Goo v. United States

187 F.2d 62
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 23, 1951
Docket12620_1
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 187 F.2d 62 (Goo v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goo v. United States, 187 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1951).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, on his plea of guilty to an information charging criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code. Upon this appeal from the judgment of conviction, he claims the District Court erred in denying his motion, made pursuant to 32(d) Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 18 U.S.C.A., to withdraw his plea of guilty.

He contends that Section 32(d) of F.R. C.P. confers upon him the absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea at any time prior to imposition of sentence.

We find no merit in this contention. There is complete uniformity in the authorities to the effect that no such right exists and that motions to withdraw guilty pleas are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. This is true as to 32(d) of F.R.C.P. and also as to motions under former Rule 11(4) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Act of March 8, 1934. We deem it unnecessary to cite the numerous decisions to that effect.

The record does not support appellant’s contention that the trial court abused *63 its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The main reason urged in support of the motion was that appellant wished to investigate income tax deductions of which he might avail himself for the years 1946 and 1947. Such matters would not have been admissible by way of defense and would have no bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charges set forth in the information, which involved prior years. Hence the District Court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Dopp
861 P.2d 51 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1993)
State v. Rodriguez
801 P.2d 1308 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1990)
State v. Hawkins
787 P.2d 271 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1990)
State v. Carrasco
787 P.2d 281 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1990)
State v. Ballard
761 P.2d 1151 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1988)
United States v. Exxon Corp.
94 F.R.D. 246 (D.C. Circuit, 1981)
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.
80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. Illinois, 1978)
Farr v. United States
314 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Missouri, 1970)
Sherman v. United States
261 F. Supp. 522 (D. Hawaii, 1966)
Charles Daniel Everett v. United States
336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Circuit, 1964)
Sydney B. Kadwell v. United States
315 F.2d 667 (Ninth Circuit, 1963)
A. C. Willingham v. United States
289 F.2d 283 (Fifth Circuit, 1961)
United States v. Panebianco
208 F.2d 238 (Second Circuit, 1954)
Mosely v. United States
207 F.2d 908 (Fifth Circuit, 1953)
State v. Pometti
97 A.2d 399 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1953)
Friedman v. United States
200 F.2d 690 (Eighth Circuit, 1953)
Williams v. United States
192 F.2d 39 (Fifth Circuit, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
187 F.2d 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goo-v-united-states-ca9-1951.