1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MANUEL ANTONION GONZALEZ, Case No.: 3:19-cv-2056-JLS-AHG CDCR #T-42888, 12 ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION Plaintiff, 13 FOR RECONSIDERATION; AND vs. (2) DISMISSING SECOND 14 AMENDED COMPLAINT DR. MALHOTRA; DR. ZHANG; 15 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A WARDEN OF R. J. CORRECTIONAL 16 FACILITY; ASSOCIATE WARDEN OF RJD, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. Procedural History 21 Plaintiff Manuel Antonio Gonzalez, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 22 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in this civil 23 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) 24 Plaintiff prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a 25 civil action at the time he submitted his original complaint. (See ECF No. 5.) In addition, 26 Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), a Motion for 27 Preliminary Injunction (“PI”), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel together with his 28 Complaint (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4.). Plaintiff has not requested that the Clerk issue a summons, 1 “present[ed] a summons to the clerk for signature and seal” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 4(b), or has yet executed service of his complaint, TRO or PI upon any of the named 3 Defendants. 4 On December 3, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and PI, denied 5 his Motion to Appoint Counsel, and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim 6 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (See ECF No. at 10-11.) However, Plaintiff was given 7 leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified 8 in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 11.) 9 On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a forty-eight (48) page First Amended Complaint 10 (“FAC”), as well as over seventy (70) pages of exhibits. (See FAC, ECF No. 7.) On April 11 7, 2020, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 8 and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; therefore, the 13 Court dismissed his FAC with leave to file an second amended complaint. (See ECF No. 14 8 at 7–8.) 15 On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a forty-six (46) page Second Amended Complaint 16 (“SAC”), as well as over eighty (80) pages of exhibits. (See SAC, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff 17 has also filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he objects to the citation to Ashcroft 18 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) in analyzing whether he has stated a claim upon which 19 relief may be granted. (See Mot., ECF No. at 11.) 20 II. Motion for Reconsideration 21 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s reliance on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 22 in screening his FAC was misplaced. (Mot. at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the 23 facts in Iqbal involved “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in 24 the history of the American Republic.” (Id. at 1 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670).) Plaintiff 25 maintains that the “current complaint [FAC] will almost certainly be more ordinary than 26 Iqbal, and Higher Courts may not demand such detailed pleading.” (Id.) Instead of Iqbal, 27 Plaintiff maintains that the Court should rely on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 28 544 (2007). (Id.) 1 Even though the facts in Iqbal are not at all comparable to the facts in Plaintiff’s 2 case, that is immaterial. In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Twombly and held that a 3 claim may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 4 that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (abrogating pleading standard 5 established by Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,78 (1957)). Two years later, in Iqbal, the 6 Supreme Court clarified the rule set forth by Twombly and held that detailed factual 7 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, 8 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. The 9 Court looks to Iqbal, not for a comparison of the specific factual allegations, but rather for 10 the pleading standard required by the Supreme Court’s decisions in determining whether 11 Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 12 A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted merely because Plaintiff is unhappy 13 with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to binding precedent, 14 or because he disagrees with the ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 15 R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (“[R]econsideration of a 16 judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”). 17 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 18 II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 19 A. Legal Standard 20 Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed this action. “As used in this section, 21 the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused 22 of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or 23 the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(c); see also Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 25 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 26 Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 27 practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 28 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. 1 Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original). The mandatory 2 screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring 3 suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 4 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, 5 or any portion of the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 6 upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 7 immune from such relief.” Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 8 purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 9 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 10 2014) (quoting Wheeler v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MANUEL ANTONION GONZALEZ, Case No.: 3:19-cv-2056-JLS-AHG CDCR #T-42888, 12 ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION Plaintiff, 13 FOR RECONSIDERATION; AND vs. (2) DISMISSING SECOND 14 AMENDED COMPLAINT DR. MALHOTRA; DR. ZHANG; 15 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A WARDEN OF R. J. CORRECTIONAL 16 FACILITY; ASSOCIATE WARDEN OF RJD, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. Procedural History 21 Plaintiff Manuel Antonio Gonzalez, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 22 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se in this civil 23 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) 24 Plaintiff prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a 25 civil action at the time he submitted his original complaint. (See ECF No. 5.) In addition, 26 Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), a Motion for 27 Preliminary Injunction (“PI”), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel together with his 28 Complaint (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4.). Plaintiff has not requested that the Clerk issue a summons, 1 “present[ed] a summons to the clerk for signature and seal” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 4(b), or has yet executed service of his complaint, TRO or PI upon any of the named 3 Defendants. 4 On December 3, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and PI, denied 5 his Motion to Appoint Counsel, and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim 6 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (See ECF No. at 10-11.) However, Plaintiff was given 7 leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified 8 in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 11.) 9 On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a forty-eight (48) page First Amended Complaint 10 (“FAC”), as well as over seventy (70) pages of exhibits. (See FAC, ECF No. 7.) On April 11 7, 2020, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 12 Procedure 8 and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; therefore, the 13 Court dismissed his FAC with leave to file an second amended complaint. (See ECF No. 14 8 at 7–8.) 15 On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a forty-six (46) page Second Amended Complaint 16 (“SAC”), as well as over eighty (80) pages of exhibits. (See SAC, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff 17 has also filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he objects to the citation to Ashcroft 18 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) in analyzing whether he has stated a claim upon which 19 relief may be granted. (See Mot., ECF No. at 11.) 20 II. Motion for Reconsideration 21 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s reliance on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 22 in screening his FAC was misplaced. (Mot. at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the 23 facts in Iqbal involved “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in 24 the history of the American Republic.” (Id. at 1 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670).) Plaintiff 25 maintains that the “current complaint [FAC] will almost certainly be more ordinary than 26 Iqbal, and Higher Courts may not demand such detailed pleading.” (Id.) Instead of Iqbal, 27 Plaintiff maintains that the Court should rely on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 28 544 (2007). (Id.) 1 Even though the facts in Iqbal are not at all comparable to the facts in Plaintiff’s 2 case, that is immaterial. In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Twombly and held that a 3 claim may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 4 that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (abrogating pleading standard 5 established by Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,78 (1957)). Two years later, in Iqbal, the 6 Supreme Court clarified the rule set forth by Twombly and held that detailed factual 7 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, 8 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. The 9 Court looks to Iqbal, not for a comparison of the specific factual allegations, but rather for 10 the pleading standard required by the Supreme Court’s decisions in determining whether 11 Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 12 A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted merely because Plaintiff is unhappy 13 with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to binding precedent, 14 or because he disagrees with the ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 15 R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (“[R]econsideration of a 16 judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”). 17 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 18 II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 19 A. Legal Standard 20 Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed this action. “As used in this section, 21 the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused 22 of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or 23 the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(c); see also Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 25 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 26 Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 27 practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 28 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. 1 Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original). The mandatory 2 screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring 3 suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 4 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, 5 or any portion of the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 6 upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 7 immune from such relief.” Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The 8 purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 9 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 10 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 11 2012)).1 12 Section 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure 13 to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 14 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient 15 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 17 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 18 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 19 suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 20 for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 21 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 22 “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this 23 plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 24 2009). 25 /// 26
27 1 A similar screening would be required if Plaintiff were proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. 28 1 B. Rule 8 2 Once again, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to comply with Federal Rule 3 of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8 provides that in order to state a claim for relief, a pleading 4 must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and 5 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2); see McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) 7 (upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with 8 redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. General Dynamics 9 C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 10 dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” “confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and 11 unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and comprised of “incomprehensible rambling,” while 12 noting that “[o]ur district courts are busy enough without having to penetrate a tome 13 approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern a plaintiff’s claims and 14 allegations.”). 15 In fact, Plaintiff’s SAC is a photocopy of Plaintiff’s FAC.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff 16 still fails to comply with Rule 8 for all the reasons set forth in the Court’s previous Orders. 17 C. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations3 18 On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff was “subjected” to a “head injury” which resulted in a 19 “concussion, post concussion syndrome, long term memory loss, short term memory loss, 20 off balance, loss of coordination, constant pressure in head.” (FAC at 13.) Plaintiff alleges 21 Defendant Malhotra, a neurologist, failed to provide him medical care which later “resulted 22 in high blood pressure in eyes, damaging eyesight, irreparable nerve damage.” (Id.) As a 23 result of the purported failure by Malhotra, Plaintiff “will have to take prescription eye 24
25 26 2 In addition, a review of Plaintiff’s original complaint and the FAC demonstrate that, while his FAC was not a photocopy of his original complaint, it was virtually identical. 27 3 The Court refers to the Court’s summary of his factual allegations found in his FAC set forth in the April 28 1 drops . . . for [his] lifetime to reduce high blood pressure in eyes.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 2 Malhotra never “ordered E.M.G. test for nerve damage” which he alleges is the 3 “appropriate test for high blood pressure in eyes.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he has “nerve 4 damage and optic nerve damage” discovered by a neuro-ophthalmologist and this damage 5 was due to Malhotra’s “failure to provide medical care.” (Id. at 14.) 6 Plaintiff alleges Malhotra “became aware of the serious medical condition” on June 7 7, 2018 but he “did not order necessary test to review cause of constant pressure to head.” 8 (Id. at 20.) Moreover, Plaintiff maintains that Malhotra “knew serious damage could 9 result” by not referring Plaintiff to a “specialist for necessary test.” (Id.) 10 Plaintiff claims Defendant Zhang, his “Primary Care Provider,” denied him adequate 11 medical care when Zhang purportedly failed to “re-schedule return follow up with 12 appointment with ‘Neuro Ophthalmologist,’ as “requested by ‘Neuro-Ophthalmologist’ in 13 February 2019.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff claims the Neuro-Ophthalmologist “ordered ‘return 14 appointment follow up’ specifically [to] monitor high blood pressure in eyes and the effects 15 of prescription eye drops, and monitor damage eyesight.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff alleges that 16 the failure to schedule the follow up visit caused him to be “subjected to blindness, losing 17 eyesight without specialist monitoring high blood pressure in eyes.” (Id. at 25.) 18 Plaintiff seeks twenty-one million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. 19 (See id. at 41.) 20 D. Inadequate Medical Care Claims 21 To the extent that Plaintiff contends Defendants Malhotra and Zhang failed to 22 provide him with adequate medical care, he again fails to allege a plausible Eighth 23 Amendment claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121 (citing 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915A). 25 A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual 26 punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious 27 medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. 28 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires a 1 plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating 2 that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the 3 ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need 4 was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 5 “Serious medical needs can relate to ‘physical, dental and mental health.’” Edmo v. 6 Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 7 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 8 (1995)). But prison officials do not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless they 9 “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 10 at 837. 11 As an initial matter, the Court will, once again, presume that Plaintiff’s factual 12 allegations describing his medical condition are sufficient to show he suffered from an 13 objectively serious medical need. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 14 (“serious medical needs” include “a medical condition that significantly affects an 15 individual’s daily activities,” and “the existence of chronic and substantial pain”) (citation 16 and internal quotations omitted). 17 To support a claim of deliberate indifference, however, Plaintiff must allege 18 additional facts which plausibly show the course of treatment Defendants Malhotra and 19 Zhang chose in response to his need was “medically unacceptable under the 20 circumstances,” and that they “chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk 21 to the plaintiff’s health.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (citations omitted). “Deliberate 22 indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cty. Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 23 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is present only 24 in cases where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or 25 possible medical need,” and where that indifference is alleged to have caused harm. Jett, 26 439 F.3d at 1096. 27 The alleged indifference to medical needs must also be substantial; inadequate 28 treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional 1 violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 2 1990). 3 As to Defendant Malhotra, Plaintiff only alleges that Malhotra purportedly never 4 “ordered E.M.G. test for nerve damage” which he alleges is the “appropriate test for high 5 blood pressure in eyes.” (SAC at 14.) As to Defendant Zhang, Plaintiff only alleges that 6 he purportedly “fail[ed] to re-schedule return follow up appointment with ‘neuro 7 ophthalmologist.” (Id. at 25.) The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient 8 to support a deliberate indifference claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint 9 that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not 10 state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical 11 malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a 12 prisoner.”); id. at 107 (noting that “the question whether an x-ray . . . is indicated is a classic 13 example of a matter for medical judgment,” and that provider’s failure to order “an x-ray 14 or additional diagnostic techniques” does not constitute deliberate indifference); Edmo, 15 935 F.3d at 786 (“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or 16 between medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not 17 amount to deliberate indifference.”) (citations omitted). 18 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has merely alleged a difference of opinion 19 regarding his need for medical care. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 20 to state an Eighth Amendment claim against either Malhotra or Zhang upon which relief 21 can be granted. 22 E. Leave to Amend 23 Because Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his 24 pleading deficiencies on two occasions, as well as an opportunity to amend those claims to 25 no avail, the Court finds granting further leave to amend would be futile. See Gonzalez v. 26 Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, 27 by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 28 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 1 || (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 2 ||subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s 3 || discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 4 ||(second alteration in original)). 5 Conclusion and Order 6 For the reasons explained, the Court: 7 1. DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 11.); 8 2. DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to 9 ||state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 1915(e)(2)(B)(Gii) and § 1915A(b)(1) and for violating Rule 8; 11 3. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 12 }}28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 13 4. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and close 14 || the file. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 ||Dated: June 2, 2020 . tt 17 pee Janis L. Sammartino 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12