Good v. Rogers

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Good v. Rogers

31 A. 264, 19 R.I. 1, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 19

DecidedMarch 2, 1895

StatusPublished

This text of 31 A. 264 (Good v. Rogers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Good v. Rogers, 31 A. 264, 19 R.I. 1, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 19 (R.I. 1895).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

The court is of opinion that the first request should have been granted. The bill of sale referred to was clearly a mortgage, both by its terms and by the testimony of the plaintiff himself. It did not purport to be and was not intended to be for the absolute transfer of the property, but only for security. The property covered by it, therefore, like any mortgaged property £ £ in the possession of the mortgagor, and while the same is redeemable at law or in equity 1 ” was subject to attachment for the debts of the mortgagor.

The second request was properly refused. The mortgagee has an immediate right of possession unless there is some stipulation in the mortgage to the contrary. Jones on Chattel Mortgages, § 126.

The exception to the first refusal to rule as requested is sustaiiied ; the second is overruled.

The petition for a new trial is granted. Case remitted to the Common Pleas Division.

1

Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 208, § 4, is as follows :

Sec. 4. Personal estate, wlien mortgaged and in tlie possession of the mortgagor, and while the same is redeemable at law or in equity may be attached on mesne process against the mortgagor, in the same manner as his other personal estate.

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Per Curiam.

The court is of opinion that the first request should have been granted. The bill of sale referred to was clearly a mortgage, both by its terms and by the testimony of the plaintiff himself. It did not purport to be and was not intended to be for the absolute transfer of the property, but only for security. The property covered by it, therefore, like any mortgaged property £ £ in the possession of the mortgagor, and while the same is redeemable at law or in equity 1 ” was subject to attachment for the debts of the mortgagor.

The second request was properly refused. The mortgagee has an immediate right of possession unless there is some stipulation in the mortgage to the contrary. Jones on Chattel Mortgages, § 126.

The exception to the first refusal to rule as requested is sustaiiied ; the second is overruled.

The petition for a new trial is granted. Case remitted to the Common Pleas Division.

1

Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 208, § 4, is as follows :

Sec. 4. Personal estate, wlien mortgaged and in tlie possession of the mortgagor, and while the same is redeemable at law or in equity may be attached on mesne process against the mortgagor, in the same manner as his other personal estate.

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Bluebook (online)

31 A. 264, 19 R.I. 1, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/good-v-rogers-ri-1895.