Gomez-Ruiz v. Garland
This text of Gomez-Ruiz v. Garland (Gomez-Ruiz v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 4 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSENDA GOMEZ-RUIZ, et al, No. 23-883
Petitioner, Agency Nos. A087-451-557 v. A215-824-247 A215-824-248 MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 1, 2024** Pasadena, California
Before: R. NELSON, VANDYKE, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Rosenda Gomez-Ruiz and her two sons, Hugo Danilo Aguilar-Ortega and
Joshua Anderson Aviel Hernandez-Ortega, seek review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1 denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and also adds its own
reasons, the panel reviews both decisions.” Jaimes-Cardenas v. Barr, 973 F.3d
940, 943 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We review the agency’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See Flores Molina v.
Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). “Under the substantial evidence
standard, administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Tzompantzi-Salazar
v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioners failed to establish past persecution. Persecution is “an extreme
concept” defined as “the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as
offensive.” Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Gomez-Ruiz was harassed by her work supervisor after she
refused to sign falsified documents related to his drug activities. Although her
supervisor threatened to kill her and her sons at one point, this threat did not result
in any harm to Gomez-Ruiz or her family in the five months that followed. Death
threats constitute “persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the
2 threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Duran-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d
929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000)). Our cases recognize that “some circumstances that
cause petitioners physical discomfort or loss of liberty do not qualify as
persecution, despite the fact that such conditions have caused the petitioners some
harm.” Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 2004). While traumatic,
the record does not compel the conclusion that the harm Gomez-Ruiz suffered rises
to the level of past persecution.
Gomez-Ruiz contends that the agency erred by determining that a May 2018
shooting incident, followed by an anonymous telephone threat, was a “byproduct
of civic unrest and economic turmoil in Guatemala” and not sufficiently linked to
her underlying claims. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination.
The shooting incident and telephone threat occurred in the course of Gomez-Ruiz’s
job as a paramedic while she was transporting a victim shot earlier in the day.
Gomez-Ruiz concedes that she does not know who fired the shots, who the
shooters were targeting, or who made the telephone threat. Because the evidence
is susceptible to differing interpretations, we defer to the agency’s consideration of
the evidence.1
1 Gomez-Ruiz also failed to establish that she was persecuted on account of her political opinion or membership in a particular social group (PSG). To the extent
3 Substantial evidence further supports the agency’s finding that Petitioners do
not have an “objectively reasonable” fear of future persecution. See Rusak v.
Holder, 734 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2013). Gomez-Ruiz does not know if her
supervisor still holds his position at the fire station where she worked because he
was scheduled to be removed in December 2018. She presented no evidence that
her supervisor continued to seek her out, two years after her refusal to sign falsified
documents. Furthermore, Gomez-Ruiz testified that her supervisor was unaware
she had family living in another town five hours away, suggesting Petitioners could
reasonably relocate within Guatemala to avoid any harm.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. “A
petitioner seeking CAT relief must show that it is more likely than not that he will
be tortured upon removal, and that the torture will be inflicted at the instigation of,
or with the consent or acquiescence of, the government.” Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511
F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioners’ generalized country conditions evidence
regarding violence and corruption in Guatemala is insufficient to establish a
particularized risk of torture. Delagado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th
Gomez-Ruiz alleges a political opinion based upon “whistleblowing,” she has not presented evidence that her supervisor was motivated by her actual or perceived anti-corruption beliefs, as opposed to personal retribution for her refusal to sign falsified documents. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2019). And there is no evidence to suggest her supervisor targeted her for her status as a “Guatemalan single woman,” her proposed PSG. 4 Cir. 2010). Gomez-Ruiz and her sons were not physically harmed in Guatemala
and there is no evidence in the record that Gomez-Ruiz’s supervisor or his drug
associates have a continued interest in targeting them. Therefore, Petitioners have
not shown it is more likely than not they will be tortured if returned to Guatemala.
PETITION DENIED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Gomez-Ruiz v. Garland, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gomez-ruiz-v-garland-ca9-2024.