2026 IL App (1st) 250074-U No. 1-25-0074
Order filed September 9, 2026 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
MICHAEL C. GOODE, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 21 L 8246 )
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a State Farm, and ) MICHAEL JANET STATE FARM AGENCY, )
)
Defendants )
) Honorable
(State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ) Jerry A. Esrig, d/b/a/State Farm, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Rochford and Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed as untimely the insured’s complaint against the insurer for, inter alia, breach of contract per the policy’s two-year limitation period where the insurer cancelled the policy before the insured’s July 2016 collision, the insured learned about this cancellation in November 2016, and the insured filed his complaint against the insurer in August 2021.
¶2 Plaintiff Michael C. Goode purchased through defendant Michael Janet, State Farm Agency (Janet Agency) an automobile insurance policy from defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company d/b/a State Farm (State Farm). In November 2016, when Goode contacted the Janet Agency regarding a claim for a July 2016 collision involving an uninsured driver, Goode learned that State Farm had cancelled the policy. In August 2021, Goode initially sued State Farm for, inter alia, fraud and breach of contract. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed Goode’s amended complaint, finding that he failed to state claims against defendants for fraud and his breach of contract claims were time barred by the policy’s two-year limitation period.
¶3 On appeal, Goode argues that (1) State Farm cannot enforce the policy’s two-year limitation period because State Farm breached the contract, (2) State Farm’s failure to give him a claim denial letter tolled the contractual limitation period, (3) no justiciable claim existed when State Farm cancelled the policy in May 2016, (4) the policy’s limitation period is ambiguous and thus unenforceable, and (5) the relation-back doctrine applies and thus renders Goode’s complaint timely.
¶4 We affirm the judgment of the trial court, which, inter alia, dismissed Goode’s breach of contract claims, which are time barred per the policy’s enforceable limitation period. 1
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 In February or March of 2016, Goode purchased a State Farm automobile insurance policy through the Janet Agency. The policy contains this two-year suit-filing deadline:
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),
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this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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“GENERAL TERMS
***
13. Legal Action Against Us [(i.e., State Farm)].
Legal action may not be brought against us until there has been full compliance with all the provisions of this policy. In addition, legal action may only be brought against us regarding:
***
c. Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage if the insured or the insured’s legal representative:
(1) presents an Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage claim to us; and (2) commences legal action by filing a lawsuit against us, in a state or federal court that has jurisdiction, within two years immediately following the date of the accident, or within two years immediately following the date the insuring company for the owner or driver of the uninsured motor vehicle becomes insolvent, if such insolvency occurs within two years immediately following the date of the accident. No legal action may be brought against us relating to the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage for any causes of action that arise out of or are related to the coverage until there has been full compliance with the provisions titled Consent to Settlement and Deciding Fault and Amount.
***
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The limitation period specified in *** c. *** above is tolled from the date proof of loss is filed for the specific coverage involved until the date claim for that coverage is denied in whole or in part.”
¶7 Goode alleged he did not know State Farm had revoked or suspended his policy prior to May 2016 due to the suspension of his driver’s license. In May 2016, the Janet Agency informed Goode that his driver’s license was suspended and he took steps to reinstate his driver’s license. He also attempted to submit documentation to Maria Machin, an employee of the Janet Agency, to support the reinstatement of his driver’s license. Specifically, on May 26, 2016, Goode faxed to the Janet Agency documentation to substantiate that his driver’s license was reinstated. Because the transmission was dark and illegible, Machin asked him to resend the fax. Goode alleged that Machin “indicated to [him] that if she, or someone else from State Farm, does not call him back that same day after the second fax is sent, he can assume that his Policy has been reinstated and that no further action is necessary on his end.”
¶8 On July 26, 2016, Goode was involved in an accident with an uninsured driver. Goode alleged that, on November 22, 2016, he made “an auto loss report” to the Janet Agency for this accident and learned for the first time that he did not have an active automobile insurance policy with State Farm.
¶9 On July 29, 2019, Goode was awarded a $500,000 judgment against the uninsured driver.
¶ 10 On August 16, 2021, Goode initiated a lawsuit against State Farm, alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. State Farm moved to dismiss Goode’s claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation per sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2020)), arguing that he failed to allege facts establishing
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those claims, which were also time barred. State Farm also moved to dismiss Goode’s breach of contract claim per section 2-619 of the Code (id. § 2-619), arguing that this claim was untimely under the policy’s two-year limitation period.
¶ 11 After the trial court granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss, Goode amended his complaint twice, adding allegations of negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract against the Janet Agency, and declaratory relief and violations of statutory provisions governing insurance against State Farm. The trial court granted State Farm’s and the Janet Agency’s motions to dismiss, and Goode appealed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Regardless of whether Goode’s claims were dismissed under section 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code, or a combination of both sections pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (id. § 2-619.1), the standard of review is de novo. Kroutil v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2021 IL App (4th) 210238, ¶ 14. Goode argues, incorrectly, that this court should apply the standard set forth in Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern Railway Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494 (1967). Pedrick, however, did not address section 2-615 and 2-619 motions to dismiss. Instead, Pedrick held that directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v. should only be entered “in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” Id. at 510; see Hamilton v. Hastings, 2014 IL App (4th) 131021, ¶ 22.
¶ 14 Whereas a section 2-615 motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, a section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts a defense outside the complaint that defeats it. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1,
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12 (2005). Specifically, section 2-619(a)(9) permits involuntary dismissal where the claim is barred by “other affirmative matter.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020). When ruling on such motions, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as well as any reasonable inferences that may arise from them (Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, 213 Ill. 2d 19, 23-24 (2004)), but a court cannot accept as true mere conclusions unsupported by specific facts (Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 473 (2009); Hanks v. Cotler, 2011 IL App (1st) 101088, ¶ 17 ((internal quotation marks omitted) a motion to dismiss under sections 2-615 and 2-619 admits well-pleaded facts, but “conclusions of law and conclusory factual allegations not supported by allegations of specific facts are not deemed admitted”).
¶ 15 When a court rules on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367-68 (2003). Dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 is warranted only where it is apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle a plaintiff to recover. Thornton v. Shah, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1018 (2002).
¶ 16 A. Policy’s Limitation Period
¶ 17 Goode argues that State Farm is precluded from asserting the policy’s two-year deadline for filing suit as a defense because his allegation that State Farm breached the policy must be taken as true based on Pedrick.
¶ 18 Goode’s argument lacks merit. As discussed above, the standard of review here is de novo; the standard in Pedrick is irrelevant because it applies to directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v. Also, Goode’s conclusory allegation that State Farm breached the policy is not deemed admitted. See Hanks, 2011 IL App (1st) 101088, ¶ 17 (conclusions of law are not deemed admitted).
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¶ 19 Further, Illinois law holds that compliance with a suit-limitation provision is a condition precedent to recovery under the policy. Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 530 (1996); Hoover v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 110939, ¶ 35. A condition precedent is defined as “an act that must be performed or an event that must occur before a contract becomes effective or before one party to an existing contract is obligated to perform.” Cathay Bank v. Accetturo, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783, ¶ 32. Goode is required to comply with the suit-limitation provision before State Farm is required to perform under the policy. An action brought after the suit-filing deadline expires is barred unless the insurer is precluded from raising the defense by either waiving it or being estopped. Florsheim v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, 75 Ill. App. 3d 298, 304 (1979). Goode did not argue in his appellate brief that State Farm waived the suit-filing deadline or is estopped from asserting it, so that argument is forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 20 Forfeiture aside, State Farm did not waive and is not estopped from asserting the suit-filing deadline. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Florsheim, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 304. State Farm raised the suit-filing deadline in its initial pleading in the trial court and therefore did not waive that deadline.
¶ 21 Estoppel occurs when an insured is misled by the insurer, the insured relied on the misrepresentation, the reliance was reasonable, and the insured was prejudiced as a result. Id. at 304-05. Goode’s own pleading undermines any estoppel argument because he pleads that when he initially contacted the Janet Agency on November 22, 2016, regarding his collision claim, he was told he had no active automobile insurance policy. Neither the Janet Agency nor State Farm attempted to lull Goode into a false sense of security so he would miss the suit-filing deadline.
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Rather, he was told he did not have a State Farm policy on November 22, 2016, approximately 20 months before the suit-filing deadline ran, giving him ample time to file suit for State Farm’s alleged breach by either allegedly wrongfully cancelling the policy or denying coverage. See id. at 305 (finding that three months before the running of the suit-filing deadline was ample time for the insured to file suit against the insurer).
¶ 22 “It is well settled that a contractual limitation requiring suit to be brought within a specific period of time is valid if reasonable even though the period provided by general statute of limitations as to suits on written contract is longer.” Id. at 303. “A limitation period is enforceable even if the claim is meritorious and the insurer should have paid it, unless the insurer because of its conduct waives or is estopped from relying on the bar.” Id. at 304.
¶ 23 Because compliance with the suit-filing deadline is a condition precedent to performance, Goode was still required to comply with that deadline despite his allegations that State Farm breached the policy first and the policy was in effect on the day of the loss.
¶ 24 B. Tolling of the Suit-Filing Deadline
¶ 25 Goode argues his complaint is timely because he alleged he timely made “an auto loss report” with the Janet Agency on November 22, 2016, but State Farm never gave him a claim denial letter. He also alleged he never received a refund of his unearned premium, which— according to the policy—would have happened promptly if and when his policy was cancelled. Goode argues that State Farm’s failure to give him a claim denial letter tolled the two-year suit- filing deadline because the policy provides that the suit-filing deadline is tolled from the date a proof of loss is filed until a denial is issued. For support, he cites the policy provision that “[t]he
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limitation period specified in *** c *** above is tolled from the date proof of loss is filed for the specific coverage involved until the date claim for that coverage is denied in whole or in part.”
¶ 26 Contrary to the plain and ordinary language of the policy, Goode conflates an informal notice of a loss that opens an insurance claim with a proof of loss, which—in the context of an uninsured motorist claim—is “proof that there is no other insurance available to cover the insured’s claim.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Leon, 2019 IL App (1st) 180655, ¶ 28 (citing McDonald v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 354, 356 (1993) (a proof of loss fulfills the purpose of providing the insurer the opportunity to investigate the claim) and Luechtefeld v. Allstate Insurance Co., 167 Ill. 2d 148, 152 (1995) (the purpose of uninsured motorist insurance is to place the insured policyholder in substantially the same position she would occupy if the uninsured driver had been insured)).
¶ 27 A proof of loss must be filed in the form required by the policy in question before the limitation period provided in the policy will be tolled. 215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 2020); Davis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 147 Ill. App. 3d 581, 584 (1986). See Country Preferred Insurance Co. v. Whitehead, 2016 IL App (3d) 150080, ¶ 16 (“The purpose of [section 143.1] is to prevent insurance companies from sitting on claims, allowing the limitations period to run and depriving insureds of their opportunity to litigate their claims in court.”). The filing of other information with an insurance company does not toll the running of a policy’s limitation period if sworn proof of loss is required by the policy. Vole v. Atlanta International Insurance Co., 172 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483 (1988). Here, the policy provides:
“INSURED’S DUTIES
***
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3. Insured’s Duty to Cooperate With Us
***
c. Any person or organization making claim under this policy must, when we require, give us proof of loss on forms we furnish.”
¶ 28 Although Goode alleged in his third amended complaint in support of his claims of fraud against State Farm and the Janet Agency that he made “an auto loss report” on November 22, 2016, the trial court dismissed as time-barred several of his claims based on his previous allegation that he “reached out to State Farm by phone in order to start a claim” and “was informed that he [could not] open a claim with State Farm since there was no coverage at the time of the accident on July 26, 2016, because his Policy was purportedly terminated prior to that date.”
¶ 29 Regardless, Goode did not specifically plead that he ever filed a proof of loss with State Farm. Further, he did not plead sufficient facts to support any allegation and argument that he submitted a proof of loss to State Farm. According to the pleadings, State Farm denied Goode’s “auto loss report” because he did not have an active automobile insurance policy with State Farm. Because this case does not involve the filing of a proof of loss, there was no tolling of Goode’s claim, so the suit-filing deadline was two years “immediately following the date of the accident.”
¶ 30 Thus, we conclude that Goode’s August 2021 complaint was untimely because the policy’s two-year deadline from the date of the July 26, 2016, accident was not tolled.
¶ 31 C. Declaratory Judgment Claim
¶ 32 Goode argues the trial court improperly dismissed his declaratory judgment claim because State Farm failed to issue the requisite denial letter to create a “justiciable controversy” between him and State Farm. Goode argues that the suit-filing deadline did not begin to run because he did
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not have a right to invoke the aid of the court to enforce his remedy since State Farm’s failure to unambiguously cancel the policy meant he had no damages.
¶ 33 Goode’s argument fails. Under his reasoning, an insured’s cause of action never accrues if the insurer never issues a denial letter to an insured. According to Goode’s reasoning, there is still no justiciable controversy here because State Farm has not issued a denial letter.
¶ 34 “Generally, a ‘justiciable matter’ is a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Village of Arlington Heights v. City of Rolling Meadows, 2025 IL 130461, ¶ 10. Goode was put on notice of a potential injury and dispute when State Farm or the Janet Agency told him on November 22, 2016, when he attempted to file a claim with State Farm, that he did not have an automobile insurance policy and State Farm refused to open a claim. Goode’s attempt to open a claim being met with an explicit statement from his insurer that he did not have a policy of insurance and refusal to open a claim created a justiciable controversy.
¶ 35 “The primary function of the court in construing contracts for insurance is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the insurance contract’s language.” West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 2021 IL 125978, ¶ 32. Where the policy terms are clear and unambiguous, the court will give them their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. However, if the policy terms are susceptible to more than one meaning, they are considered ambiguous and will be construed against the party who drafted the contract. Id.
¶ 36 The policy required Goode to commence “legal action” against State Farm by filing a lawsuit against State Farm within two years of the date of the accident. Based on the clear and
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unambiguous policy terms, the suit-filing deadline extends to both breach of contract and declaratory judgment actions.
¶ 37 We find support for this position in Hermanson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1032 (1994), where the claimant suffered injuries on December 16, 1989, when an uninsured motorist struck the car in which the claimant was a passenger. The claimant made a claim against the insurer of the car in which he was a passenger, and the insurer denied his claim based on the policy’s set-off provision. Id. The policy’s suit-filing deadline required the claimant to commence any suit, action, or arbitration within two years after the date of the accident. Id. at 1033. Though the claimant demanded arbitration against the insurer within two years after the accident, he failed to file his declaratory judgment suit against the insurer until August 12, 1992, which was after the deadline had lapsed. Id. The trial court dismissed the suit as untimely per the two-year suit-filing deadline set by the policy. Id.
¶ 38 On appeal, the claimant argued that the policy provision was ambiguous because it was unclear that he had to commence both the arbitration and lawsuit within the same two-year period. Id. This court rejected the claimant’s argument and affirmed the dismissal of his lawsuit as untimely based on the unambiguous policy provision. Id. at 1034-35. This court also stated that the well-established rule that insurers have a right to set reasonable limitation periods in their policies would be thwarted if insureds were able to circumvent the limitation periods by delaying an arbitration demand indefinitely. Id. at 1034.
¶ 39 Regardless of whether Goode intended to pursue a declaratory judgment action or breach of contract action, to comply with the suit-filing deadline, which is a condition precedent to
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coverage, he needed to file suit within two years of the July 26, 2016, accident. He failed to timely file suit, so the trial court properly dismissed his declaratory judgment claim as untimely.
¶ 40 D. Ambiguous Deadline
¶ 41 Goode argues that the suit-filing deadline is unenforceable because it is ambiguous since it could lead to a situation where an insured may be required to file suit against his insurer and the tortfeasor simultaneously.
¶ 42 The general rules governing the interpretation of insurance policies are well-established.
“When interpreting an insurance policy, the agreement is to be enforced as written so long as it is unambiguous and only to the extent that it does not contravene public policy.
[Citation.] *** An ambiguity exists when the language is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression or where the language is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. [Citation.] A contract is not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its meaning. [Citation.] Additionally, [the court] will not strain to find an ambiguity where none exists, nor will [the court] consider an interpretation that is unreasonable or leads to absurd results.” Sweet Berry Café, Inc. v. Society Insurance, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210088, ¶ 34.
¶ 43 Goode does not argue that the policy language is difficult to understand or open to multiple interpretations. Instead, he claims it could result in circumstances where an insured is required to file suit against the insurer and tortfeasor at the same time.
¶ 44 We reject Goode’s argument that the suit-filing deadline is ambiguous. This court addressed a similar argument in Vansickle v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 841 (1995), and found it unavailing. In Vansickle, the plaintiff argued that the two-year suit-filing
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deadline in the uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM-UIM) provision of her policy was unenforceable because she could not know if she had a cause of action until after she obtained a judgment or settlement from the tortfeasor. Id. at 842. The trial court dismissed her cause of action, and this court upheld the dismissal, noting that, even though the court was “not unmindful of the problems created when an insured’s legal action against a tortfeasor is prolonged past the two-year period,” if an insured can sufficiently allege a cause of action against a tortfeasor, then the insured can allege a cause of action against the insurer because the only additional allegation required is “that the insured’s damages and the UM–UIM coverage exceed the tortfeasor’s liability insurance.” Id. at 843.
¶ 45 Also, the record indicates that Goode’s claimed ambiguity did not cause him to miss the suit-filing deadline. He filed suit against the tortfeasor on April 7, 2017, which was 15 months before the suit-filing deadline set by the policy, and obtained a judgment against the tortfeasor on July 29, 2019. So, Goode was not stuck between choosing to file suit against the tortfeasor or State Farm. Rather, he chose to file suit against the tortfeasor first and had 15 months to ascertain the amount of the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage and determine if he (Goode) had a valid basis to seek uninsured motorist coverage from State Farm by filing suit in accordance with the policy.
¶ 46 E. Relation-Back Doctrine
¶ 47 Goode argues that the relation-back doctrine should have applied to his attempt to assert an action against State Farm for fraud because State Farm never issued a denial of coverage letter to him or refunded his unearned premium, and he—as a lay person—had no idea that the lapse of a valid driver’s license rendered him without coverage. Goode mentions the discovery rule and argues his cause of action did not accrue because the time at which he knew or reasonably should
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have known both of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused were disputed questions of fact. He argues he could not have known of his injury until after the tortfeasor did not pay the $500,000 judgment in 2019. He also argues he could not have known the injury was wrongfully caused until either November 2016, when he attempted to file a claim with State Farm, or perhaps October 2022, when Machin testified at her deposition that she had all the information she requested from Goode in November 2016 but failed to process it. Goode argues that the Janet Agency and its employees were State Farm’s agents. He also argues he pled a valid claim against State Farm for fraud and Illinois applies the five-year statute of limitations to declaratory judgment actions when a valid fraud action has been alleged.
¶ 48 We agree with State Farm’s response that Goode’s remaining arguments are not clear and cohesive, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). He referred to the record without citing the pages of the record he relies on. He cited a case without explaining why and fails to cite the page of that case that supports his argument. His remaining arguments are a laundry list of record citations and caselaw without a common thread that connects the citations and caselaw to a unifying theme or argument against State Farm.
¶ 49 Rule 341(h)(7) requires that an argument “contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” “A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authority and cohesive arguments; it is not merely a repository into which an appellant may dump the burden of argument and research, nor is it the obligation of this court to act as an advocate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (2009). An issue not
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clearly defined and sufficiently presented fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and is, therefore, forfeited. In re Estate of Doyle, 362 Ill. App. 3d 293, 301 (2005).
¶ 50 We conclude that we need not address Goode’s remaining arguments because they do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) and thus are forfeited.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 53 Affirmed.