Gona v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEEPIKNA GONA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:20-cv-3680-RCL

UNITED ST A TES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court are defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services'

(USCIS) motion [15] to stay proceedings or to extend the LCvR 7(n)(l) deadline and the parties'

Rule 16(b) report [ 17]. The Court addresses these items in turn.

I. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

The agency asks the Court to stay proceedings for sixty days to allow it time to complete

adjudication of plaintiff Deepikna Gona's applications.

The Court has "has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to

control its own docket." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). In exercising that discretion,

the Court must "weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance between the court's

interests in judicial economy and any possible hardship to the parties." Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v.

Gov 't of Belize, w, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Landis

v. N Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)). The movant bears the burden of establishing its

need for a stay. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708. If a stay may harm another party, the movant "must

make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward." Landis v. N Am.

Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). The Court has no doubt that Ms. Gona suffers harm each day she waits-without the ability

to work-for the agency to process her applications. Accordingly, the agency must demonstrate

clearly that it would suffer hardship or inequity absent a stay. This it cannot do. The agency's

case for a stay is rooted entirely in efficiency concerns; however, engaging in potentially

unnecessary litigation for a few weeks does not pose nearly the same hardship as an inability to

lawfully work for the same per.iod of time. Thus, the agency is not entitled to a stay.

II. EXTENSION OF DEADLINES

In the alternative, the agency seeks a three-week extension of its deadline to file an index

of the administrative record, as required by LCvR 7(n)( 1).

As the agency sought the extension before the deadline lapsed, it must demonstrate good

cause to be accorded additional time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(l)(A). The agency says it "will need

additional time to produce a certified list of the administrative record documents pertaining to the

agency actions and inactions that are raised in the Complaint," Def. 's Mem. 4, ECF No. 15-1, but

does not explain why it needs ~dditional time. A conclusory statement of unavoidable delay does not constitute good cause to extend a deadline. The agency also says that "because Plaintiff's

counsel has filed cases raising essentially identical claims in other judicial districts, the contents

of the administrative records must be coordinated among attorneys and agency officials

responsible for handling the other cases, as well." Id. The Court struggles to see why parallel

suits should slow the process of producing the administrative record. The record supporting an

agency regulation is static. Indeed, if anything, the existence of parallel litigation in a more

advanced posture should lessen the work the agency must complete in this case. Nevertheless,

because Ms. Gona has not expressly opposed this extension and because an extension is unlikely

to prejudice Ms. Gona or hinder the fair administration of justice, the Court will allow the agency

2 the extension it seeks. See Day v. D.C. Dep't of Consumer & Regul. Ajfs., 191 F. Supp. 2d 154,

160 (D.D.C. 2002).

III. DISCOVERY

Jn their Rule 16(b) report, the parties disagree about whether discovery is appropriate in

this case. The Court need not parse all of their arguments because the resolution of this dispute is

quite simple.

Ms. Gona is entitled to conduct discovery on her unreasonable delay claim because resolving

that claim requires careful analysis of her specific factual circumstances. See Mashpee

Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Indeed, the

Court cannot decide this claim based solely on the administrative record because agency inaction

generally does not produce a record at all. See Nat 'l L. Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. Dep 't

of Veterans Affs., 842 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D.D.C. 2012); see ·also, e.g., Mot. for Relief from

LCvR 7(n) at 2, Addala v. Cuccinelli, No. 20-cv-2460-RCL, ECF No. 8 (acknowledging that

USCIS does not have administrative record prior to visa adjudication). More importantly, an

isolated administrative record would not allow the Court to determine whether the agency adheres

to a rule ofreason in adjudicatiµg visa applications. Discovery is necessary to resolve Ms. Gona's

inaction claim.

Ms. Gona is not entitled to conduct discovery, as it appears both parties agree, to support

her APA challenge to the agency regulation. In a challenge to final agency action, judicial review

is ordinarily limited to the administrative record in existence at the time of the agency's decision.

Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971,976 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,

470 U.S. 729, 743(1985)).

3 IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the motion is GRANTED IN PART insofar as it seeks an

extension of the LCvR 7(n)(l) deadline and DENIED IN PART insofar as it seeks a stay of

proceedings. The agency's deadline to produce an index of the administrative record is extended,

nunc pro tune, to April 5, 2021.

Additionally, the parties shall adhere to the following deadlines:

• Discovery deadtine May 10, 2021

• Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment due May 17, 2021

• Defendant's combined cross-motion for summary judgment/ May 31, 2021 opposition due

• Plaintiffs combined response/reply due June 7, 2021

• Defendant's reply due June 14, 2021

• Joint appendix of administrative record due June 28, 2021

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: - - -- I '-I I I '1,,( - -- - Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge