No. 81-144
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA
LARRY LAWRENCE GONZALES, JR.,
Petitioner,
-vs- JAMES BLODGETT, a c t i n g W a r d e n ,
Respondent.
O R I G I N A L PROCEEDING :
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For P e t i t i o n e r ;
L a r r y L a w r e n c e G o n z a l e s , Jr., Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t :
Hon, M i k e Greely, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ! H e l e n a , Montana Harold Hanserr County Attorney! Billings, Montana
Submittedt J u n e 1, 1 9 8 1
Decided : JuL 2 2 198%
Filed; 3Uh 2 2 198d
Clerk Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f the Court.
P e t i t i o n e r L a r r y Lawrence G o n z a l e s , J r . , has f i l e d a
pro se p e t i t i o n for a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1)
t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o revoke
h i s d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e a f t e r i t had e x p i r e d o r was c o m p l e t e d
and ( 2 ) t h a t he was d e n i e d e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel
by r e a s o n o f t h e f a i l u r e of h i s court-appointed counsel t o
r a i s e t h i s a s a defense.
On October 24, 1977, the District Court of
Yellowstone County d e f e r red i m p o s i t i o n of sentence and
placed petitioner on p r o b a t i o n for a period of one year
following his plea of guilty to the crime of aggravated
assault. On A u g u s t 1 4 , 1978, t h e D i s t r i c t Court extended
t h e d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e an a d d i t i o n a l two y e a r s
t o October 24, 1980, f o l l o w i n g a r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g w h e r e in
petitioner admitted a parole v i o l a t i o n . On A p r i l 4 , 1979,
t h e D i s t r i c t Court a g a i n extended t h e d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of
sentence until October 24, 1982, following a second
revocation hearing wherein the District Court found that
p e t i t i o n e r had a g a i n v i o l a t e d h i s p a r o l e .
On F e b r u a r y 2 , 1 9 8 1 , p e t i t i o n e r was f o u n d g u i l t y o f
the crime of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor, in the
J u s t i c e Court of Yellowstone County. Two d a y s later the
county attorney filed a third petition for revocation of
petitioner's deferred imposition of s e n t e n c e b a s e d on t h i s
misdemeanor c o n v i c t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e d a p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n
as well. Following a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t Court revoked
its order staying deferment of sentence and sentenced
petitioner t o a term of f i v e years in the State Prison for
t h e o r i g i n a l crime of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . P e t i t i o n e r contends i n t h i s habeas corpus proceeding
that:
(1) t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o revoke
the deferment of sentence and to sentence him for the
o r i g i n a l crime because p e t i t i o n e r had completed t h e p e r i o d
o f d e f e r m e n t and p r o b a t i o n ; and
(2) petitioner was denied effective assistance of
c o u n s e l by f a i l u r e o f h i s court-appointed counsel t o r a i s e
t h i s defense in the revocation proceeding.
The State raises four additional issues that it
c o n s i d e r s necessary t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s proceeding:
( 1 ) Is a deferred imposition of sentence a valid
s e n t e n c e t h a t c a n o n l y be v a c a t e d or modified pursuant t o
statutory authority?
( 2 ) Is s e c t i o n 46-18-203, MCA, a l i m i t a t i o n upon t h e
D i s t r i c t Court's sentencing authority?
(3) What is meant by the statutory language of
section 46-18-203, MCA, wherein the district judge is g r a n t e d o p t i o n a l and d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y t o " r e t a i n s u c h
j u r i s d i c t i o n with h i s court"?
( 4 ) Were t h e o r d e r s e x t e n d i n g t h e p e r i o d o f d e f e r m e n t
of i m p o s i t i o n of sentence i n excess of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
jurisdiction?
We find that only the first issue raised by the
petitioner need be addressed by the Court in reaching a
decision in t h i s matter.
The District Court is granted broad and flexible
s e n t e n c i n g a u t h o r i t y by s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n s 46-18-201 e t seq.,
MCA. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e d i s t r i c t judge is g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y
t o defer imposition of sentence following c o n v i c t i o n of a felony for a period not exceeding three years. Section
46-18-201(1)(a), MCA. In this action the petitioner's
s e n t e n c e was deferred on three separate occasions by the
D i s t r i c t Court f o r a t o t a l d e f e r r a l period of f i v e years.
The District Court's order of October 24, 1977, deferred
imposition of sentence and p l a c e d petitioner on p r o b a t i o n
f o r a p e r i o d of o n e y e a r . Following an a d m i t t e d v i o l a t i o n
of p r o b a t i o n a r y r u l e s , t h e p e r i o d o f d e f e r m e n t was e x t e n d e d
an a d d i t i o n a l two y e a r s . Following a second v i o l a t i o n of
probationary rules, the period of deferment was extended
another two years. During that period of deferment,
p e t i t i o n e r was f o u n d g u i l t y o f a m i s d e m e a n o r , h i s d e f e r m e n t
was r e v o k e d and he was s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e y e a r s i m p r i s o n m e n t .
Petitioner contends that the District Court exceeded its
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n e x t e n d i n g t h e t o t a l t i m e o f d e f e r m e n t beyond
the three-year l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i d e d by s t a t u t e , and we a g r e e .
Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA, gives the d i s t r i c t
judge authority t o defer i m p o s i t i o n of sentence following
conviction of a felony for a period not exceeding three
years. The l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e i s c l e a r and unambiguous
and it is the function of this Court, as set forth in
s e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA, t o s i m p l y a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e what
is in terms or i n substance contained i n the s t a t u t e . "When
the l a n g u a g e of the statute is p l a i n , unambiguous, direct
and cqrtain, the statute speaks for itself and there is nothing f o r the Court t o construe." S t a t e , E t c . v. D i s t r i c t
Court, Etc. (1979), Mont. , 5 9 1 P.2d 656, 662, 36
St.Rep. 489, 496, and c a s e s t h e r e i n c i t e d . "The i n t e n t i o n
of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e p l a i n
meaning o f t h e w o r d s u s e d and i f t h e meaning o f t h e s t a t u t e c a n be so determined, the c o u r t s may n o t g o f u r t h e r and
a p p l y any o t h e r means o f interpretation." State, Etc. v. D i s t r i c t Court, E t c . , supra. Applying these rules we hold that section 46-18-
2 0 1 ( l ) ( a ) , MCA, allows the District Court to revoke a d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e f o r any f e l o n y o n l y d u r i n g t h e t h r e e - y e a r p e r i o d immediately following t h e i n i t i a l sentence d e f e r r a l .
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No. 81-144
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA
LARRY LAWRENCE GONZALES, JR.,
Petitioner,
-vs- JAMES BLODGETT, a c t i n g W a r d e n ,
Respondent.
O R I G I N A L PROCEEDING :
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For P e t i t i o n e r ;
L a r r y L a w r e n c e G o n z a l e s , Jr., Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t :
Hon, M i k e Greely, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ! H e l e n a , Montana Harold Hanserr County Attorney! Billings, Montana
Submittedt J u n e 1, 1 9 8 1
Decided : JuL 2 2 198%
Filed; 3Uh 2 2 198d
Clerk Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f the Court.
P e t i t i o n e r L a r r y Lawrence G o n z a l e s , J r . , has f i l e d a
pro se p e t i t i o n for a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1)
t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o revoke
h i s d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e a f t e r i t had e x p i r e d o r was c o m p l e t e d
and ( 2 ) t h a t he was d e n i e d e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel
by r e a s o n o f t h e f a i l u r e of h i s court-appointed counsel t o
r a i s e t h i s a s a defense.
On October 24, 1977, the District Court of
Yellowstone County d e f e r red i m p o s i t i o n of sentence and
placed petitioner on p r o b a t i o n for a period of one year
following his plea of guilty to the crime of aggravated
assault. On A u g u s t 1 4 , 1978, t h e D i s t r i c t Court extended
t h e d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e an a d d i t i o n a l two y e a r s
t o October 24, 1980, f o l l o w i n g a r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g w h e r e in
petitioner admitted a parole v i o l a t i o n . On A p r i l 4 , 1979,
t h e D i s t r i c t Court a g a i n extended t h e d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of
sentence until October 24, 1982, following a second
revocation hearing wherein the District Court found that
p e t i t i o n e r had a g a i n v i o l a t e d h i s p a r o l e .
On F e b r u a r y 2 , 1 9 8 1 , p e t i t i o n e r was f o u n d g u i l t y o f
the crime of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor, in the
J u s t i c e Court of Yellowstone County. Two d a y s later the
county attorney filed a third petition for revocation of
petitioner's deferred imposition of s e n t e n c e b a s e d on t h i s
misdemeanor c o n v i c t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e d a p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n
as well. Following a h e a r i n g , t h e D i s t r i c t Court revoked
its order staying deferment of sentence and sentenced
petitioner t o a term of f i v e years in the State Prison for
t h e o r i g i n a l crime of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . P e t i t i o n e r contends i n t h i s habeas corpus proceeding
that:
(1) t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o revoke
the deferment of sentence and to sentence him for the
o r i g i n a l crime because p e t i t i o n e r had completed t h e p e r i o d
o f d e f e r m e n t and p r o b a t i o n ; and
(2) petitioner was denied effective assistance of
c o u n s e l by f a i l u r e o f h i s court-appointed counsel t o r a i s e
t h i s defense in the revocation proceeding.
The State raises four additional issues that it
c o n s i d e r s necessary t o t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s proceeding:
( 1 ) Is a deferred imposition of sentence a valid
s e n t e n c e t h a t c a n o n l y be v a c a t e d or modified pursuant t o
statutory authority?
( 2 ) Is s e c t i o n 46-18-203, MCA, a l i m i t a t i o n upon t h e
D i s t r i c t Court's sentencing authority?
(3) What is meant by the statutory language of
section 46-18-203, MCA, wherein the district judge is g r a n t e d o p t i o n a l and d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y t o " r e t a i n s u c h
j u r i s d i c t i o n with h i s court"?
( 4 ) Were t h e o r d e r s e x t e n d i n g t h e p e r i o d o f d e f e r m e n t
of i m p o s i t i o n of sentence i n excess of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
jurisdiction?
We find that only the first issue raised by the
petitioner need be addressed by the Court in reaching a
decision in t h i s matter.
The District Court is granted broad and flexible
s e n t e n c i n g a u t h o r i t y by s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n s 46-18-201 e t seq.,
MCA. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e d i s t r i c t judge is g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y
t o defer imposition of sentence following c o n v i c t i o n of a felony for a period not exceeding three years. Section
46-18-201(1)(a), MCA. In this action the petitioner's
s e n t e n c e was deferred on three separate occasions by the
D i s t r i c t Court f o r a t o t a l d e f e r r a l period of f i v e years.
The District Court's order of October 24, 1977, deferred
imposition of sentence and p l a c e d petitioner on p r o b a t i o n
f o r a p e r i o d of o n e y e a r . Following an a d m i t t e d v i o l a t i o n
of p r o b a t i o n a r y r u l e s , t h e p e r i o d o f d e f e r m e n t was e x t e n d e d
an a d d i t i o n a l two y e a r s . Following a second v i o l a t i o n of
probationary rules, the period of deferment was extended
another two years. During that period of deferment,
p e t i t i o n e r was f o u n d g u i l t y o f a m i s d e m e a n o r , h i s d e f e r m e n t
was r e v o k e d and he was s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e y e a r s i m p r i s o n m e n t .
Petitioner contends that the District Court exceeded its
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n e x t e n d i n g t h e t o t a l t i m e o f d e f e r m e n t beyond
the three-year l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i d e d by s t a t u t e , and we a g r e e .
Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA, gives the d i s t r i c t
judge authority t o defer i m p o s i t i o n of sentence following
conviction of a felony for a period not exceeding three
years. The l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e i s c l e a r and unambiguous
and it is the function of this Court, as set forth in
s e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA, t o s i m p l y a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e what
is in terms or i n substance contained i n the s t a t u t e . "When
the l a n g u a g e of the statute is p l a i n , unambiguous, direct
and cqrtain, the statute speaks for itself and there is nothing f o r the Court t o construe." S t a t e , E t c . v. D i s t r i c t
Court, Etc. (1979), Mont. , 5 9 1 P.2d 656, 662, 36
St.Rep. 489, 496, and c a s e s t h e r e i n c i t e d . "The i n t e n t i o n
of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e p l a i n
meaning o f t h e w o r d s u s e d and i f t h e meaning o f t h e s t a t u t e c a n be so determined, the c o u r t s may n o t g o f u r t h e r and
a p p l y any o t h e r means o f interpretation." State, Etc. v. D i s t r i c t Court, E t c . , supra. Applying these rules we hold that section 46-18-
2 0 1 ( l ) ( a ) , MCA, allows the District Court to revoke a d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e f o r any f e l o n y o n l y d u r i n g t h e t h r e e - y e a r p e r i o d immediately following t h e i n i t i a l sentence d e f e r r a l . This three-year p e r i o d c a n n o t be e x t e n d e d by a n o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n impose c o n d i t i o n s o f probation during the time of deferment which are not in
contradiction t o the deferred sentence, but t h e court cannot e x t e n d t h e p e r i o d o f d e f e r m e n t beyond t h e maximum t h r e e - y e a r p e r i o d mandated by s e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 8 - 2 0 1 ( 1 ) ( a ) , MCA.
In this action the maximum period for revoking a deferred sentence had elapsed and the District Court no longer had jurisdiction at the time it sentenced the
petitioner t o serve f i v e years in the S t a t e Prison for the o r i g i n a l crime of aggravated a s s a u l t . Since the D i s t r i c t C o u r t had l o s t i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e s e n t e n c e imposed by it is void.
A c c o r d i n g l y t h e w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s i s g r a n t e d , and the respondent is d i r e c t e d to release petitioner from
confinement i n t h e S t a t e Prison f o r t h w i t h absent independent grounds f o r holding p e t i t i o n e r i n custody.
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