F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 30 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
KATHY GONZALES, individually, and as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRIS GONZALES, and as parent and next friend of RICHARD C. GONZALES, PATRISHA K. GONZALES, and CHRISTINA M. LOPEZ, minors, and ROBERT J. No. 96-2167 CHAVEZ, (D.C. No. CIV-95-463 LH) (DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO) Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, HENRY, Circuit Judge, and MCWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3 By a first amended complaint, Kathy Gonzales brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico against the United States of America for the
wrongful death of her husband, Chris Gonzales, which death, she said, was caused by
“medical malpractice” by employees of the Veterans Administration Hospital in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Kathy Gonzales brought suit individually, as the personal
representative of Chris Gonzales’ estate, and as parent and next friend of Chris Gonzales’
four children. Gonzales’ claims were based on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2671, et seq.
By answer, the United States alleged, inter alia, that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Gonzales’ claims which, it said, were time-barred under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. After discovery, the United States filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of Gonzales’
failure to file this action within the time limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The
district court granted the motion of the United States, treating it as a Rule 56 motion, and
dismissed the action in its entirety. Gonzales appeals. We affirm. Some background
facts are in order.
Chris Gonzales died on July 16, 1991, allegedly from an untreated and
undiagnosed pulmonary embolism following his visit and release from the emergency
room at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Albuquerque. On April 15, 1993, Kathy
-2- Gonzales filed a claim based on wrongful death with the Office of District Counsel for
the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) in Albuquerque, which claim admittedly was
received within the two year period for filing such a claim as provided by 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b). After several extensions, the United States, by way of certified mail, return
receipt requested, dated March 18, 1994, notified Kathy Gonzales that her claim for
wrongful death was denied. She signed the return receipt for the March 18 denial letter
on March 21, 1994. In the March 18 letter Kathy Gonzales was advised, inter alia, that
she could request reconsideration of her claim and that such request should be filed with
the VA prior to the expiration of six months from the date of the mailing of the denial
notice.
About one year after the denial letter of March 18, 1994, counsel for Gonzales
contacted the VA in Washington, D.C., to inquire about the status of her request for
reconsideration of the denial letter. A Douglas Bradshaw, of the VA, informed counsel
that he was not aware of a request for reconsideration ever having been received by the
department. On April 26, 1995, Gonzales filed her initial complaint in the present
proceeding and on August 18, 1995, filed her first amended complaint, with which we are
here concerned.
As indicated, there was some discovery in the form of depositions and affidavits
before the district court when it granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment.
Included therein was the affidavit of Gonzales’ counsel in which she stated that she
-3- mailed a request for reconsideration of the denial letter of March 18, 1994, on September
8, 1994, to the address given in the March 18, 1994, denial letter. Various government
employees, by deposition and affidavit, stated that the request for reconsideration referred
to by Gonzales’ counsel in her affidavit was never received by the United States.
We believe the instant case is governed by Moya v. United States, 35 F.3d 501
(10th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff in Moya filed an administrative claim on October 1, 1991,
with the VA, alleging that employees at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, negligently caused the death of her husband. The VA by
letter denied the claim on June 16, 1992. On May 20, 1993, the plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice and wrongful death action against the United States in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico. In that complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
she mailed a request for reconsideration to the administrative agency on October 16,
1992. However, the United States denied ever receiving a request for reconsideration. At
a hearing on the United States’ motion for summary judgment, the district court held that,
because the United States had not received plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, the
agency’s denial letter of June 16, 1992, served as a “final denial” by the agency.
Accordingly, the district court held that plaintiff’s complaint was filed outside the time
limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). On appeal, we affirmed the district court.
In Moya, we noted that a plaintiff may not assert a federal tort claim unless he, or
she, has prior thereto filed a claim with the appropriate federal agency within two years
-4- after the claim accrues. Further, we stated that, if the claim be denied, an action must
then be brought within six months after the date of mailing “of notice of final denial of
the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). More specifically, in Moya we said that within six
months following the notice of final denial, a claimant may either file suit in district court
or file a request for reconsideration, citing 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b). We also observed, in
Moya, that the agency had denied plaintiff’s claim on June 16, 1992, and that suit was not
brought until May 20, 1993, some eleven months later, and not within the six months
provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
The “evidentiary” matter before the district court in Moya was summarized by us
as follows:
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 30 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
KATHY GONZALES, individually, and as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRIS GONZALES, and as parent and next friend of RICHARD C. GONZALES, PATRISHA K. GONZALES, and CHRISTINA M. LOPEZ, minors, and ROBERT J. No. 96-2167 CHAVEZ, (D.C. No. CIV-95-463 LH) (DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO) Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, HENRY, Circuit Judge, and MCWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3 By a first amended complaint, Kathy Gonzales brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico against the United States of America for the
wrongful death of her husband, Chris Gonzales, which death, she said, was caused by
“medical malpractice” by employees of the Veterans Administration Hospital in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Kathy Gonzales brought suit individually, as the personal
representative of Chris Gonzales’ estate, and as parent and next friend of Chris Gonzales’
four children. Gonzales’ claims were based on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2671, et seq.
By answer, the United States alleged, inter alia, that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Gonzales’ claims which, it said, were time-barred under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. After discovery, the United States filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of Gonzales’
failure to file this action within the time limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The
district court granted the motion of the United States, treating it as a Rule 56 motion, and
dismissed the action in its entirety. Gonzales appeals. We affirm. Some background
facts are in order.
Chris Gonzales died on July 16, 1991, allegedly from an untreated and
undiagnosed pulmonary embolism following his visit and release from the emergency
room at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Albuquerque. On April 15, 1993, Kathy
-2- Gonzales filed a claim based on wrongful death with the Office of District Counsel for
the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) in Albuquerque, which claim admittedly was
received within the two year period for filing such a claim as provided by 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b). After several extensions, the United States, by way of certified mail, return
receipt requested, dated March 18, 1994, notified Kathy Gonzales that her claim for
wrongful death was denied. She signed the return receipt for the March 18 denial letter
on March 21, 1994. In the March 18 letter Kathy Gonzales was advised, inter alia, that
she could request reconsideration of her claim and that such request should be filed with
the VA prior to the expiration of six months from the date of the mailing of the denial
notice.
About one year after the denial letter of March 18, 1994, counsel for Gonzales
contacted the VA in Washington, D.C., to inquire about the status of her request for
reconsideration of the denial letter. A Douglas Bradshaw, of the VA, informed counsel
that he was not aware of a request for reconsideration ever having been received by the
department. On April 26, 1995, Gonzales filed her initial complaint in the present
proceeding and on August 18, 1995, filed her first amended complaint, with which we are
here concerned.
As indicated, there was some discovery in the form of depositions and affidavits
before the district court when it granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment.
Included therein was the affidavit of Gonzales’ counsel in which she stated that she
-3- mailed a request for reconsideration of the denial letter of March 18, 1994, on September
8, 1994, to the address given in the March 18, 1994, denial letter. Various government
employees, by deposition and affidavit, stated that the request for reconsideration referred
to by Gonzales’ counsel in her affidavit was never received by the United States.
We believe the instant case is governed by Moya v. United States, 35 F.3d 501
(10th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff in Moya filed an administrative claim on October 1, 1991,
with the VA, alleging that employees at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, negligently caused the death of her husband. The VA by
letter denied the claim on June 16, 1992. On May 20, 1993, the plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice and wrongful death action against the United States in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico. In that complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
she mailed a request for reconsideration to the administrative agency on October 16,
1992. However, the United States denied ever receiving a request for reconsideration. At
a hearing on the United States’ motion for summary judgment, the district court held that,
because the United States had not received plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, the
agency’s denial letter of June 16, 1992, served as a “final denial” by the agency.
Accordingly, the district court held that plaintiff’s complaint was filed outside the time
limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). On appeal, we affirmed the district court.
In Moya, we noted that a plaintiff may not assert a federal tort claim unless he, or
she, has prior thereto filed a claim with the appropriate federal agency within two years
-4- after the claim accrues. Further, we stated that, if the claim be denied, an action must
then be brought within six months after the date of mailing “of notice of final denial of
the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). More specifically, in Moya we said that within six
months following the notice of final denial, a claimant may either file suit in district court
or file a request for reconsideration, citing 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b). We also observed, in
Moya, that the agency had denied plaintiff’s claim on June 16, 1992, and that suit was not
brought until May 20, 1993, some eleven months later, and not within the six months
provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
The “evidentiary” matter before the district court in Moya was summarized by us
as follows:
Plaintiff supports her claim that she filed an appropriate request for reconsideration with an affidavit from her attorney stating that the request was sent via certified mail. Plaintiff does not produce a certificate of mailing, a return receipt, a certified mail number or any acknowledgment by the defendant of having received the request. Defendant denies ever receiving a request for reconsideration from plaintiff. In support, defendant presents affidavits stating that the VA searched its files in Washington and New Mexico and found no record of the plaintiff’s request. There is no independent evidence in the record indicating that plaintiff’s request was ever sent, let alone received by defendant.
Moya, 35 F.3d at 503.
We further noted in Moya that, under C.F.R. § 14.2(a), a “claim” is not presented
to a federal administrative agency until the claim is “received” by the agency. And we
-5- went on to state in Moya that a request for reconsideration is also not presented to an
agency “until it is received by the agency,” and that a “[m]ailing of a request for
reconsideration is insufficient to satisfy the presentment requirement.” Moya, 35 F.3d at
504.1 In this latter connection, we further stated that it is “the plaintiff’s burden to
establish the proper agency’s receipt of the request for reconsideration.” Id. Under the
facts of Moya, we also rejected the concept of any “presumed delivery” of a properly
addressed piece of mail, and then held that the plaintiff’s complaint having been filed
“out of time,” the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the United
States.
We recognize that in Moya the request for reconsideration was allegedly mailed by
certified mail, return receipt requested, some two months before expiration of the six
months time limitation provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), whereas, in the instant case, the
request for reconsideration, according to counsel’s affidavit, was simply “mailed” some
ten days before the expiration of the six month time limitation. However, such, in our
view, does not mean that in the instant case there is “presumed delivery” of any request
for reconsideration. As indicated, in Moya we rejected the concept of “presumed
In Anderberg v. United States, 718 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1983), we held that a 1
request for reconsideration must be received by the federal agency within six months of the latter’s denial order, and that a request, though mailed within the six month limitation period but not received until one day beyond the six month period, was not timely filed. Similarly, in Industrial Construction Corp. v. United States, 15 F.3d 963, 967 (10th Cir. 1994), we held that an administrative claim is not “presented” until it is actually received by the federal agency involved.
-6- delivery” in an action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and we do so in the
present case. In this regard, prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States was
immune from tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The exception
provided for in the Federal Tort Claims Act is to be construed and applied as written, and
neither extended nor narrowed. See Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); Arvayo v. United States, 766 F.2d 1416 (1985). And under
Moya, “mailing” is simply not proof of “receipt.”2
Judgment affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Robert H. McWilliams Senior Circuit Judge
2 In count 10 of the first amended complaint, Gonzales alleged a “spoliation” of evidence claim, alleging that the United States received her request for reconsideration, and thereafter negligently or intentionally destroyed it. Assuming that such a claim is otherwise allowable, the claim must fail in view of our holding that there is no showing that the United States ever “received” any request for reconsideration from Gonzales.
-7-