Gonzalo Romero Hernandez, et al. v. City of Vallejo, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00900
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GONZALO ROMERO HERNANDEZ, Case No. 2:25-cv-00900-CSK et al., 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 14 MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., 15 (ECF No.10) Defendants. 16 17 Pending before the Court are Defendants City of Vallejo, Jason Ta, Pablo Lopez, 18 and Rosenda Mesa’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in part and 19 motion to strike pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). Defs. 20 Mot. (ECF No. 10).1 A hearing by Zoom was held on September 2, 2025.2 (ECF No. 19.) 21 Melissa Nold appeared as counsel for Plaintiffs and Katelyn M. Knight appeared as 22 counsel for Defendants. (ECF No. 19.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS 23 IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion. Defendants’ motion to strike is 24 GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 25

26 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) on the consent of all parties. (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 9.) 27 2 The Court approved Plaintiffs’ unopposed request to appear by video and the hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss was transitioned to be held by Zoom. (ECF Nos. 15, 28 18.) 1 48, 53-65, 70-78, 94-108, 110-151, and the prayer for a consent decree, are GRANTED; 2 and Defendants’ motion to strike Paragraphs 49-52, 66-69, 79-93 and 109 are DENIED. 3 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 4 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Chief Ta in his official 5 capacity are GRANTED with leave to amend; and Defendants’ motion to dismiss 6 Plaintiffs’ Monell claim (fourth cause of action) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 7 PART. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim on the basis of a custom or practice theory may proceed. 8 Plaintiffs’ Monell claim on the basis of a ratification theory is DISMISSED with leave to 9 amend. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 A. Facts3 12 On or about March 19, 2023, at approximately 2:45 a.m., married couple Plaintiffs 13 Daisy Romero and Gonzalo Romero Hernandez were passengers in a car driving 14 through the City of Vallejo. FAC ¶ 20 (ECF No. 4). Plaintiffs were passengers, asleep in 15 the back seat of the car when the driver, Miguel Maravillas, was involved in a minor car 16 accident. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. The car’s safety system summoned law enforcement and 17 Defendants Lopez, Mesa and other unidentified Vallejo police officers arrived to the 18 scene of the accident. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff Daisy remained in the back seat of the car and 19 did not wake up when Plaintiff Gonzalo tried to get her up and out of the car. Id. ¶ 22. 20 Instead of checking on Plaintiff Daisy to see if she needed medical attention, “Vallejo 21 Police Officers began screaming at her, ‘GET OUT OF THE CAR.’” Id. ¶ 23. Both 22 Plaintiff Gonzalo and Maravillas told officers that Plaintiff Daisy passed out and was not 23 awake or responsive. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff Gonzalo was not allowed to assist or help Plaintiff 24 Daisy. Id. Unidentified Vallejo police officers “violently dragged [Plaintiff Daisy] out of the 25

26 3 These facts primarily derive from the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4), which are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the non-moving party. Faulkner 27 v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court does not assume the truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions. Paulsen v. 28 CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 car by the hair of her head and upper body,” thereby waking up Plaintiff Daisy who was 2 shocked and terrified. Id. ¶ 25. 3 After being violently dragged out of the car, Plaintiff Daisy was slammed in a 4 seated position on the grass of the sidewalk while she cried out in pain, triggering her 5 pre-existing herniated disk and sciatic injury. FAC ¶ 26. Plaintiff Gonzalo began filming 6 the officers and verbally protested the mistreatment of Plaintiff Daisy despite Defendant 7 Lopez’s attempts to prevent him from filming. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Plaintiff Daisy was then 8 grabbed by Defendant Mesa from a “cross-legged position on the grass,” thrown 9 forward, and her face, head and body were slammed into the street, while Plaintiff 10 Gonzalo cried out to the officers “what are you doing??” and to “leave her alone.” Id. 11 ¶ 29. Plaintiff Daisy was held down by “other officer(s)” and Defendant Mesa straddled 12 her and an unidentified Vallejo police officer handcuffed Plaintiff Daisy while her face, 13 head and body were forced into the ground. Id. ¶ 31. 14 After placing Plaintiff Daisy in the patrol car, Defendant Mesa told Plaintiff 15 Gonzalo to back up. FAC ¶ 34. After Plaintiff Gonzalo complied and turned his back to 16 the officers, “multiple Vallejo police officers” pulled Plaintiff Gonzalo off his feet, dumped 17 him on his head face first into the concrete and slammed his head into the concrete 18 multiple times, scraping multiple layers of skin off his face. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. After Plaintiff 19 Gonzalo briefly ended up on his back, cellphone footage showed an unidentified Vallejo 20 police officer with his hands around Plaintiff Gonzalo’s throat choking him. Id. ¶ 36. 21 Additional unidentified Vallejo police officers bent, abused and contorted Plaintiff 22 Gonzalo’s body, flipped him over and violently handcuffed him. Id. After Plaintiff 23 Gonzalo’s arrest, an unidentified Vallejo police officer tried to convince him that his 24 injuries were a result of falling. Id. ¶ 37. 25 Plaintiff Daisy was falsely arrested and charged for resisting arrest, and Plaintiff 26 Gonzalo was falsely arrested for felony battery on a police officer and a misdemeanor 27 resisting arrest. FAC ¶¶ 38-39. The Solano County District Attorney later dismissed the 28 charges. Id. ¶ 42. 1 In October 2023, Plaintiffs filed a formal complaint with the Vallejo Police 2 Department and requested an internal affairs investigation of the incident. FAC ¶ 44. 3 Plaintiffs have not received an outcome on their formal complaint. Id. Plaintiffs allege 4 they continue to suffer from “pain, fear, embarrassment, anxiety, stress and 5 disfigurement” resulting from the incident. Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 45. 6 B. Procedural Posture 7 On March 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this action. See 8 Compl. (ECF No. 1). On April 9, 2025, prior to the filing of a responsive pleading, 9 Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint as a matter of right pursuant to 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See FAC. The FAC names Defendants City of 11 Vallejo; Chief Jason Ta in his official capacity; Officer Pablo Lopez in his individual 12 capacity; Officer Rosendo Mesa in his individual capacity; and Does 1-25. Id. ¶¶ 11-15. 13 The FAC alleges the following eight (8) causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for 14 excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment brought by Plaintiffs against 15 Defendants Lopez, Mesa, and Does 1-25; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for right to film in 16 violation of the First Amendment brought by Plaintiff Gonzalo against Defendants Lopez, 17 Mesa, and Does 1-25; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure in violation of the 18 Fourth Amendment brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants Mesa, Lopez, and Does 1- 19 25; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 20 436 U.S. 658 (1978), brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants City of Vallejo, Chief Ta, 21 and Does 1-25; (5) negligence claim brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants City of 22 Vallejo, Mesa, Lopez, and Does 1-25; (6) battery claim brought by Plaintiffs against 23 Defendants City of Vallejo, Mesa, Lopez, and Does 1-25; (7) excessive force claim in 24 violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 (referred to as the “Bane Act”) brought by 25 Plaintiffs against Defendants City of Vallejo, Mesa, Lopez, and Does 1-25; and (8) false 26 imprisonment and false arrest claim brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants City of 27 Vallejo, Mesa, Lopez, and Does 1-25. FAC ¶¶ 180-243. 28 Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Defendant Chief Ta and to dismiss 1 the fourth cause of action (Monell) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 2 granted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defs. Mot. at 3, 8-9. 3 Defendants also move to strike paragraphs 48-151 of the FAC and Plaintiffs’ prayer for a 4 consent decree pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f). Id. at 3-8. Plaintiffs 5 have filed an opposition, and Defendants have filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 14, 17.) 6 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 7 A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 8 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon 9 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if 10 it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 11 theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To state a claim on 12 which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to 13 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 14 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 15 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 16 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (2009). When considering whether a claim has 17 been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and 18 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mollett, 795 19 F.3d at 1065. However, the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual 20 allegations contradicted by documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions 21 merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 22 1071. 23 B. Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f) 24 Rule 12(f) grants the district court with authority to “strike from a pleading an 25 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 26 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f). The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion “is to avoid the expenditure 27 of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with 28 those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th 1 Cir. 1983). Granting a motion to strike “may be proper if it will make trial less complicated 2 or eliminate serious risks of prejudice to the moving party, delay, or confusion of the 3 issues.” Taheny v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1466944, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 4 2011) (citing Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993)). “Motions 5 to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted.” Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 6 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[m]otions to strike should 7 not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible 8 bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Defendant Chief Ta and to dismiss 11 the fourth cause of action (Monell) for failure to state a claim. Defs. Mot. at 3, 8-9. 12 Defendants also move to strike paragraphs 48-151 of the FAC and Plaintiffs’ prayer for a 13 consent decree. Id. at 3-8. The Court addresses Defendants’ arguments in turn. 14 A. Motion to Strike 15 The Court first addresses Defendants’ motion to strike. Defs. Mot. at 3-8. Plaintiffs 16 oppose the motion arguing the allegations in paragraphs 48-151 of the FAC are material 17 and pertinent to establish a pattern, custom, and/or practice in support of their Monell 18 claim. Pls. Opp’n at 8-11. 19 1. Allegations Relating to Plaintiff’s Counsel 20 Paragraphs 48, 61-62, 70-74, and 78 relate to Plaintiff’s counsel’s personal 21 interactions and experiences with Vallejo police officers and officials beginning from 22 2019. FAC ¶¶ 48, 61-62, 70-74, 78. These paragraphs do not support Monell liability and 23 have “no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Neveu, 392 F. Supp. 2d 24 at 1170. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 48, 61-62, 70-74, 25 and 78. 26 2. Allegations Relating to Excessive Force and the Right to Film 27 Violations 28 Paragraphs 49-53 relate to a prior incident in 2019 involving allegations of assault 1 and/or excessive force and the right to film during a traffic stop by Vallejo police officer 2 McLaughlin and subsequent attempts by Vallejo police officers to intimidate the victim 3 into not filing a grievance regarding the 2019 traffic stop. FAC ¶¶ 49-53. These 4 paragraphs involve allegations relating to constitutional violations, including excessive 5 force and the right to film, which appear to bear some factual similarity to the “subject 6 matter of the litigation” and may serve to support Monell liability in this matter. Neveu, 7 392 F. Supp. 2d at 117. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 49- 8 52. 9 3. Allegations Relating to Racism and Hiring Deficiencies 10 Paragraphs 54-56, 58-60, 63-65, 94-108, and 110-115 relate to prior incidents 11 involving Vallejo police officers that are alleged to be racially motivated, racially- 12 motivated “terror tactics” on community members, workplace discrimination of African 13 American Vallejo police officers, the California Department of Justice’s three-year 14 informal “Cooperative Agreement” with the Vallejo Police Department relating to its 15 history of racism and excessive force, and unlawful hiring practices that were racially- 16 motivated and deficient. FAC ¶¶ 54-56, 58-60, 63-65, 94-108, 110-115. These 17 allegations are not sufficiently similar to the “subject matter of the litigation” and not 18 relevant to policies or customs concerning the alleged constitutional violations in this 19 case. Neveu, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. In addition, Plaintiffs do not allege a Monell equal 20 protection claim in this action. See FAC; see also Jenkins v. City of Vallejo, 2025 WL 21 2410992, at *5 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025). The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion 22 to strike paragraphs 54-56, 58-60, 63-65, 94-108, and 110-115. 23 4. Allegations Relating to the Vallejo Police Department’s “Badge 24 Bending” Practice 25 Paragraphs 66-69 and 79-93 relate to allegations of the Vallejo Police 26 Department’s “badge bending” practice of bending the star tip of the badge of officers 27 who were involved in an on-duty shooting. FAC ¶¶ 66-69, 79-93. Though there are no 28 allegations of an officer-involving shooting in this action, the allegations related to the 1 Vallejo Police Department’s badge bending practice is sufficiently connected to Plaintiffs’ 2 Monell claim based on a practice or custom theory. See generally FAC; Neveu, 392 F. 3 Supp. 2d at 1170. The Court also notes that Defendants have not moved to strike the 4 FAC’s reference to the badge bending practice in the “Monell Allegations” section. See 5 Defs. Mot.; FAC ¶ 157. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 66- 6 69 and 79-93. 7 5. Allegations Relating to 2019 Deadly Force Incident 8 Paragraph 57 relates to a prior incident in 2019 involving Vallejo police officers 9 who shot and killed the victim by shooting the victim 55 times while he was asleep in his 10 car in a drive through and the subsequent media coverage thereafter. FAC ¶ 57. These 11 allegations relating to a prior incident are not sufficiently similar to the allegations in this 12 matter because the prior incident involves the use of deadly force which is not alleged 13 here. See Bagos, 2020 WL 6043949, at *6; Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825. The Court GRANTS 14 Defendants’ motion to strike paragraph 57. 15 6. Allegations Relating to Other Incidents 16 Paragraphs 75-77, and 130-150 relate to allegations of harassment by Vallejo 17 Police Department employees of critics and families of victims; the hiring of police 18 lieutenant Nichelini based on nepotism; the resignation of City Attorney Trujillo; a 19 contract entered into by Defendant City of Vallejo with Truleo, a company that conducts 20 audits of police body cameras and the discovery of “potentially unprofessional conduct;” 21 a subsequent vote of no confidence in Police Chief Shawny Williams and his subsequent 22 forced departure from the police department due to racial threats and harassment; and 23 the public dissent regarding Defendant Chief Ta’s hiring as Police Chief. FAC ¶¶ 75-77, 24 130-150. These allegations are not sufficiently similar to the “subject matter of the 25 litigation” and are not sufficiently connected to similar constitutional violations alleged 26 here. Neveu, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike 27 paragraphs 75-77, and 130-150. 28 / / / 1 7. Allegations Related to California Attorney General’s Stipulated 2 Agreement with City of Vallejo 3 Paragraph 109 relates to a stipulated agreement entered into by the California 4 Attorney General’s Office and Defendant City of Vallejo in October 2023 for the failure to 5 report threats received by Captain Whitney and Chief Williams and for failure to 6 investigate potentially unqualified Vallejo police officers. FAC ¶ 109. These allegations 7 have the potential to support Monell liability based on Defendant City of Vallejo having a 8 pattern, custom, and/or practice of being deliberately indifferent to constitutional 9 violations by the Vallejo Police Department. See Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 10 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (“To impose liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that (1) he 11 was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy 12 amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is 13 the moving force behind the constitutional violation.”). The Court therefore DENIES 14 Defendants’ motion to strike paragraph 109. 15 8. Allegations Related to the City Attorney’s Office 16 Paragraphs 116-129, and 151 relate to allegations of destruction of evidence and 17 discovery misconduct and generalized allegations of concealing misconduct by the 18 Vallejo City Attorney’s Office. FAC ¶¶ 116-129, 151. These allegations are not 19 sufficiently similar to the “subject matter of the litigation,” and are not sufficiently 20 connected to similar constitutional violations alleged or to the Monell claim alleged. 21 Neveu, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike 22 paragraphs 116-129, and 151. 23 9. Prayer for a Consent Decree 24 Plaintiffs do not oppose striking their prayer for a consent decree. See generally 25 Pls. Opp’n. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for a 26 consent decree. 27 10. Conclusion 28 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ 1 motion to strike. Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 48, 53-65, 70-78, 94-108, 110- 2 151, and the prayer for a consent decree, is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to strike 3 paragraphs 49-52, 66-69, 79-93 and 109 is DENIED. 4 B. Motion to Dismiss 5 1. Defendant Chief Ta 6 Defendants seek to dismiss all claims against Defendant Chief Ta, who is sued in 7 his official capacity only. Defs. Mot. at 3. Defendants argue Defendant Chief Ta is a 8 redundant defendant because the claims against Defendant Chief Ta are in his official 9 capacity only and are duplicative of the claims against Defendant City of Vallejo. Id. 10 (citing Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 11 799 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims 12 against Defendant Chief Ta in his official capacity. 13 At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued they could plead facts to establish supervisory 14 liability under Section 1983 against Defendant Chief Ta in his individual capacity. 15 Accordingly, Plaintiffs will be provided an opportunity to amend their FAC, if they can, to 16 allege specific facts demonstrating Defendant Chief Ta’s connection to or involvement in 17 the alleged violations. 18 2. Monell Claim (Fourth Cause of Action) 19 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have alleged irrelevant, vague and 20 conclusory allegations that are insufficient to state a cognizable Monell claim. Defs. Mot. 21 at 8-9. Plaintiffs argue they have established a cognizable Monell claim based on the 22 following theories: (1) ratification by a final policymaker, Defendant Chief Ta; and (2) a 23 custom, practice, and/or policy based on a showing of 150 prior incidents of police 24 misconduct, concealment of these prior incidents, and failure to discipline or train any of 25 the involved officers in the prior incidents. Pls. Opp’n at 11-14. 26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 27 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks 1 omitted). Section 1983 claims must demonstrate the defendant (1) acted under color of 2 state law; and (2) caused a plaintiff to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution 3 or laws of the United States. See Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024). Under 4 Monell, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a 5 policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a 6 violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 7 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). There is no respondeat superior liability under 8 § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94. The Ninth Circuit recognizes four theories that 9 establish municipal liability under Monell: “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice 10 or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final 11 policymaker.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir. 12 2019). “Cases often refer to the fourth theory as ratification by a final policymaker.” Est. 13 of Temple v. Placer Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2024 WL 3742920, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2024) 14 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 15 a. Monell Claim Based on a Ratification Theory 16 Plaintiffs allege Monell liability against Defendant City of Vallejo based on 17 allegations that Defendant Chief Ta, as the final policymaker, knew of the custom and 18 practice of using excessive force by Vallejo police officers. Pls. Opp’n at 11. Plaintiffs 19 allege that: 20 Chief Ta, the final policymaker, the City Manager and the City Attorney’s Office, knew of the custom, culture and practice of 21 using excessive force by Vallejo Police Officers and excused their behavior by not initiating internal affairs overview of the 22 incidents and/or directing them to dismiss the allegations without sufficient discipline or retraining and/or unlawfully 23 concealing victim complaints from public scrutiny; concealing officer misconduct records; the longstanding practice of hiring 24 officers who were disqualified from serving as police officers and/or refusal to terminate officers who did not pass 25 background investigations; termination of misconduct review methods; and retaliation against people seeking to correct the 26 constitutionally violative practices, including a former Vallejo Police Chief, Deputy Chief, and Captain. The voluminous 27 amount of previously hidden misconduct allegations, which span a decade, demonstrate how deeply ingrained the 28 constitutionally violative practices are and the degree to 1 which they have been ratified by the municipality, that would rather fire whistleblowers than reform. 2 3 Pls. Opp’n at 11-12; see also FAC ¶¶ 152-168. 4 “[A] local government may be held liable under § 1983 when ‘the individual who 5 committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority’ or such 6 an official ‘ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for 7 it.’” Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on 8 other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 9 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir.1992)). “The policymaker must have 10 knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it. A mere failure to 11 overrule a subordinate's actions, without more, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.” 12 Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “The policymaker must 13 have knowledge of the constitutional violation and must make a ‘conscious, affirmative 14 choice’ to ratify the conduct at issue.” Garcia v. City of Imperial, 2010 WL 3911457, at *1 15 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) (citing Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987). 16 Here, Plaintiffs’ FAC provides conclusory allegations that Defendant Chief Ta 17 ratified unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates. See FAC ¶¶ 152-168; see also Pls. 18 Opp’n at 11-12. As pled, this is insufficient to state a cognizable Monell claim. In 19 addition, Plaintiffs also appear to generally allege multiple individuals as final 20 policymakers. See FAC ¶¶ 152 (“[T]he Vallejo Police Department ratifies officers’ 21 unconstitutional behaviors which continue because they go by unchecked.”), 158 (“the 22 City’s failure to investigate, control, supervise, and discipline…ratifies [Vallejo police 23 officers’] unlawful behavior.), 166 (“Vallejo Police Department’s longterm failure to 24 investigate complaints of misconduct…is a proximate result of the Vallejo Police 25 Department’s not only failure to properly supervise its Officers but subsequent ratification 26 of their unconstitutional conduct.). The FAC, as pled, does not clearly allege who the 27 final policymaker is and does not allege that the final policymaker made a “conscious, 28 affirmative choice” to pursue a particular policy. Garcia, 2010 WL 3911457, at *1; see 1 also Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell 3 claim on the basis of a ratification theory. The Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend 4 because additional allegations may permit a cognizable Monell claim under a ratification 5 theory against Defendant City of Vallejo. 6 b. Monell Claim Based on a Practice or Custom Theory 7 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant City of Vallejo has an “informal policy” of 8 “repeated constitutional violations” that establishes Monell liability based on a practice or 9 custom. Pls. Opp’n at 12-13. Plaintiffs argue the 150 incidents alleged in the FAC are 10 sufficient to establish a pattern of police misconduct, failure to investigate, and failure to 11 discipline or retrain involved officers. Id. at 13-14. 12 “[A] plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice that, 13 although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and 14 well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.’” City of St. Louis v. 15 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 16 144, 168 (1970)). Liability for an improper custom may not be premised on isolated or 17 sporadic incidents, but rather it must be founded on practices of “sufficient duration, 18 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying 19 out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has 20 “long recognized that a custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or 21 evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were 22 not discharged or reprimanded.” Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 23 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 24 Plaintiffs have identified multiple prior instances of alleged misconduct by 25 Defendant City of Vallejo in the FAC. Even without the stricken allegations, the FAC 26 sufficiently alleges a custom or practice of police misconduct, failure to investigate, and 27 failure to discipline or retrain involved officers. Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly show a 28 custom or practice of Defendant City of Vallejo that is “permanent and well settled.” 1 Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167-68. These allegations sufficiently allege that Defendant City of 2 Vallejo had an unconstitutional custom or practice of police misconduct, failure to 3 investigate, and failure to discipline or retrain involved officers. 4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell 5 claim on the basis of a custom or practice theory. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 In conclusion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 8 1. Defendants’ motion to strike (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED IN PART AND 9 DENIED IN PART. 10 a. Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 48, 53-65, 70-78, 94-108, 11 110-151, and the prayer for a consent decree, is GRANTED; and 12 b. Defendants’ motion to strike Paragraphs 49-52, 66-69, 79-93 and 13 109 is DENIED. 14 2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED IN PART AND 15 DENIED IN PART: 16 a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant 17 Chief Ta in his official capacity is GRANTED with leave to amend. 18 Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend as to claims against Defendant 19 Chief Ta in his individual capacity only. Plaintiffs shall file their 20 amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of this 21 order. Failure to timely file an amended complaint consistent with 22 this order will be construed as Plaintiffs’ consent to proceed with the 23 dismissal of these claims. 24 b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claim (fourth cause 25 of action) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ 26 Monell claim on the basis of a custom or practice theory may 27 proceed. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim on the basis of a ratification theory 28 is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall file their 1 amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of this 2 order. Failure to timely file an amended complaint consistent with 3 this order will be construed as Plaintiffs’ consent to proceed with the 4 dismissal of this claim. 5 3. Within 30 days of this Order, Plaintiffs must either file: (a) a Second Amended 6 Complaint consistent with this order regarding the claims against Defendant 7 Chief Ta in his individual capacity and a Monell claim based on a ratification 8 theory, if Plaintiffs can allege such claims, and removing the stricken 9 allegations; or (b) a Final FAC that removes the stricken allegations and 10 dismissed claims. 11 12 | Dated: October 15, 2025 C ii $ \U 13 CHI S00 KIM 44 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 || 4, hernogoo.25 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15