[Cite as Gomm v. Kings Motors Group, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-2000.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
NATHAN GOMM : : C.A. No. 30729 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 25CVI01039 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Municipal Court) KINGS MOTORS GROUP LLC : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellant : OPINION :
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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 29, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30729
MICHAEL T. COLUMBUS, Attorney for Appellant NATHAN GOMM, Appellee, Pro Se
EPLEY, J.
{¶ 1} Kings Motors Group, LLC (“KMG”), appeals from the trial court’s judgment in
favor of Nathan Gomm, which awarded him $6,000 in damages on its finding that KMG
violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”) when it sold him a used vehicle
that had multiple defects. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is
reversed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On April 19, 2024, Gomm purchased a used 2020 Hyundai Elantra from KMG.
Almost immediately following the purchase, Gomm became aware that the vehicle had
significant problems, which would cost approximately $9,500 to fix. On April 30, 2025, Gomm
filed a petition against KMG in small claims court, alleging that it had misrepresented the
condition of the Elantra it sold to Gomm.
{¶ 3} On July 22, 2025, the magistrate conducted a trial during which Gomm and
KMG salesperson Mohammad Qasem testified. During trial, Gomm testified that prior to
deciding on the Elantra, he test-drove three other vehicles that KMG had on the lot for sale.
When he ultimately decided to purchase the Elantra, he negotiated a sales price of $11,500
with Qasem. Gomm recalled asking Qasem questions about the history of the vehicle,
including whether it had ever been in an accident. He testified that Qasem indicated that the
vehicle had a “clean Carfax” (an online vehicle history report). Gomm acknowledged that
prior to making the purchase, he had looked online for the Carfax associated with the
2 Elantra. Gomm further acknowledged that he signed documents agreeing that he was
purchasing the Elantra “as-is.” He recalled that while signing these documents, Qasem told
him that KMG “has a due diligence process, they thoroughly inspect every vehicle.” Gomm
testified that he asked Qasem if they had come across any issues with the Elantra during
their inspection process. Qasem responded that he was not aware of any issues with the
vehicle. Gomm stated that Qasem never advised him to have the vehicle inspected by a
mechanic.
{¶ 4} After being at the dealership for approximately an hour and a half, Gomm took
the Elantra home the same day. When he and his family took the vehicle out for a drive, they
noticed some small defects. Gomm discovered that one of the back doors would not open
from the inside, one of the seatbelts in the backseat was broken, and one of the windshield
wipers was missing. He also noticed that the blinker lights were not working.
{¶ 5} Gomm reached out to KMG regarding these defects, and he provided the details
of those communications through his texts and e-mails that were admitted as exhibits during
the trial. Gomm’s record of the communications that he had with KMG indicated that on
April 21, 2024, he sent a text to Qasem stating, in relevant part: “I wanted to let you know
on my way home from the dealership and later that night driving my kids around the
neighborhood, I was disappointed as we noticed several issues that I feel King’s Motors
should have been aware of through its due diligence and inspection processes and that
should have been disclosed prior to selling the car. This is what we came across: broken
seatbelt in backseat; driver side rear door doesn’t open from the inside, no spare tire, front
panel missing from car and sitting in the trunk; both front blinker lights are out; missing
windshield wiper; warning light on due to the Blind-spot Collision Warning System.”
3 {¶ 6} Gomm then asked Qasem what KMG would do to “make this right.” After Gomm
failed to receive a response, he followed up with Qasem via text and e-mail on April 25,
2024. According to Gomm’s records, Qasem responded with a text notifying Gomm that he
sent all of the information to his manager and that the manager would be reaching out to
Gomm soon to discuss the issues with the Elantra. Gomm testified that Sal, the manager at
KMG, reached out to him on April 27, 2024, and left a voicemail for Gomm to call him back
regarding the issues with the Elantra. When Sal returned Gomm’s call on April 30, 2024, Sal
informed him that KMG outsources its vehicle inspections to a third party, but he would reach
out to them to obtain a copy of the inspection sheet and asked Gomm to give him until the
end of the week. However, Sal did not reach back out to Gomm. After attempting to contact
Sal multiple times, Gomm received a text from Qasem on May 10, 2024. Qasem informed
Gomm that Sal had reached out to the mechanic and there was nothing they could do.
According to Gomm’s records, Qasem stated that “the mechanic said everything passed
inspection and isn’t helping out. Normally we would reimburse you but being we already
gave you a great deal on the car and we waived the document fee, there’s nothing more we
are able to do. Sorry.”
{¶ 7} Following receipt of Qasem’s text, Gomm reached out to Richard Smith, owner
and operator of Muffler Brothers, on May 10, 2024. Gomm informed Smith about the issues
he had discovered with the Elantra, and he scheduled an appointment on May 16, 2024, for
Smith to take a closer look at the vehicle. Following the inspection, Smith told Gomm that
there were many more significant issues with the vehicle, and he advised Gomm to have
the Elantra inspected by an auto body shop.
{¶ 8} On May 18, 2024, Gomm e-mailed KMG regarding Smith’s findings. Gomm
stated that the mechanic’s inspection of the Elantra showed that the blinker lights did not
4 work because “they were not connected to the front wiring harness due to extensive front
end damage that has been pieced together with zip strips.” Gomm further informed KMG
that the Elantra appeared to have been involved in both front and rear end collisions, none
of which were disclosed prior to the sale. Sal responded on May 19, 2024, apologizing for
the issues with the vehicle and asking to schedule a call to discuss how KMG could “make
it right.”
{¶ 9} Gomm testified that the call took place on May 23, 2024, during which Sal
informed him that KMG was not required to do anything to remedy the situation because
Gomm bought the vehicle as-is. However, Sal stated that they could try to work something
out, and they agreed that Sal would evaluate the Elantra and send Gomm an offer to help
cover the repair cost. Gomm acknowledged that he was willing to pay a part of the repair
costs, as well. They further agreed that Gomm would have the Elantra inspected by an auto
body shop to obtain an estimate for the repair work, and he would send the estimate to KMG.
However, on May 27, 2024, prior to Gomm’s obtaining an estimate from a body shop, Sal e-
mailed him again and offered $500 to help with the repair costs. Gomm responded and said
that he did not want to accept until he got the estimate from the auto body shop.
{¶ 10} On May 30, 2024, Gomm e-mailed KMG again and stated that he had taken
the Elantra to C & D Collision Center for inspection. He stated that two mechanics looked at
the vehicle and found extensive damage. Gomm stated that the mechanics’ “biggest
concerns were the front support being broken and the rocker panel on the passenger side
of the vehicle. Instead of it being replaced, the damaged metal was left in place and then
gaps were filled with plastic which will eventually break.” C & D Collision Center also
provided two estimates to Gomm. The first estimate was $2,802.45 for all of the work needed
5 to align the front of the Elantra so the blinkers could be fixed. The second estimate was
$6,621.99 for all of the remaining work.
{¶ 11} Gomm sent this information to Sal at KMG and informed Sal that he would be
willing to accept $12,500 to cover the amount of the loan and repairs. Gomm stated that he
followed up with KMG several times, but he never received a response or any further
communication. Additionally, Gomm sent a final e-mail to Sal and Qasem on June 20, 2024,
informing them that he intended to file suit and that the amount that was financed for the
vehicle was more than the amount specified in the documents Gomm had signed at the time
of sale. Specifically, the amount stated in the documents to be financed was $12,391.25,
but the amount actually financed by Kemba Credit Union was $12,686.25. The difference
was $295, which was the exact amount of the finance charge that Gomm contended KMG
had agreed to waive during their negotiations prior to the sale. Gomm requested that KMG
correct the error and refund him the $295 difference. Gomm testified that he still owns the
Elantra but drives it only locally.
{¶ 12} With respect to the documents Gomm had signed when he purchased the
vehicle, he acknowledged signing a document stating that he was purchasing the vehicle
as-is with no dealer warranty. Gomm also signed a document acknowledging that the dealer
does not provide a warranty for any repairs after sale. At the bottom of that page, it stated,
“Ask the dealer if your mechanic can inspect the vehicle on or off the lot,” and Gomm said
that he did not make any such request. The same document also advised, “Obtain a vehicle
history report and check for open safety calls,” which Gomm testified he did not do. Gomm
acknowledged that he did not have a mechanic inspect the vehicle prior to purchase.
Additionally, Gomm acknowledged receipt of KMG’s buyer’s guide, which included a list of
major defects that may occur in used cars.
6 {¶ 13} Following Gomm’s testimony, KMG called Qasem to testify during trial. Qasem
stated that he had informed Gomm that there was no warranty on the Elantra and that he
had recommended that Gomm have the vehicle inspected by a mechanic. Qasem further
testified that Gomm came into KMG on two separate occasions to take the vehicle for a test
drive and to have it looked at by a mechanic.
{¶ 14} With respect to KMG’s process for obtaining and re-selling vehicles, Qasem
testified that KMG purchases vehicles at auction and then has them inspected. He stated
that KMG will repair any major cosmetic defects, such as large dents or breaks, but they
focus mainly on a vehicle’s operating system. According to Qasem, they check the brakes,
tire tread, and rotors, and make any necessary repairs before placing a vehicle on the lot for
sale.
{¶ 15} Regarding the discrepancy in the financing amounts, Qasem testified that the
original application he sent to the credit union was for $12,641, which was the estimated
finance amount. He further stated that the $295 at issue was for bank fees that are out of
KMG’s control and cannot be waived by KMG. However, Qasem testified that he had agreed
to waive KMG’s $350 documentation fee, which resulted in Gomm paying less than the
originally estimated cost of the vehicle.
{¶ 16} The magistrate took the matter under advisement and issued a decision on
August 11, 2025. The magistrate concluded that KMG engaged in an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of the CSPA. The magistrate stated that KMG misrepresented to
Gomm that the Elantra had been “thoroughly inspected,” had “no problems,” and had a clean
Carfax report. The magistrate noted that although Gomm purchased the vehicle “as-is,” this
does not preclude relief under the CSPA because KMG failed to disclose the defects in the
vehicle and misrepresented the quality of the vehicle. The magistrate held that Gomm was
7 entitled to actual economic damages in the amount of the repair cost. However, because
the cost of repairs exceeded the $6,000 jurisdictional limit of the small claims court, the
magistrate awarded Gomm $6,000—the maximum amount allowed.
{¶ 17} On August 25, 2025, KMG filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and
Gomm responded to the objections on September 8, 2025. KMG also filed supplemental
objections on October 14, 2025. In KMG’s objections, it argued that if Qasem made any
statements to Gomm regarding the condition of the vehicle or the inspection process, it was
merely “non-actionable puffery or opinion” and did not constitute unfair or deceptive acts or
practices under the CSPA. KMG noted that irrespective of any alleged representations
Qasem may have made to Gomm, the buyer’s guide specifically advised the buyer to get a
pre-sale inspection of the vehicle, which Gomm declined to do. As to the actual economic
damages award, KMG objected to the magistrate’s award of the $6,000 jurisdictional
maximum, stating that there was no competent evidence connecting the amount awarded
to any actual damages that occurred due to a “proven violation.” KMG asserted that the
repair estimate submitted by Gomm was unreliable and that it failed to establish whether the
defects were present at the time of April 19, 2024 sale or a result of Gomm’s misuse of the
vehicle following the sale.
{¶ 18} On November 13, 2025, the trial court issued its final judgment entry adopting
the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court noted that KMG’s
objections placed a great deal of emphasis on Gomm’s occupation as a federal contracting
officer. KMG had asserted that due to Gomm’s profession, he should have understood the
meaning of “as-is,” but the trial court determined that KMG’s emphasis on Gomm’s
professional field was misplaced. Instead, the trial court credited Gomm’s testimony
regarding Qasem’s representations that the vehicle had been thoroughly inspected, that
8 Qasem was not aware of any issues, and that the vehicle had a clean Carfax report. The
trial court further determined that “[t]here is no credible evidence in the record to refute”
Gomm’s testimony that Qasem made these claims to him regarding the quality of the Elantra
prior to the sale. Although KMG argued in its objections that these statements were merely
“puffery,” the trial court disagreed. The trial court also overruled KMG’s argument that the
damages amount was improper and not determined correctly. The trial court stated that it
was within the magistrate’s discretion to award damages, noting that the amount awarded
was less than the amount Gomm had claimed.
{¶ 19} KMG now appeals the trial court’s judgment. It raises two assignments of error.
II. Unfair and Deceptive Practices Under the CSPA
{¶ 20} In its first assignment of error, KMG asserts: “The trial court erred as a matter
of law by treating generalized statements about inspection practices and an alleged ‘clean
Carfax’ statement as deceptive or unconscionable acts or practices under R.C. 1345.02
and/or R.C. 1345.03, absent proof of a specific, material, objectively false statement of fact,
and in the face of a fully integrated ‘as is’ transaction and appellee’s admitted refusal to
obtain an independent inspection or vehicle-history report.”
{¶ 21} The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.
Loury v. Westside Automotive Group, 2022-Ohio-3673, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). “Accordingly, we
stand in the shoes of the trial court and conduct an independent review of the
record.” Chester/12 Ltd. v. Epiq Constr. Servs., Inc., 2023-Ohio-1886, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 22} “The CSPA is a remedial law, designed to compensate for inadequate
traditional consumer remedies, and must be liberally construed to achieve its remedial
purpose.” Loury at ¶ 22, citing Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Ohio St.3d 27, 29 (1990).
9 “The law prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unconscionable acts or practices
by suppliers in consumer transactions.” Id.; see also R.C. 1345.02(A) and 1345.03(A).
{¶ 23} R.C. 1345.01(D) defines the term “consumer” as “a person who engages in a
consumer transaction with a supplier.” R.C. 1345.01(D). A “supplier” is defined as a “seller,
lessor, assignor, franchisor, or other person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting
consumer transactions.” R.C. 1345.01(C). A “consumer transaction” is defined as “a sale,
lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service,
a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family,
or household, or solicitation to supply any of these things.” R.C. 1345.01(A).
{¶ 24} In the present case, there is no dispute that with respect to the transaction at
issue between Gomm and KMG, Gomm was a consumer and KMG was a supplier under
the CSPA. Additionally, KMG’s sale of the Elantra to Gomm constituted a consumer
transaction as defined by the CSPA.
{¶ 25} “[T]he CSPA defines ‘unfair or deceptive consumer sales practices’ as those
that mislead consumers about the nature of the product they are receiving, while
‘unconscionable acts or practices’ relate to a supplier manipulating a consumer’s
understanding of the nature of the transaction at issue.” Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 2005-
Ohio-4985, ¶ 24. Deceptive acts or practices include representing “that the subject of a
consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, prescription, or model,
if it is not” and “that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not.” R.C. 1345.02(B)(2) and
(8).
{¶ 26} In determining whether a particular act or practice is unconscionable, the
following circumstances must be taken into account:
10 (1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability
of the consumer reasonably to protect the consumer’s interests because of the
consumer's physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to
understand the language of an agreement;
(2) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was
entered into that the price was substantially in excess of the price at which
similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar consumer
transactions by like consumers;
(3) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was
entered into of the inability of the consumer to receive a substantial benefit
from the subject of the consumer transaction;
(4) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was
entered into that there was no reasonable probability of payment of the
obligation in full by the consumer;
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a
consumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were substantially one-sided
in favor of the supplier;
(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of
opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to the consumer's detriment;
(7) Whether the supplier has, without justification, refused to make a
refund in cash or by check for a returned item that was purchased with cash
or by check, unless the supplier had conspicuously posted in the
establishment at the time of the sale a sign stating the supplier's refund policy.
R.C. 1345.03(B).
11 {¶ 27} “Proof of intent is not required to prove a deceptive act under R.C. 1345.02.”
Loury, 2022-Ohio-3673, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). “Whether an act is deceptive depends on how
the consumer viewed the supplier’s act or statement.” Id. “[C]ourts apply a reasonableness
standard in determining whether an act amounts to deceptive, unconscionable, or unfair
conduct.” Id., citing McPhillips v. United States Tennis Assn. Midwest, 2007-Ohio-3594, ¶ 27
(11th Dist.). “The basic test is one of fairness; the act need not rise to the level of fraud,
negligence, or breach of contract.” Shumaker v. Hamilton Chevrolet, Inc., 2009-Ohio-5263,
¶ 19 (4th Dist.). “The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable consumer would have been
deceived by the supplier’s act or statement.” Loury at ¶ 25, citing Shumaker at ¶ 19, 30.
An act is considered “deceptive” when it “has the likelihood of inducing a state of mind in the
consumer that is not in accord with the facts.” (Cleaned up.) Shumaker at ¶ 19. We have
previously held that “[a] sales practice is deceptive within the meaning of R.C. 1345.02(A) if
it has the tendency or capacity to mislead consumers concerning a fact or circumstance
material to a decision to purchase the product or service offered for sale.” Cranford v. Joseph
Airport Toyota, Inc., 1996 WL 282997, *2 (2d Dist. May 17, 1996). “The focus of any inquiry
in that regard is the likely effect of the act or practice on consumers.” Id. “The seller’s intent
is immaterial.” Id.
{¶ 28} Here, Gomm contends in his responsive brief that he relied to his detriment on
Qasem’s statements that every vehicle on the KMG lot is thoroughly inspected and that
Qasem was unaware of any issues with the vehicle. Gomm testified during trial that Qasem
told him that the vehicle had a “clean Carfax.” However, upon review, we agree with KMG
that these statements do not constitute deceptive acts under the CSPA.
{¶ 29} The record demonstrates that Gomm had multiple years of experience acting
as a contract specialist for the federal government. Although the trial court held that KMG
12 placed too much emphasis on Gomm’s profession, it is relevant to the extent that it
demonstrates that Gomm was familiar with contracts and the contracting process. Gomm
acknowledged during his trial testimony that KMG provided him a copy of its buyer’s guide,
which stated at the top in large, bold, capital letters, “AS IS – NO DEALER WARRANTY.”
Gomm further acknowledged that directly below that statement, the buyer’s guide included
another line stating, “the dealer does not provide a warranty for any repairs after sale.”
Additionally, at the bottom of the same page, the buyer’s guide included the following
recommendations: “Ask the dealer if your mechanic can inspect the vehicle on or off the lot”
and “Obtain a vehicle history report and check for open safety recalls.” Gomm testified that
he did not ask KMG if he could have the vehicle inspected, nor did he obtain the vehicle
history report. Gomm also acknowledged during his testimony that the second page of the
buyer’s guide included an extensive list of significant defects that can occur in used vehicles,
but he did not have a mechanic inspect the Elantra for any such issues prior to purchasing
the car. Gomm further admitted that although he was aware of the foregoing
recommendations and advisories, he declined to follow any of the guidance and proceeded
to sign the buyer’s guide and purchase the vehicle.
{¶ 30} In addition, Gomm testified that he signed the bill of sale, which included a
section entitled “Warranty Disclaimer.” This disclaimer states: “Unless Seller provides a
written warranty, or enters into a service contract within 90 days from the date of this
contract, this vehicle is being sold ‘AS IS – WITH ALL FAULTS’ and Seller makes no
warranties, express or implied, on the vehicle, and there will be no implied warranties of
merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose. This disclaimer does not affect any
warranties by the vehicle manufacturer. Seller neither assumes nor authorizes any other
person to assume for it any liability in connection with the sale of the vehicle and the related
13 products and services.” The bill of sale also included an integration clause stating that the
agreement constituted the entire agreement of the parties and superseded any prior
discussions or understandings. The bill of sale further advised that “Buyer shall bear the
entire risk and expense of repairing or correcting any defects that presently exist, or which
may hereafter occur.” Again, Gomm acknowledged that he signed this document, indicating
that he understood and agreed to the terms therein.
{¶ 31} Despite these advisories and recommendations, Gomm testified that he is a
trusting person and that he relied on Qasem’s representations that the vehicle was
thoroughly inspected, that Qasem was not aware of any issues with the vehicle, and that the
vehicle had a clean Carfax. Notwithstanding the integration clause’s statement that no prior
oral or written statements or representations have any bearing on the terms of the contract,
Qasem’s statements do not constitute deceptive sales practices under the CSPA.
{¶ 32} Qasem’s alleged statement that the vehicles sold by KMG are thoroughly
inspected did not pertain to the specific vehicle that Gomm was purchasing, nor did the
statement make any specific guarantees as to the quality or condition of the Elantra. Further,
Qasem’s statement to Gomm that he was not aware of any issues with the vehicle does not
amount to a deceptive sales practice that would have misled a reasonable consumer
concerning a fact material to the sale. Although it is likely that KMG has a process for
inspecting all the vehicles prior to sale, the mere existence of that process does not
guarantee that the inspection will catch every possible defect. Similarly, the fact that Qasem
stated that he was not aware of any issues with the vehicle does not establish that there
were, in fact, no issues with the vehicle. Gomm was aware that Qasem was a salesman, not
a mechanic, and there was no testimony or evidence to suggest that Qasem guaranteed
that there were no issues with the Elantra that Gomm was purchasing.
14 {¶ 33} Finally, with respect to Qasem’s alleged representation that the Elantra had a
“clean Carfax,” Gomm did not testify that Qasem provided a copy of the Carfax or that he
asked KMG for a copy of the Carfax. Notably, Gomm testified that he was able to find the
Carfax for the Elantra online, but he did not indicate that he actually reviewed it.
{¶ 34} When considering the alleged deceptive statements by Qasem, as well as the
multiple advisories contained in the contract documents, a reasonable consumer would not
have been misled into purchasing a defective vehicle based on Qasem’s alleged
misrepresentations. Rather, all the statements attributed to Qasem pertained to KMG’s
inspection process in general, as well as Qasem’s personal understanding of the condition
of the Elantra. However, the contract documents include multiple, unambiguous advisories
and cautionary language regarding the as-is nature of the sale, as well as the
recommendation to have a mechanic inspect the vehicle prior to purchase. We do not agree
with the trial court that these statements would have induced a reasonable consumer to
ignore the extensive, detailed contract language in favor of vague, general representations
made by KMG’s salesman. The trial court therefore erred in concluding that KMG violated
the CSPA.
{¶ 35} Accordingly, KMG’s first assignment of error is sustained.
III. Damages Award
{¶ 36} In its second assignment of error, KMG asserts that the trial court “abused its
discretion and erred in awarding $6,000 in ‘actual economic damages’ under R.C. 1345.09
without competent evidence of pecuniary loss causally linked to a proven CSPA violation.”
{¶ 37} Here, because KMG did not violate the CSPA, Gomm was not entitled to
damages arising from any such violation. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to consider
15 whether the trial court based its damages award on competent evidence. KMG’s second
assignment of error is overruled as moot.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} The judgment of the Vandalia Municipal Court is reversed.
.............
LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.