Gomez v. Gonzalez 3965

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedSeptember 12, 2025
Docket3:23-cv-02026
StatusUnknown

This text of Gomez v. Gonzalez 3965 (Gomez v. Gonzalez 3965) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gomez v. Gonzalez 3965, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER DAWEL GOMEZ, Case No.: 3:23-cv-02026-WQH-DDL

12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 vs. 14 EMILIO GONZALEZ #3965, San Diego Sheriff, 15 Defendant. 16 HAYES, Judge: 17 The matter before the Court is the Motion to Allow Amendment of the Complaint to 18 Include State Law Claims (“Motion to Amend Complaint”) (ECF No. 48) filed by Plaintiff 19 Christopher Dawel Gomez (“Plaintiff”). 20 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 21 On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint pro se 22 (“Complaint”) (ECF No. 1) against Defendants San Diego Central Jail and Emilio 23 Gonzalez #3965. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), the Court dismissed 24 San Diego Central Jail as a defendant on November 14, 2023, and the case proceeded solely 25 against Emilio Gonzalez (“Defendant Gonzalez”). (ECF No. 3.) 26 27 28 1 On April 26, 2024, Defendant Gonzalez filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 2 State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). (ECF No. 11.) On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a 3 Response in Opposition to Defendant Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) 4 On November 6, 2024, Magistrate Judge David D. Leshner issued a Report and 5 Recommendation for Order Denying Defendant Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss (“Report 6 and Recommendation”). (ECF No. 25.) On November 20, 2024, Defendant Gonzalez filed 7 an Objection to the Report and Recommendation (“Objection”). (ECF No. 26.) 8 On December 20, 2024, the Court issued an Order (ECF No. 30) adopting the Report 9 and Recommendation in full, overruling Defendant Gonzalez’s Objection, denying 10 Defendant Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss, and directing Defendant Gonzalez to file an 11 answer to the Complaint. 12 On January 17, 2025, Defendant Gonzalez filed an Answer to the Complaint. (ECF 13 No. 31.) 14 On May 22, 2025, Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, filed the pending Motion 15 to Amend Complaint. (ECF No. 48.) On June 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed the First Amended 16 Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 49.) The FAC alleges federal constitutional and state tort 17 claims against Defendant Gonzalez, and adds as new Defendants Jose De La Torre, San 18 Diego County Sheriff’s Department, County of San Diego (“County”), and Does 1 through 19 10. 20 On June 9, 2025, Defendant Gonzalez filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion 21 to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 50), and a supporting declaration asserting that the 22 “Defense was not provided with a copy of the proposed changes” to the Complaint until 23 June 6, 2025. On June 23, 2025, the Court issued an Order granting Defendant Gonzalez 24 more time to file a substantive response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint. (ECF 25 No. 51.) 26 On July 7, 2025, Defendant Gonzalez filed a Response in Opposition (“Defendant’s 27 Response”) (ECF No. 55) to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint. On July 14, 2025, 28 Plaintiff filed a Reply (“Plaintiff’s Reply”) (ECF No. 56) to Defendant’s Response. 1 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 mandates that “[t]he court should freely give 4 leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “This policy is to be 5 applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 6 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 7 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). District courts consider several factors when deciding whether 8 to grant leave to amend: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 9 movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 10 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of 11 amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Smith v. Pac. Props. 12 Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004). “Not all of the [Foman] factors merit 13 equal weight. As this circuit and others have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the 14 opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1052. “The 15 party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, Ltd. 16 v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of 17 any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor 18 of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1052. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Defendant Gonzalez contends that granting leave to amend would prejudice him 21 because Plaintiff’s state-law claims are “untimely” and Plaintiff made “no efforts [] to 22 comply with the [California] Government Tort Claims Act . . . .” (ECF No. 55 at 2–4.) 23 Defendant Gonzalez further contends that Plaintiff’s amended federal constitutional claims 24 are “conclusory” and “should be dismissed” because they “fail[] to allege sufficient facts 25 to substantiate Monell [v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] liability.” (Id. at 2, 4, 26 6, 7.) Lastly, Defendant Gonzalez argues Plaintiff’s negligence claims “should be 27 removed” because the “County is immune from liability for any injuries” caused to 28 prisoners. (Id. at 7–8.) 1 Plaintiff contends that leave to amend should be granted because he “attempted to 2 pursue [his state-law] claim in a timely manner and had a good[-]faith basis to believe that 3 he had filed the claim on time.” (ECF No. 48 at 8.) Plaintiff further contends that several 4 factors should excuse the “late filing” of his state-law claim, including “inadequate access 5 to the law library” while incarcerated, his “lack of education and ignorance of the law,” 6 and “long-term impacts from excessive force.” (Id. at 10–11.) Additionally, Plaintiff 7 contends that amendment will not prejudice Defendant Gonzalez because “he was only two 8 months late” and the initial Complaint put Defendant Gonzalez on notice of his claims. (Id. 9 at 11.) 10 “‘Undue prejudice’ means substantial prejudice or substantial negative effect.” SAES 11 Getters S.p.A. v. Aeronex, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2002). To meet its 12 burden of demonstrating prejudice, the non-movant must show that amendment “greatly 13 alters the nature of the litigation and requires defendants to undertake, at a late hour, an 14 entirely new course of defense.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 15 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, Defendant Gonzalez provides no evidence that amendment 16 would cause such prejudice—especially given the relatively early stage of litigation. See 17 Leighton, 833 F.3d at 188 (finding no prejudice where, as here, the case was “still at the 18 discovery stage with no trial date pending”). 19 After consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that the 20 remaining Foman factors do not warrant deviating from the “presumption under Rule 15(a) 21 in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (emphasis 22 omitted); see Netbula v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal.

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