Goncalves v. Bondi

138 F.4th 58

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: May 20, 2025
• Docket: 24-1511
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1511 IGOR LEANDRO RAMOS GONCALVES,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA J. BONDI,* UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Rikelman, Howard, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.

Sierra J. Perez-Sparks, with whom David Zimmer was on brief, for petitioner. Christopher Ian Pryby, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, and Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent.

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Merrick B. Garland as respondent. May 20, 2025 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. Igor Quinn-Goncalves, an

undocumented native and citizen of Brazil, brings this petition

for review of an April 17, 2024 decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying his appeal of an immigration

judge's order that he be removed from the United States.1 The

petition was not timely filed in this Court and therefore is

dismissed.

Quinn-Goncalves, who has been detained at all relevant

times, acknowledges that his petition was untimely because it

arrived at the clerk's office on May 20, 2024 -- three days after

the last day on which it could have been timely filed.2 See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (requiring that petitions for review "be

filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of

removal"); Fed. R. App. P. 15(a)(1) ("Review of an agency order is

commenced by filing, within the time prescribed by law, a petition

for review with the clerk of a court of appeals authorized to

review the agency order."); id. 25(a)(2)(A)(i) ("[F]iling [of a

1 Although the petitioner submitted his petition under the name Igor Leandro Ramos Goncalves, he changed his name to Igor Quinn-Goncalves after marrying Kerry Quinn-Goncalves. We use the petitioner's married name. 2 Kerry Quinn-Goncalves sent the petition through the United Parcel Service ("UPS") on May 17, 2024 -- the last day on which it could be timely filed. She contends that she did so after phoning the clerk's office on that date and being incorrectly advised that placing the petition in the mail by the deadline was sufficient to make the petition timely.

- 3 - petition for review] may be accomplished by mail addressed to the

clerk, but filing is not timely unless the clerk receives the

[petition] within the time fixed for filing."). He also recognizes

that this Court may not extend the time for filing a petition for

review. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2) (stating that, while an

appeals court generally may extend time deadlines "[f]or good

cause," it "may not extend the time to file," inter alia, a

petition for review of a decision of an administrative board); see

also id. 2(a) ("[A] court of appeals may -- to expedite its

decision or for other good cause -- suspend any provision of these

rules in a particular case and order proceedings as it directs,

except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b)."). He nevertheless

contends that we may address the merits of his petition through a

post hoc extension of time for the clerk to receive the petition,

and that good cause exists for us to do so.

Quinn-Goncalves's principal argument builds from the

premise that, under section 1252(b)(1), Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i), and

Rule 26(b)(2), a petition for review placed in the mail within

thirty days of the final order of removal, as his petition was, is

filed upon mailing. Proceeding from there, Quinn-Goncalves argues

that, while Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i) also establishes a separate and

distinct timely "receipt" requirement -- a requirement that he

acknowledges he did not satisfy -- Rule 26(b)(2)'s prohibition on

"extend[ing] the time to file" a petition for review applies only

- 4 - to the filing of the petition, and not to its receipt by the clerk.

Thus, the argument runs, Rule 26(b)'s prohibition on an extension

of time "to file" a petition for review does not preclude a court

from, for good cause, extending the time for receipt of the filing.

The government disputes Quinn-Goncalves's premise that,

in the context of nonelectronic filing under Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i),

mailing the petition constitutes filing the petition. According

to the government, the act of filing is not complete in this

context until the clerk receives the petition. Here, because the

clerk received the petition three days after the statutory filing

deadline, the government argues that it was not timely filed. And

Rule 26(b)(2), the government says, bars this Court from addressing

the merits of a petition for review that was not timely filed.

We assume arguendo two elements of Quinn-Goncalves's

case that are contested by the government. First, we assume that

Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i) governs this case even though

Quinn-Goncalves's wife sent the petition by UPS rather than by

depositing it in the U.S. mail. See supra, note 2. Second, we

assume that Quinn-Goncalves could establish good cause under Rules

2(a) and 26(b) for the clerk's untimely receipt of his petition.

Even so, we conclude that a petition for review mailed but not

timely received within the time fixed for filing falls within Rule

26(b)(2)'s prohibition on the Court granting time extensions.

- 5 - Quinn-Goncalves's argument in support of reading the

word "filed" in section 1252(b)(1) to refer only to mailing a

petition for review, and not its receipt, begins from an analogy

he draws to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266 (1988). There, a state prisoner proceeding pro se timely

"deposited" with prison authorities a notice of appeal from the

denial of his federal habeas petition. Id. at 268. But the

notice, which prison authorities then mailed, did not arrive at

the appropriate district court clerk's office until after the

expiration of the applicable statutory deadline. See id. at 268-

69. Emphasizing the obstacles to timely filing faced by

unrepresented prisoners, the Court held that the prisoner's notice

was "filed" within the meaning of the applicable procedural

provisions when the prisoner deposited the notice with prison

authorities for mailing. See id. at 269-76.3

3 The procedural provisions applicable in Houston included 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Rules 3(a) and 4(a)(1). See 487 U.S. at 272. Like 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), the then-extant version of section 2107 set forth a thirty-day time limit but neither "define[d] when a notice of appeal has been 'filed' [n]or designate[d] the person with whom it must be filed . . . ." Id. And the then-extant versions of Rules 3(a) and 4(a)(1) "[were] not dispositive" of when "filing" occurs as a textual matter. Id. at 273. Subsequently, in 1993, Rule 25 was amended to memorialize Houston's holding and extend it "to all papers filed in the courts of appeals by persons confined in institutions." Fed. R. App. P. 25 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. In relevant part, Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(iii) states:

- 6 - There are some similarities between the statute

interpreted in Houston, 28 U.S.C. § 2107, and section 1252(b)(1).

As just observed, neither statute provided a definition of the

steps required for filing a paper. See supra, note 3. Moreover,

Houston adopted a "mailbox rule" even though, as in this case,

neither of the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly

required it to do so. See Houston, 487 U.S. at 274; Fed. R. App.

P. 3(a), 4(a)(1).4 But on balance, Houston undermines, rather than

supports, Quinn-Goncalves's argument.

First, Houston emphasized that its ruling was informed

by the "unique" constraints faced by pro se prisoners. Houston,

Inmate Filing. If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, an inmate confined there must use that system to receive the benefit of this [Rule]. A paper not filed electronically by an inmate is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing . . . . 4 Contrast the relationship between the Supreme Court certiorari statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2101 -- which specifies the deadlines for, inter alia, filing a petition for a writ of certiorari without defining when filing occurs -- and Supreme Court Rule 29.2, which quite clearly adopts a mailbox rule: A document is timely filed if it is . . . sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing . . . .

- 7 - 487 U.S. at 272.5 Quinn-Goncalves did not face all of these

constraints. Critically, he was not in the position of having 'no

choice but to entrust the forwarding of his [papers] to prison

authorities . . . .'" Id. His wife sent his petition to the Court

on his behalf, and he also concedes that he had access to but did

not use an electronic filing system of the type now authorized by

Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(iii), which did not exist when Houston was

decided. See supra, note 3.

Second, Houston stated that it was not disturbing the

general rule in civil appeals, confirmed by "a large body of lower

court authority," that receipt by the court is ordinarily a

necessary filing element. 487 U.S. at 274 (collecting illustrative

cases). In other words, Houston carefully limited its adoption of

the mailbox rule to the specific situation presented in that case

5 Houston identified the following constraints as relevant to its conclusion: (1) "pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the [paper] is stamped 'filed' or to establish the date on which the court received the notice"; (2) pro se prisoners are disadvantaged compared with other litigants in that only they are forced to "entrust their [papers] to the vagaries of the mail and the clerk's process for stamping incoming papers"; (3) pro se prisoners cannot "place the [paper] directly into the hands of the United States Postal Service (or a private express carrier)" or "call[] the court" to confirm that it has been "received and stamped, knowing that if the mail goes awry they can personally deliver [the paper] at the last moment or that their monitoring will provide them with evidence to demonstrate either excusable neglect or that the [paper] was not stamped on the date the court received it"; and (4) pro se prisoners have "no choice but to entrust the forwarding of [their papers] to prison authorities whom [they] cannot control or supervise and who may have every incentive to delay." 487 U.S. at 271.

- 8 - which, as we have just said, is quite different from the situation

here.

Third, Houston observed that the administrative concerns

frequently cited in support of the general rule that filing is

fully accomplished only upon receipt -- namely, that adoption of

a mailbox rule "would increase disputes and uncertainty over when

a filing occurred" and "would put all the evidence about the date

of filing in the hands of one party" -- do not apply to a pro se

prisoner. Id. at 275. A pro se prisoner "does not anonymously

drop his [paper] in a public mailbox," but rather "hands it over

to prison authorities who have well-developed procedures for

recording the date and time at which they receive papers for

mailing and who can readily dispute a prisoner's assertions that

he delivered the paper on a different date." Id. But these

administrative concerns do militate against the use of a mailbox

rule to assess the timeliness of a filing by one who simply drops

a petition for review in a publicly accessible mailbox. See Fed.

R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(i).6

6 We recognize that Kerry Quinn-Goncalves's use of UPS to send the petition to the clerk's office made it unlikely that any controversy would arise about the date on which she sent the petition. See supra, note 2. But Quinn-Goncalves asks us to treat his case as if he had "accomplished" his filing "by mail" within the meaning of Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i). We do so for the sake of argument and thus analyze the case as if it in fact involved a mailbox mailing which would raise the concerns described above.

- 9 - For these reasons, we reject Quinn-Goncalves's argument

that, under the reasoning of Houston, we should read section

1252(b)(1) to treat a petition for review as filed when mailed.

In this situation, the general rule should apply.

In addition to relying on Houston, Quinn-Goncalves makes

an independent argument that Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i) provides that

timely filing occurs upon mailing the petition within the statutory

deadline. He contends that the Rule's statement that "filing may

be accomplished by mail" must be read to mean that the filing is

complete upon mailing, and that the subsequent provision of the

Rule stating that the "filing is not timely unless the clerk

receives the paper within the time fixed for filing" simply adds

an additional, waivable, timely-receipt requirement. He also

suggests that a contrary reading would render the Rule's timely-

receipt language superfluous and that a comparison of the text of

Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i) with that of Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii)

reinforces his contention that filing is completed upon mailing

under all three subsections.7 Again, we disagree.

7 Quinn-Goncalves says that if, as a general matter, filing is not complete until a paper is received by the clerk, then there would be no need to include language specifying a timely receipt requirement. But the very fact that we are relying on a "general rule" concerning the completion of filing in the context of mailed papers makes clear that there also are exceptions. To see that this is so, one need look no further than Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(ii), which specifies that, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 25(a)(2)(a)(i) requiring timely receipt by the

- 10 - The better reading of the Rule, we believe, starts with

recognizing that section (a)(2)'s heading -- "Filing: Method and

Timeliness" -- suggests that both method and timeliness are

elements of an effective "filing." See Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2).

The remainder of the section then provides details about both

elements in various filing scenarios. Under this reading, the

statement that "filing may be accomplished by mail addressed to

the clerk" in Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i) is not a statement about how

filing is to be completed; it is, rather, an affirmation that a

mailing to the clerk is a permissible method of nonelectronic

filing. And the immediately subsequent statement that a "filing

[by mail] is not timely unless the clerk receives the papers within

the time fixed for filing" is a necessary clarification about how

the timeliness of a mailed filing will be judged. Such a

clarification is necessary because, unlike an electronic or hand

-delivered submission, the clerk will not receive a mailed filing

simultaneously with its being submitted. Rules 25(a)(2)(A)(ii)

and (iii) then carve out, respectively, mailbox-rule exceptions to

the generally applicable timeliness requirement for briefs,

clerk for most papers, "[a] brief or appendix not filed electronically is timely filed" if "on or before the last day for filing, it is . . . mailed to the clerk . . . or dispatched to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the clerk within 3 days." Thus, rather than being surplusage, the timely-receipt language in Rule 25(a)(2)(i) serves to clarify that the mailbox rule adopted in Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(ii) for briefs and appendices does not apply to other papers.

- 11 - appendices, see supra, note 7, and inmate filings, see supra, note

3, that are not filed electronically. And Rule 25(a)(4) reinforces

that filing generally occurs upon receipt by the clerk. See id.

("The clerk must not refuse to accept for filing any paper

presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in

proper form as required by these rules or any local rule or

practice." (emphasis added)).8

The understanding that the elements of an effective

filing include both a permissible method and a standard for judging

timeliness also leads to a more even-handed and administrable

operation of Rule 26(b)'s prohibition on granting good-cause

extensions of the time to file petitions for review.

Quinn-Goncalves's proposed use of a mailbox rule to differentiate

petitioners who are eligible to seek a good-cause time extension

from those facing a time-bar runs counter to the unqualified

language of Rule 26(b), which uniformly bars untimely petitions.

We see no reason to introduce a disparity into the operation of a

rule whose text does not contemplate it. Moreover,

Quinn-Goncalves's proposal (1) would likely increase uncertainty

and thus disputes over when a "filing" has occurred, and (2) would

put all of the evidence about the date of filing in the hands of

8 As the government points out, the words "for filing" would be superfluous if the filing was complete upon mailing, for the mailed paper already would have been filed.

- 12 - one party. Both factors counsel in favor of treating timely

receipt as an element of filing under Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i). See

Houston, 487 U.S. at 275 (elaborating why the timeliness of the

filing of a mailed paper is usually based on when it is received

by the clerk and not when it is mailed).

Although Quinn-Goncalves mailed his petition before the

expiration of the statutory deadline for filing his petition for

review, he failed to ensure that the clerk received it by that

deadline. Quinn-Goncalves therefore failed to timely file his

petition, see, e.g., Chao Lin v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 677 F.3d 1043,

1044-46 (11th Cir. 2012) (petition untimely when sent by

third-party courier before deadline but not received until after

deadline); Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th

Cir. 2003) (similar, involving mailed petition); Sankarapillai v.

Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 1004, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 2003) (similar,

involving petition mailed on the deadline); is barred by Rule 26(b)

from obtaining a post hoc extension of time for filing;9 and has

presented no other developed argument for avoiding the prohibition

set forth in Rule 26(b).10 Accordingly, we dismiss the petition.

9 Cf. Diaz-Valdez v. Garland, 122 F.4th 436 (1st Cir. 2024) (remanding to the agency to apply the correct legal standard in addressing a request for equitable tolling, based on the BIA's own precedent, construing the BIA's regulation setting out a thirty- day appeal deadline). 10 Quinn-Goncalves does present an alternative request that we treat his filing as a timely inmate filing under

- 13 - Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(iii), see supra, note 3, and excuse for good cause his failure to deposit it in his institution's internal mail system. But Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(iii), by its terms, precludes us from doing so. See id. ("If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, an inmate confined there must use that system to receive the benefit of this Rule . . . .") (emphasis added).

- 14 -