Gonzalez-Utz v. Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 2, 2024
Docket23-240
StatusUnpublished

This text of Gonzalez-Utz v. Garland (Gonzalez-Utz v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gonzalez-Utz v. Garland, (9th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 2 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL DE JESUS GONZALEZ- No. 23-240 UTZ; MARIA PAULINA GONZALEZ- Agency Nos. SUNUC, A201-448-718 A201-448-717 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 28, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Manuel De Jesus Gonzalez-Utz (Gonzalez-Utz) and Maria Paulina

Gonzalez-Sunuc (Gonzalez-Sunuc), natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their

appeal of the finding by an Immigration Judge (IJ) that they were “removable as

charged.” We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

“When the BIA reviews the IJ’s decision de novo, our review is limited to

the BIA’s decision except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.”

Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “But when the BIA appears to have conducted de novo review,

yet the decision lacks any significant analysis, it suggests that the BIA gave

significant weight to the IJ’s findings and we look to the IJ’s decision as a guide to

what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.” Id. (citation, alteration, and internal

quotation marks omitted). We review de novo “questions of law” and “claims of

due process violations in removal proceedings.” Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d

1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks

omitted).

1. Petitioners argue that the Forms I-213 and accompanying Forms I-831

were inadmissible because they were not authenticated. We have held that

“documents may be authenticated in immigration proceedings through any

recognized procedure, such as those required by INS regulations or by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.

2007) (citation and alteration omitted). As the agency explained, Petitioners’

2 fingerprints were on the forms and the documents were part of Petitioners’ “A

File.”1 See id. at 1184 (explaining that “the requirement of authentication or

identification . . . is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims”) (citation and alteration omitted).

Petitioners also contend that the admission of the forms violated their

due process rights. To prevail on a due process challenge, Petitioners must

establish (1) “that the challenged proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that they

were prevented from reasonably presenting their case” and (2) “[s]ubstantial

prejudice [which] is established when the outcome of the proceeding may have

been affected by the alleged violation.” Grigoryan, 959 F.3d at 1240 (citations,

original alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioners have not

established that admission of the forms was fundamentally unfair, or that the

absence of the forms would have changed the outcome of their proceedings. See

Sanchez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Admission

of a Form I-213 is fair absent evidence of coercion or that the statements are not

those of the petitioner.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Petitioners assert that the translation provided to Gonzalez-Utz during

their merits hearing was inadequate and violated Gonzalez-Utz’s due process

1 The “A File” is a file that includes documentation of one’s immigration history. United States v. Medina-Suarez, 30 F.4th 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2022).

3 rights. Although Petitioners insist that “Mr. Manuel Gonzalez-Utz could not

understand the nature of the proceedings against him,” the record reflects that

Gonzalez-Utz understood the translator and the nature of the proceedings.

Additionally, the IJ made several attempts to obtain an interpreter, and assured

Gonzalez-Utz that the court would “spend as much time as possible” for “as long

as it takes . . . to make sure that” Gonzalez-Utz understood everything. Petitioners

have not demonstrated that a different translator would have changed the outcome

of their proceedings. Cf. Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 780-81 (9th Cir.

2000). Thus, Petitioners failed to establish that the proceedings were

“fundamentally unfair.” Grigoryan, 959 F.3d at 1240.

3. Petitioners also contend that the IJ violated their due process rights by

questioning Gonzalez-Utz’s alienage. But the IJ asked about Gonzalez-Utz’s

alienage solely to “determine the appropriate dialect” for translation purposes.

Petitioners have not demonstrated that the IJ’s questions “prejudiced [their]

interest.” Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011).

4. The IJ did not abuse its discretion in denying a competency hearing

for Gonzalez-Utz. The record does not reflect that “there [were] indicia of

incompetence” that required a hearing. Calderon-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 878 F.3d

1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2018).

4 Petition Denied.2

2 Petitioners also contend that the IJ violated the Settlement Agreement under Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2016), and that the IJ erroneously denied their motion to sever the proceedings. However, Petitioners “failed to exhaust the[se] alleged claim-processing violation[s] as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), [and] we deny this portion of the petition.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023), as amended (citations omitted). Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. 2, is denied. The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.

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Related

Gutierrez v. Holder
662 F.3d 1083 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Griselda Sanchez v. Eric H. Holder Jr.
704 F.3d 1107 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Vatyan v. Mukasey
508 F.3d 1179 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Jenny Flores v. Loretta Lynch
828 F.3d 898 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Henri Calderon-Rodriguez v. Jefferson Sessions
878 F.3d 1179 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Elen Grigoryan v. William Barr
959 F.3d 1233 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
United States v. Lucio Medina-Suarez
30 F.4th 816 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Josue Umana-Escobar v. Merrick Garland
69 F.4th 544 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)
Kwang Park v. Merrick Garland
72 F.4th 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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