Gonzalez-Mejia v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 13, 2024
• Docket: 23-1610
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 13 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIRON IBAN GONZALEZ-MEJIA, No. 23-1610 Agency No. Petitioner, A200-211-700 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Department of Homeland Security

Submitted September 11, 2024** San Francisco, California Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Jairon Iban Gonzalez-Mejia, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for

review of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision concurring with an asylum

officer’s negative reasonable fear determination. We have jurisdiction under 8

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and review the IJ’s reasonable fear determination for substantial

evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829,

833–34 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s negative reasonable fear

determination. A petitioner has a “reasonable fear of persecution or torture” when

he “establishes a reasonable possibility that he . . . would be persecuted on account

of his . . . race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or

political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the

country of removal.” Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836 (citing 8 C.F.R.

§§ 208.31(c), 1208.31(c)). Gonzalez-Mejia claims he has a reasonable fear of

returning to Honduras because gangs have targeted him due to (1) his political

opinion as a member of the Honduran military, and (2) based on his membership in

the particular social group comprised of his family. Neither is sufficient to establish

reasonable fear.

First, Gonzalez-Mejia fails to show that gang members targeted him based on

his military affiliation. In his testimony, Gonzalez-Mejia mentions only one

incident—a 2016 episode when gang members stole his motorcycle—connecting his

alleged persecution to his military status. But he conceded that he was wearing

civilian clothing during the robbery, and the robbers didn’t say anything about his

military affiliation. And when asked how the gang knew of his military affiliation,

2 23-1610 Gonzalez-Mejia vaguely responded that “maybe some of [his] friends, [or] other

people” told them. But he further testified that he had never previously received

threats from gangs due to his military affiliation. So substantial evidence supports

the IJ’s conclusion that Gonzalez-Mejia failed to establish that any alleged

persecution occurred because of his military status.

Second, Gonzalez-Mejia claims that he fears certain people, whom he doesn’t

know, that targeted him because of his father. Because his father allegedly killed

someone, Gonzalez-Mejia fears that his father’s enemies will retaliate against him

upon his return to Honduras. And he asserts that these unnamed people threatened

and followed his family. But Gonzalez-Mejia concedes that he was never directly

harmed or threatened by his father’s enemies, and that his family has lived in

Honduras without any harm from these enemies. So he failed to show a reasonable

possibility that his father’s enemies would persecute him. See Sharma v. Garland,

9 F.4th 1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The ongoing safety of family members in the

petitioner’s native country undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.”).

Because Gonzalez-Mejia failed to establish that persecution or torture would

occur based on a protected trait, the IJ properly concluded that he lacked reasonable

fear.

2. Gonzalez-Mejia also raised several due process arguments, each of which

is meritless. First, he asserts the reasonable fear screening procedures violate due

3 23-1610 process because petitioners cannot present new evidence. But we rejected that

argument in Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2021), because

“[d]ue process does not mandate the right to present new evidence to an appellate

tribunal when a litigant has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present

evidence to the first-instance decision-maker.” Id. at 1195.

Next, Gonzalez-Mejia contends that, even if the process is constitutionally

valid, the IJ’s conduct during his screening violated due process. Although he claims

that “the IJ’s statements toward Petitioner and his attorney show bias and hostility

such that the IJ did not act as a neutral fact finder,” Gonzalez-Mejia doesn’t point to

any instances in the record that demonstrate bias. He contends that the IJ’s bias

resulted in a lack of analysis. But that is insufficient to show any alleged bias

“potentially affected the outcome of the proceedings.” See Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d

1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019) (simplified); see also Alvarado-Herrera, 993 F.3d at

1190–91 (“During the review hearing, the immigration judge . . . may (but need not)

accept additional evidence and testimony from the non-citizen.” (simplified)).

Gonzalez-Mejia further admits that there are “no[] . . . cases where this Court

remanded for a new reasonable fear review due to an IJ’s bias[.]”

Lastly, related to his other claims, Gonzalez-Mejia argues that the IJ’s

decision violated due process because its analysis did not address any of his alleged

fears. But “an IJ’s failure specifically to address all of the evidence and claims

4 23-1610 before him or her (during the reasonable fear review proceedings) does not violate

the alien’s due process rights.” Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir.

2018). So the IJ did not violate Gonzalez-Mejia’s due process rights.

PETITION DENIED.

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