehicle' means any vehicle which transports persons or proper-ty_” (Emphasis Added.)

Thus the term “utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle” as used in KRS 304.39-020(6) includes as a primary purpose the transportation of property. Defendant is alleged to have negligently conducted this activity.

We glean from the Brief for Defendant and the plaintiff’s original Complaint which was filed therewith as an “Appendix,” that the answer to the question presented is important in the resolution of the pending case because the Complaint was filed ten days late if the one year statute of limitations for personal injury actions as provided in KRS 413.140 applies, but timely if two years as authorized by the MVRA applies. KRS 304.39-230(6) provides:

“An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060 may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the injury, or the death, or the last basic or added reparation payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later occurs.”

In the present case the defendant argues the legislature did not intend the two year statute of limitations in MVRA to cover the present situation, whereas the plaintiff argues that the statutory language speaks for itself. The express words of KRS 304.-39-230(6) cover “an action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060” without limitation.

We have recently undertaken to interpret KRS 304.39-230(6) in Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832 (1984).¹ Bailey v. Reeves was a personal injury action arising out of an accident in which the plaintiff’s vehicle struck the defendant’s cow which had wandered into the road.

The fact situation obviously differs from the present one. However, as in the present case, the defendant contended that the two year statute of limitations prescribed by the MVRA should be given a restricted meaning. We held otherwise, stating:

“We have a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion.” 662 S.W.2d at 834.

The fact that in KRS 304.39-020(6) “loading and unloading” is excepted, from the definition of “use of a motor vehicle” in certain circumstances can mean only that it is an included use where the exception does not apply. The statute says the exception does not apply where “the conduct occurs while occupying” the vehicle.

This case is in contrast to Commercial Union Assur. Companies v. Howard, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 647 (1982), in which we held KRS 304.39-020(6) did not cover a person injured “while underneath his own truck effecting repairs to the suspension system.” This did not qualify as “occupying, entering into, or alighting from” the vehicle. We held that repairing or servicing the motor vehicle was not “utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle.”

While there is dicta in the Commercial Union case referring to the activity of “loading or unloading,” this dicta would not apply to one “occupying” the vehicle.

Defendant cites a Court of Appeals opinion, Clark v. Young, Ky.App., 692 S.W.2d 285 (1985), involving a person injured when a strap being utilized in the process of securing the tarpaulin on a flatbed trailer snapped loose and struck him in the eye. The Court of Appeals accepted the argument that the place where the injury occurred was “purely fortuitous.” We need not decide whether we agree or disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion because the facts differ from the present case.²

When we consider the situation of a modern day personal injury victim, confronted with questions of no-fault coverage, first party medical and disability coverage, and workers’ compensation insurance, replacing a one year statute of limitations with a two year statute is not unreasonable. As we stated in Bailey v. Reeves, supra:

“When one looks to the policy and purposes behind the Act, KRS 304.39-010, it is evident that the legislature intended to encourage those injured in auto accidents to look first to their no-fault benefits and then pursue a tort claim if necessary. This approach presupposes the need for a longer statute of limitations, regardless of whether the tort claim to be pursued is against a motorist or a nonmotorist.” 662 S.W.2d at 834.

It is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended exactly what it said when it made the two year statute for “an action for tort liability” prescribed in KRS 304.39-230(6) part of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, that two years applies to all tort actions not abolished by the Act.³

In response to the question of law certified to us by the United States District Court, we hold that the term “Use of a Motor Vehicle” as defined in KRS 304.39-020(6) includes within its definitional parameters the unloading of a trailer in the circumstances of this case.

STEPHENS, C. J., and AKER, GANT and LEIBSON, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., files a separate dissenting opinion in which STEPHENSON, J., joins.

1 . We will assume this is the same case referred to in two places in Plaintiffs Brief as “Bailey v. Reece, Ky., 626 S.W.2d 832 (1984).”

2 . We note that the Court of Appeals’ decision construing KRS 304.39-020(6) in Clark v. Young, supra was not germane to the ultimate decision. The Court of Appeals applied the “relation hack" language of CR 15.03 to save the cause of action, so that it did not matter whether the one year personal injury statute in KRS 413.140 or the two year statute of Limitations in KRS 304.39-230(6) applied.

3 . It is limited to accidents involving motor vehicles because it is part of the MVRA and not KRS Chapter 413, the general statute on Limitation of Actions.