1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 SAN JOSE DIVISION 8 TIM GOMES, et al., 9 Case No. 5:18-cv-04191-EJD Plaintiffs, 10 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Vv. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING SANTA CLARA COUNTY, et al., PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. 13 Re: Dkt. Nos. 56, 63
14 Tn this action, Plaintiffs Tim and Catherine Gomes argue that their constitutional rights © 3 15 || were violated when Santa Clara County social workers removed their two children (1.G. and H.G.) Q 16 || and placed them in county custody following allegations of neglect and abuse. Defendants Santa
17 Clara County, Roshanda Burns, Linda Hsaio, Michael Shaheed, Sarah Arana, and Bob Beck now
18 || move for summary judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs also move for partial summary judgment in 19 || their favor. Having considered the Parties’ papers, the Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ 20 || motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.' 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 A. Factual Background 23 Plaintiffs bring 15 claims against Defendants—Roshanda Burns, Linda Hsaio, Michael 24 Shaheed, Sarah Arana, and Bob Beck. The first four claims relate to the removal of Plaintiffs’ 25 26 || | . Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b) and General Order 72-5, this Court found this motion 27 || suitable for consideration without oral argument. See Dkt. 73. Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 older child I1.G. See First Amended Complaint for Damages (“FAC”) J§ 52-66, Dkt. 16. Claims 2 || five through nine relate to the removal of Plaintiffs’ younger child H.G. /d. J] 67-87. Claim 3 || thirteen relates to both children. See id. 116-22. In claims ten through twelve, Plaintiffs allege 4 || sexual battery, sexual harassment, and sexual discrimination against Defendant Shaheed. □□□ 5 || 99 88-115. Claim fourteen alleges a Monell claim. Id. J] 123-24. Lastly, claim fifteen alleges an 6 || intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Arana. /d. J§ 125-31. Plaintiffs 7 || maintain that the social workers violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association 8 and their right to be free from the use of deception and false evidence in judicial proceedings.” Id. 9 |} §§ 56-87, 116-31. Plaintiffs further maintain that the social workers’ conduct was negligent 10 || and/or malicious. Jd. 11 1. Removal of I.G. s In February 2013, Plaintiffs were arguing in the street about a quarter of a mile away from
13 their home. When police officers learned that they had left 16-month-old I.G. alone at home, they
14 went to Plaintiffs’ home and found I.G. near a heater and hazardous materials. In June 2013, I.G. © 3 15 || was declared a dependent of the juvenile court and returned to Plaintiffs with family maintenance Q 16 || services. In February 2014, after Plaintiffs completed their case plan, the juvenile court dismissed
17 || the case. See Inre H.G., 2019 WL 1615301, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019).
18 In January 2016, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services 19 || (“DFCS”) again alleged that Plaintiffs were neglecting I.G based on the fact that police had 20 || discovered rotting food and human waste through the home. These conditions were allegedly 21 hazardous to I.G.’s health and safety. 22 23 * The FAC also alleges that the warrantless seizure of H.G. violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. FAC 9§ 71-75. This is an improper claim—Plaintiffs cannot bring a Fourth Amendment 24 || claim for unlawful seizure of their child—their claims are properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1146 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The claims of the 25 || parents in this regard should properly be assessed under the Fourteenth Amendment standard for interference with the right to family association. Because only the children were subjected to a 26 || seizure, their claims should be assessed under the Fourth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). On this ground, Count Six, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, is dismissed. Plaintiffs have 27 || acknowledged this. See Cormier Decl. § 3, Ex. A, Interrogatory Response No. 4. Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 A month later, on February 29, 2016, DFCS received a referral after four-year-old I.G. was 2 || found wandering alone in the street. When Catherine was contacted, she did not know that I.G. 3 || was missing and refused to claim her. The home was again found to be dirty with unsafe 4 || surroundings. Jd. at *2. 5 In March 2016, DFCS filed a petition alleging that I.G. “came within” the provisions of 6 || California Welfare and Institutions Code § 300(b). In June 2016, that petition was amended to 7 || allege that IG. was at risk of harm in Plaintiffs’ care due to Catherine’s mental health issues, 8 exposure to Plaintiffs’ domestic violence, and Tim’s failure to protect LG. See In re □□□ (“In re 9 || LG. I”), 2018 WL 5095117, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018). As support, the amended petition 10 || alleged that: (1) Catherine’s mental health issues were poorly managed and that she was placed on 11 a psychiatric hold in January 2016; (2) during a mental-health episode on February 2, 2016, 12 || Catherine hit Tim on the back of the head; (3) when the police arrived following the domestic 13 || violence incident, they found a large amount of food on the bed sheets, trash and food scattered 14 || about the living room, and the odor of decomposing trash in all the rooms; (4) on February 29, 3 15 || 2016, I.G. was found wandering in the street unsupervised; (5) when the police took I.G. home, a 16 || Catherine stated that she did not know the child had been missing and would not claim her; and 3 17 || (6) the police reported a foul smell emitting from the bedrooms and uncleaned cat litter and cat 18 || feces. Jd. The amended petition also included information about how I.G. was placed in 19 || protective custody in February 2013 and was declared a dependent of the court. In June 2016, 20 || based on this amended petition, the juvenile court again declared I.G. a dependent of the court. /d. 21 at *2. 22 Plaintiffs appealed this decision and argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 23 || the allegations in the amended petition. See id. The appellate court disagreed. /d. at *15. The 24 || court noted Plaintiffs’ inability to care for I.G., Plaintiffs’ unsanitary living conditions, I.G.’s 25 speech and social delays, and the fact that I.G. was often left alone with Catherine, who was 26 || unable to care for her. From this, the appellate court held that there was substantial evidence to a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 support the juvenile court’s findings. Jd. 2 Defendant Burns became the primary social worker on I.G.’s case in June 2016. Over the 3 next year, Defendant Burns attempted to provide services to Plaintiffs. Defendant Burns referred 4 Plaintiffs to mental health services, parent education classes, and intensive in-home services. 5 Defendant Burns also met, in person, with Plaintiffs at least once per month. Defendant Burns 6 || maintains that while the parents made some effort, they were extremely resistant to court-ordered 7 || services and often did not follow through with the services offered and did not complete any case 8 || plan activities. See Dkt. 54-15. 9 In May 2017—following the March 2016 dependency determination—Catherine was 10 || placed on an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions 11 Code § 5150. The hold was expanded to a 14-day hold under § 5250. Jd. at 15041. Tim informed 12 || Defendant Burns of the hold. One of the treating psychiatrists told Defendant Burns that she 13 “would not leave a child with [Catherine].” Jd. 14 On June 9, 2017, the day Catherine was expected to be released from the hold, DFCS 3 15 || obtained a warrant to remove I.G. from Plaintiffs’ custody. Defendant Burns signed the a 16 || declaration in support of the warrant and cited, among other things, Catherine’s ongoing mental 3 17 || illness and specific examples of Catherine’s concerning actions, such as coming to the door naked, 18 || telling a social worker that someone was trying to chop her head off, and making threats to staff 19 || during her psychiatric hold. Declaration of Rashonda Burns (“Burns Decl.”), Dkt. 54-9. 20 || Defendant Burns also cited Tim’s poor insight and minimization of Catherine’s mental health 21 issues and their impact on I.G. /d. The declaration further stated that the previous disposition in 22 || 2013 had not been effective in protecting I.G. because of Catherine’s severe and untreated mental 23 || health issues and Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with their case plan services. Based on this 24 || information, the juvenile court issued a protective custody order and I.G. was placed in a foster 25 || home. 26 a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 In August 2017, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on the 2 || dependency petition. At that time, I.G. experienced anxiety, exhibited bizarre behavior, was not 3 || toilet-trained (at age five), and had a speech delay. The juvenile court found DFCS’s allegations 4 || to be true despite Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary. During an October 2017 interim review 5 || hearing, the juvenile court ordered all previous orders to remain in effect. Plaintiffs’ appealed the 6 || juvenile court’s orders and argued that there was no evidence to supporting the juvenile court’s 7 || orders regarding I.G.’s out-of-home placement. See In re (“I.G. IT”), 2018 WL 6696489, at 8 *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018). The appellate court reaffirmed that there was substantial 9 || evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that the allegations in the June 2016 amended 10 || petition were true and that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s later 11 || rulings regarding I.G. /d. 12 A February 22, 2019, section 366.26 report recommended that parental rights for I.G. be || terminated so that I.G. could be adopted by her maternal aunt and uncle. Following a hearing, the 14 || juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that I.G. was adoptable and terminated 3 15 || Plaintiffs’ parental rights. The appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s finding. See Jn re a 16 || (‘LG LT’), 2020 WL 500176 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020). 3 17 2. Removal of H.G. 18 On November 7, 2017, Michael Shaheed replaced Defendant Burns and became the new 19 || Continuing Social Worker for the Gomes family. A Continuing Social Worker is assigned to a 20 || case after the jurisdiction and disposition hearings and after a child has officially become a 21 dependent of the court. See Declaration of Michael Shaheed (“Shaheed Decl.”), Dkt. 56-9. At 22 || this point, Catherine was pregnant with H.G. Jd. 23 On November 22, 2017, Plaintiffs called Defendant Shaheed to let him know that 24 || Catherine was at a Kaiser hospital in San Francisco and that she expected to be in labor soon. 25 H.G. was born two days later, on November 24, 2017. That afternoon, the County of Santa 26 || Clara’s Child Abuse and Neglect Center (“CANC’’) sent an email to Defendant Shaheed with a a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 “non-report”® notifying Defendant Shaheed that Catherine had given birth. The reporting party 2 || learned that I.G. was not in Plaintiffs’ custody and called CANC to follow hospital policies. The 3 call was not based on any concerns about the infant. 4 However, on November 27, 2017, Defendant Shaheed received a call from a Kaiser staff 5 |} member expressing concern over Plaintiffs’ ability to care for H.G. Because DFCS had an open 6 || case for IG. (H.G.’s sibling), Defendant Shaheed provided the staff member with the CANC’s 7 || number. Defendant Shaheed also relayed the staff members concerns to the CANC manager by 8 || phone and email. Shaheed Decl. Jj 14-15. 9 Kaiser personal called the CANC and expressed concerns about Plaintiffs’ lack of attention 10 || toward H.G. See Declaration of Bob Beck (“Beck Decl.”), Dkt. 56-3; see also Dkt. 54-5 (report 11 with Defendant Beck’s findings). By early afternoon on November 27, the Emergency Response 12 || Unit (“ER”) assigned social worker Katherine DiPaulo to the case. Beck Decl. 9 5. DiPaulo 13 spoke to multiple Kaiser personnel, including a medical social worker, nurse, and doctor. She also 14 || interviewed Plaintiffs and observed Plaintiffs’ interactions with the infant. DiPaulo also observed 3 15 coaching attempts by Kaiser staff to Plaintiffs. /d. 5—6. Concerns raised by Kaiser staff a 16 || included letting H.G. cry for an extended time while Plaintiffs slept, leaving H.G. unswaddled to 3 17 || the point that her body temperature dropped, not changing diapers or feeding when needed, 18 || throwing dirty diapers and other trash, like Catherine’s bloody post-natal pads, on the floor rather 19 || than in the trash receptacles, and Tim holding H.G. by her neck and dangling her body. □□□ 6. 20 Based on these concerns and on DiPaulo’s own observations, the ER team began the 21 process of obtaining a warrant for the removal of H.G. Jd. Defendant Beck and DiPaulo 22 || discussed the case with their manager and decided that they would recommend removal of H.G. at 23 || the Joint Case Staffing meeting that was scheduled for the next morning. /d. 8. Defendant Beck 24 || and DiPaulo began work on the forms that they anticipated they would need if the Staffing 25 26 > A “non-report” occurs when the CANC receives a referral or call, but determines that the information does not rise to a level requiring a response or that the information was previously 27 || reported and/or is already being addressed by the DFCS. Shaheed Decl. § 13. Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 meeting resulted in a decision to seek a warrant. /d. § 9; see also Dkt. 54-11 (email chain with 2 || warrant attachments). 3 On the morning of November 28, the CANC received a call from Kaiser with similar 4 || concerns to those expressed the previous day. See Dkt. 54-5 at 4472. The Staffing meeting took 5 place, with Defendants Beck and Shaheed, DiPaulo, and an attorney from county counsel in 6 || attendance. Defendants decided to seek a warrant for H.G.’s removal. Beck Decl. {fj 10-11. 7 || DiPaulo and Defendant Beck continued to work on the warrant documents. They believed that 8 || they would have enough time to obtain a productive custody warrant before H.G. was discharged. 9 Id. § 11. However, on November 28, Kaiser staff informed Defendant Beck that H.G. and 10 || Plaintiffs would be released “momentarily.” Jd. 11. Defendant Beck estimated that he would 1] need at least a few more hours to obtain a warrant. /d. Because of the concerns raised by the 12 Kaiser staff, Defendant Beck believed that H.G. would be in immediate risk if she was in 13 Plaintiffs’ sole care. Accordingly, rather than proceed with the warrant process, the ER team 14 || decided that exigent circumstances justified emergency removal. /d. J§ 11-12; Dkt. 54-5 at 4474— 3 15 75. DiPaulo arrived at the hospital that afternoon to take custody of H.G. /d. ¥ 14. a 16 Over the next two days, social workers spoke to Plaintiffs multiple times, gave them notice 3 17 || of the upcoming December 1, 2017 court hearing, and tried to arrange separate visits for Plaintiffs 18 || with H.G. Tim declined to attend the hearing and refused to attend the separate visits. See 19 || Declaration of Marisela Duefias (“Duefias Decl.”) [§ 6—8, Dkt. 56. 20 On or about December 1, 2017, the County submitted an Initial Hearing Report, which the 21 || juvenile court admitted as evidence. See Dkt. 54-7. During the December 1 hearing, the juvenile 22 || court judge stated that he believed there was sufficient evidence to remove H.G. See Dkt. 54-6 at 23 9. The judge authorized “the Department to set up the visits in a way that they believe allows 24 || them to do the assessment they need to do,” even if that means separate visits. /d. at 9. The judge 25 || then stated: 26 a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court finds [that] a prima facie case has been made that [H.G.] 1 is described by section 300 of the Juvenile Court law. Her initial detention was justified given the serious concerns about how the 2 parents behaved with [H.G.]| while at the hospital, in addition to the concerns about why [I.G.] was brought into and continues to be in 3 our system. 4 Id. at 10. The judge also adopted the findings and orders proposed by DFCS in its Initial Hearing ° Report. /d. ° Ultimately, a section 366.26 report recommended that parental rights for H.G. be terminated so that she could be adopted by her maternal aunt and uncle. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that H.G. was adoptable and terminated ° Plaintiffs’ parental rights. The appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s finding. See /.G. LIT, " 2020 WL 500176. " 3. Sexual Misconduct Claims Plaintiffs next allege that on January 6, 2018, Defendant Shaheed sexually assaulted ° Catherine during a party celebrating H.G.’s baptism. FAC §§ 41-42. Plaintiffs allege that "4 Defendant Shaheed approached Catherine while she was holding H.G. and began touching her . “under the ruse of adjusting a blanket on the baby.” /d. § 43. Defendant Shaheed “began rubbing [Catherine’s] legs in a sexual manner, with his full palms on her thighs.” Jd. 4 44. She then screamed and called out for Tim. /d. § 45. Tim claims that Catherine screamed so loudly that 18 anyone in the room would have heard. See Declaration of Claire Cormier (“Cormier Decl.”), Ex. " E at 120-35, 150-53, 154-55. Plaintiffs reported the incident to DFCS and Defendant Shaheed °° was removed as Plaintiffs’ social worker. An investigation was conducted. I Defendant Shaheed admits that he put a blanket over H.G. while Catherine was holding her. He denies that he touched Catherine’s legs. Shaheed Decl. §] 27; see also id., Ex. F. °° Following an investigation, the County found the claims to be unsubstantiated. The investigator, Tere Cohn-Hayes, based this conclusion on Catherine and Tim’s inconsistent stories. For example, Catherine told Hayes that in addition to screaming Tim’s name, she also yelled, “He *° has his hands on me!” She also claimed that Defendant Shaheed kept his hands on her legs until a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Tim came in and removed them. Tim’s story was different. He did not report Catherine yelling, 2 “He has his hands on me!” or that he had to remove Defendant Shaheed’s hands. Rather, Tim 3 || maintained that Defendant Shaheed removed his hands after Catherine yelled. See Declaration of 4 || Tere Cohn-Hayes (“Hayes Decl.”) 44 5—6, Dkt. 56. 5 Catherine’s parents contradict Plaintiffs’ allegations. Catherine’s parents, the Stephanovs, 6 || were in the room at the time of the alleged assault. Cormier Decl., Exs. C & D, Response Nos. 13 7 || & 14. Both Stephanovs noted that Defendant Shaheed told Catherine and Tim that they needed to 8 || keep H.G. warm and covered and that he tried to cover H.G. up when Plaintiffs failed to do so. 9 || Declaration of Alexander Stepanov (“A. Stepanov Decl.”) § 12, Dkt. 56; Declaration of Helen 10 Stepanov (“H. Stepanov Decl.”) § 12, Dkt. 56. Both stated that, based on (1) the size and 11 openness of the room where the touching allegedly occurred; (2) their presence in the room; (3) s Defendant Shaheed’s professional demeanor; (4) the fact that neither of them saw any touching oe 13 |) nor heard Catherine call out in distress; (5) the fact that Plaintiffs did not say anything to them
14 || about inappropriate touching until weeks after the reception; and (6) Catherine’s mental health © 3 15 || history, they do not believe that Defendant Shaheed inappropriately touched Catherine. A. 16 Stepanov Decl. § 20; H. Stepanov Decl. § 20.
(«17 B. Procedural History
18 On June 5, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Motion for Summary 19 || Judgment (“D MSJ”), Dkt. 56.’ Plaintiffs filed their motion for partial summary judgment and an 20 || opposition brief on June 23, 2020. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition (“P 21 22 || * Defendants also filed a request for judicial notice. See Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Dkt. 57. They ask the Court to take notice of California Court of Appeal decisions 23 (specifically, those involving I.G. and H.G.), excerpts of juvenile dependency court transcripts, the content of documents filed with the Santa Clara County Juvenile Court, and of the DFCS’ Online 24 || Policies & Procedures. This court may take judicial notice of “proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to 25 || matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F. 2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court may also take notice of official information posted on 26 || government websites. Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, Defendants’ exhibits are subject to judicial notice and Defendants’ request for 27 || judicial notice is GRANTED. Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 MSJ/Opp.”), Dkt. 63. On July 8, 2020, Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for 2 || partial summary judgment. Opposition/Response re Motion for Summary Judgment (“D Opp.”), 3 || Dkt. 66. On July 16, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their reply to Defendants’ opposition. Reply re Motion 4 || for Partial Summary Judgment (“P Reply”), Dkt. 72. 5 Il. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows “that there is no genuine 7 || dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 56(a). In order to satisfy this burden, “the moving party must either produce evidence 9 || negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the 10 || nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate 11 burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 12 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the 13 moving party must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Jd. 14 If the moving party meets its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce 3 15 || evidence to support its claim or defense. /d. at 1103. If the nonmoving party fails to produce a 16 || enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, Rule 56(c) mandates that the moving 3 17 || party win the motion for summary judgment. See id. 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 A. Application of Rooker Feldman to Plaintiffs’ Claims 20 Defendants first argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 21 claims and their related state-law claims. The Court agrees that the doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ 22 || Section 1983 claims as to I.G.. The Court, however, finds that the doctrine does not apply to the 23 Section 1983 claims involving H.G. 24 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal 25 courts from exercising appellate review over final state-court judgments. For instance, a plaintiff 26 || may not argue in federal court that a state court wrongly decided an issue. Likewise, the doctrine a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 “prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de 2 || facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, 525 F.3d 855, 858-89 (9th 3 Cir. 2008). A “de facto appeal” occurs where “claims raised in the federal court action are 4 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the federal 5 || claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of 6 || state laws or procedural rules.” /d. at 859. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, generally speaking, 7 bars a plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 suit to remedy an injury inflicted by the state court’s 8 decision.” Loumena v. Kennedy, 2015 WL 906070, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015). The doctrine 9 || may even apply when the merits of a state court decision are not directly contested. The relevant 10 || inquiry is whether a plaintiff's claim would “require review of the relevant state-court decisions.” 11 Grimes v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Servs., 2011 WL 4948879, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011). 12 Plaintiffs’ first and second claims relate to I.G.’s removal. While Plaintiffs admit that the 13 California Court of Appeal has consistently upheld I.G.’s removal and continued detention, 14 || Plaintiffs argue that the courts never “adjudicated whether the facts presented by [Defendant] 3 15 || Burns in order to obtain a warrant to remove I.G. were fraudulent facts (evidence).” Cormier a 16 || Decl., Exs. C & D, Interrogatory Response Nos. 1-6. Plaintiffs ground their I.G. Section 1983 3 17 || claim in Defendant Burn’s warrant application, and argue that Defendants Hsaio and Burns’ 18 falsification of evidence in the warrant application caused Plaintiffs to be unconstitutionally 19 || deprived of I.G. The Court must decide if the state courts have already assessed this question. 20 There are multiple instances in the records where Plaintiffs argued that Defendant Burns 21 lied in her report. For instance, during a juvenile dependency hearing Plaintiffs argued that 22 || Defendant Burns’ testimony and documents included statements that were “not true.” See Dkt. 23 54-3 at 4995 (“Tim: I would like to point out that there are certain facts in the report, the social 24 || study, that are just in error or not true.”); see also Dkt. 54-8 at 921 (Tim objected to 25 || characterization of Defendant Burns’ report); /d. at 929-30. The judge in the juvenile dependency 26 || hearing disagreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that the report was fraudulent and found, after a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 listening to the testimony and reading the reports, that just cause existed to keep I.G. out of 2 || Plaintiffs’ homes. This Court may not disrupt that finding. Allowing Plaintiffs to pursue their 3 Section 1983 claims as to I.G. would do just that. It would require the Court to assess whether 4 || Defendant Burns’ warrant included fraudulent statements. This question has already been 5 considered and rejected by the juvenile dependency court. For that reason, the Court GRANTS 6 || Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ first and second counts. 7 Defendants further argue Rooker-Feldman bars Plaintiffs’ claims as to H.G. The Court 8 || cannot agree. Plaintiffs argue that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the 9 warrantless removal of H.G. Pursuant to section 315 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which 10 || supported H.G.’s emergency removal, the juvenile court must determine whether the minor should 11 be further detained. While the juvenile court must specify why the initial removal was necessary, 12 || there is no requirement that the court find that exigent circumstances existed to justify a 13 || warrantless removal. See Anderson-Francois v. Cty. of Sonoma, 2009 WL 1458240, at *5 (N.D. 14 || Cal. May 22, 2009); see also Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2001) 3 15 (“The juvenile court’s findings are not relevant to whether a sufficient exigency existed at the time a 16 || of the removal to justify the warrantless action... .”). In contrast, in the Ninth Circuit, a court 3 17 must ask whether, at the time of the seizure, defendants had “reasonable cause to believe that the 18 child [was] in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.” Hence, this Court’s inquiry into 19 || exigency will not disrupt the state court’s determination that further removal of H.G. was proper. 20 For that reason, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs’ H.G. claims. 21 B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims/Immunity 22 Plaintiffs argue that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the warrantless 23 || removal of H.G. and that they are entitled to summary judgment on these claims. The Court 24 || disagrees. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show that exigent circumstances did not 25 || justify H.G.’s removal. 26 a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 Parents and children have a well-established constitutional right to live together without 2 || governmental interference. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be 3 separated from their children without due process of law except in emergencies. Officials violate 4 || this right if they remove a child absent “information at the time of the seizure that establishes 5 ‘reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that 6 || the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.’” Rogers v. Cty. of 7 San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007). “Serious allegations of abuse that have been 8 investigated and corroborated usually give rise to a ‘reasonable inference of imminent danger 9 || sufficient to justify taking children into temporary custody’ if they might again be [abused] during 10 || the time it would take to get a warrant.” Jd. at 1294-95. 11 The Court must determine whether Defendants (specifically Defendant Beck)” had 12 || sufficient evidence of “imminent danger of serious bodily injury” to justify H.G.’s warrantless 13 |} removal. Given that Defendants Beck and Ms. DiPaulo (1) knew about Plaintiffs’ extensive 14 || history of neglect, (2) knew about Kaiser staffs’ repeated concerns that Plaintiffs could not care for 3 15 || H.G,, and (3) were in the process of obtaining a warrant to remove H.G., but lacked sufficient time a 16 || to obtain the warrant, there is no question that exigent circumstances justifying removal existed. 3 17 First, removal is only appropriate where officials have reasonable cause to believe that a 18 child will suffer serious bodily injury “in the time that would be required to obtain a warrant.” 19 || Jd.at 1295 (emphasis added). Defendant Beck and others were pursuing a warrant for that 20 || reason—they believed that H.G. would be in serious imminent harm upon leaving the hospital 21 with Plaintiffs. Rogers provides a cogent example: there, the risk of harm to the children was 22 || “flat.” The dirty, maggot-infested home, and malnourishment at issue were long-standing and 23 || known issues. Because the issues, while serious, were unlikely to cause any “significant 24 || worsening of the children’s physical conditions or an increase in the prospects of long-term harm,” 25 26 || s Plaintiffs include Defendant Shaheed in this claim, but there are no allegations connecting 27 || Shaheed to H.G.’s removal. Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 in the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had 2 || sufficient grounds to support their Fourteenth Amendment claims. /d. 3 Plaintiffs thus are incorrect that Rogers held that “[b]ottle rot, malnourishment, and 4 || disorderly home conditions do not present an imminent risk of serious bodily harm.” See P 5 || MSJ/Opp. at 14-15. The Rogers court analyzed these risks in context—of special importance to 6 || the decision was the fact that officials had previously left the children in the home with these 7 || conditions for an extended period. Thus, it was not that exigency was not warranted based on the 8 conditions in the home. It was that the officials’ prior behavior showed that the conditions did not 9 || present a serious risk of harm such that the children could be removed without a warrant, 10 || especially because it would only take a “few hours” to obtain a warrant. Jd. at 1294-95. This 11 aligns with the standard stated above: when analyzing exigency, courts must look to the officials’ 12 behavior to see if the officials had reasonable cause, at the time of the removal, to believe that the 13 child was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. If an official has previously allowed a 14 || child to stay in a condition, that same condition likely cannot constitute exigency. 3 15 Based on the record in Rogers, it was clear that officials had time to obtain a warrant. a 16 || From this, Plaintiffs argue that an official should get a warrant if time permits. This is not in 3 17 || dispute. The dispute at hand is whether time did not permit officials to obtain a warrant. 18 Unlike Rogers, the risk that Plaintiffs posed to H.G. was not stagnant. The Parties agree 19 || that H.G. was not in any immediate danger while in the hospital. The hospital staff could, and did, 20 || intervene before H.G. was placed in any serious jeopardy. But, once the hospital called 21 Defendants and announced that Plaintiffs and H.G. were to be released “momentarily,” exigency 22 || arose. As confirmed by the Kaiser staff, Plaintiffs failure to (1) swaddle H.G., (2) hold H.G. 23 || properly, (3) clean up after waste, and (4) respond to H.G.’s cries and need for changing, put H.G. 24 || at serious risk. See DKt. 54-5 at 4473 (“Nurse |] expressed strong concerns that should this infant 25 || be discharged to the parents, it [| is likely that serious harm or injury will occur to the child.”). 26 || Hence, the moment Defendants learned that H.G. was to be taken from the hospital, the risk of a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 harm elevated and justified warrantless removal. This is exactly the type of exigent circumstance 2 || discussed in Rogers. Cf Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 1184, 1192-1201 (9th Cir. 2016) 3 || (finding that no exigency existed that justified warrantless removal because there was no 4 || expectation that the baby would imminently be leaving the hospital). 5 Plaintiffs maintain that there was “ample time for the Defendants to secure a warrant.” P 6 || MSJ/Opp. at 16. Of course, Plaintiffs do not say when this time existed. They merely concluded, 7 || “Defendants did not secure a warrant despite the fact that the courts were open between the time 8 || that the staff meeting took place and the time H.G. was removed.” /d. This ignores the fact that 9 || (1) Defendant was in the process of obtaining a warrant, but (2) was unable to do so because they 10 || were told H.G. would be imminently released. It is possible that a jury could find through cross- 11 examination that the circumstances were not as grave as the Kaiser nurses claimed. Factual issues 12 || thus remain. But, Plaintiffs have not shown that exigency did not exist and so the Court DENIES 13 Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment 14 Defendants next contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to 3 15 || remove H.G. without a warrant. See D MSJ at 24. A claim of qualified immunity requires a two- a 16 || part inquiry: “(1) Was the law governing the official’s conduct clearly established? (2) Under that 3 17 law, could a reasonable [official] have believed the conduct was lawful?” Rogers, 487 F.3d at 18 1296-97. It is undisputed that, at the time the events took place, the Fourteenth Amendment 19 || prohibited government officials from removing a child from his or her parents absent evidence of 20 || “imminent danger of serious bodily injury,” and that the right was well-established. See id. at 21 1294-97, 22 A reasonable officer would not have understood that the law required a warrant under the 23 circumstances presented by the record. The investigation was in its infancy; Defendants had just 24 || learned about Plaintiffs’ alleged neglect of H.G. Indeed, H.G. was only days old. Moreover, 25 || Defendants were scrambling to secure a warrant before H.G. was released. Cf Anderson- 26 || Francois, 2009 WL 1458240, at *7 (finding that a reasonable officer under the circumstances a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 |} would have understood that a warrant was required because the investigation had taken nearly six 2 || weeks and the allegations of abuse had been known for months prior to the warrantless removal). 3 || Also, there were specific evidence indicating that H.G. was in imminent danger—(1) Tim had 4 || picked H.G. up by her neck and allowed her body to dangle; (2) Plaintiffs, on multiple occasions, 5 left H.G. unswaddled to the point where her body temperature dropped; and (3) Plaintiffs dropped 6 || dirty diapers, post-natal pads, and other trash on the floor, rather than in trash receptacles. More 7 || concerning, Plaintiffs were unreceptive to coaching attempts by nurses and social workers. All 8 || this, coupled with the fact that Plaintiffs had an ongoing juvenile dependency action involving 9 || I.G., confirms that there was a plethora of specific evidence showing that H.G. was in imminent 10 || danger of serious harm. The evidence goes beyond “the mere possibility that, because plaintiff [] 11 had abused her children in the past, she might do so again.” /d. Further, because the hospital told 12 || Defendants that H.G. was to be released momentarily, Defendants did not have the few hours 13 needed to obtain a warrant. 14 Despite the above background, Plaintiffs argue that exigency did not exist. The Court’s 3 15 || recitation of the record shows the contrary. Accordingly, because Defendants had reasonable a 16 || cause to believe that H.G. was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, they were justified in 3 17 || removing H.G. without a warrant and are entitled to immunity for any liability following 18 || therefrom. For these reasons, Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to 19 Counts Five, Six, and Seven. 20 C. Monell Claim (3, 8, 14) 21 Plaintiffs also sue Santa Clara County. See FAC, Counts Three, Eight, and Fourteen. A 22 || public entity is subject to liability under Section 1983 only when a violation of a federally 23 || protected right can be attributed to (1) an express municipal policy, such as an ordinance, 24 || regulation or policy statement, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 25 || 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (2) a “widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or 26 || express municipal policy, is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage’ a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 || with the force of law,” see City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)); (3) the 2 || decision of a person with “final policymaking authority,” see id. at 123; or (4) inadequate training 3 || that is deliberately indifferent to an individual’s constitutional rights, see City of Canton v. Harris, 4 || 489 US. 378 (1989). Plaintiffs must show a sufficient causal connection between the enforcement 5 of the municipal policy or practice and the violation of their federally protected right. Harris, 489 6 || U.S. at 389; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). 7 The Court may not assess the Monel! claim as to I.G. Plaintiffs argue that the County 8 should have reprimanded Defendant Burns for using false information in her warrant declaration. 9 || See Cormier Decl., Exs. A & B, Interrogatory Response Nos. 6-10. The juvenile court found 10 || Defendant Burns’ statements to be true. See supra II].A. The Court cannot assess the Monell 11 claim as it relates to I.G.—doing so would require the Court to disrupt the trial court’s findings. 12 || This the Court cannot do. For that reason, Defendants motion for summary judgment is 13 GRANTED as to Count Three. 14 As for the warrantless removal of H.G., Plaintiffs assert that the County had a “custom of 3 15 detaining or removing children from their family and homes without exigent circumstances.” a 16 || They argue that the DFCS’s policies were insufficient because they did not meet the Ninth 3 17 || Circuit’s standard. See Cormier Decl., Exs. A & B, Interrogatory Response Nos. 6—10. This is 18 || bizarre. The DFCS Online Policies and Procedures advise that a warrant is only appropriate where 19 || there is “immediate danger of serious physical harm.” See D MSJ at 25. In fact, the policies 20 || advise that when there is only “imminent” danger, a warrant should be sought. These policies thus 21 comport and exceed the Ninth Circuit standard. See Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1294 (stating that 22 || officials must have “reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious 23 || bodily injury” to justify a warrantless removal (emphasis added)). 24 The problem is compounded by Plaintiffs failure to show evidence of a custom of 25 detaining or removing children from their families without exigent circumstances. Plaintiffs have 26 || not provided evidence of a “widespread” practice of wrongfully depriving parents of their children a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 or sufficient facts to support their allegation that the County had a practice of depriving parents of 2 || their children, had a practice of lying in warrant applications, and failed to adequately 3 || train/supervise its employees. See Johnson v. City of Vallejo, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1218 (E.D. 4 || Cal. 2015) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic 5 incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 6 || the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” (quotation marks and citation 7 || omitted)); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (“A municipality’s culpability 8 for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”). 9 || Plaintiffs only cite to the removal of H.G. to support their Monel/ claim. This is insufficient as a 10 || matter of law. See Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 814 (1985) (finding that proof of a single 1] incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof 12 || ofthe incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy). 13 || Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts Eight 14 || and Fourteen. 3 15 D. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claims a 16 The Court must now decide what to do with Plaintiffs’ state claims. See FAC, Counts 3 17 Four, Nine, Ten—Twelve, & Fifteen. The Court can only retain jurisdiction over these claims if it 18 exercises supplemental jurisdiction over them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also FAC § 10. 19 Supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 20 || (9th Cir. 1997), supplemented by 121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997). 21 Courts “may”—and often do—“decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if, as here, it 22 || has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see 23 also, e.g., Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2011); Yates v. Delano 24 || Partners, LLC, 2012 WL 4944269, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012); RK. v. Hayward Unified Sch. 25 || Dist., 2008 WL 1847221, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008). As the Supreme Court and Ninth 26 || Circuit have “often repeated,” “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 before trial, the balance of factors will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 2 || remaining state-law claims.” Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (alterations omitted) (quoting Carnegie- 3 || Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). 4 This is the usual case. First, the Court has not considered the merits of Plaintiffs’ state-law 5 claims, and so there is no judicial economy interest in retaining the case. Second, Plaintiffs have 6 || not articulated any significant inconvenience that they would face in refiling in state court. 7 || Indeed, the Parties have already engaged in discovery, so the issues should be clearer in the event 8 || Plaintiffs choose to refile their claims in state court. The Court thus declines to exercise 9 || supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state claims. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 1] For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in 12 || part as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims (Counts One—Three, Five—Eight, & Thirteen—Fourteen). 13 Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. The Court declines to exercise 14 || supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The Clerk shall close the file and a 3 15 || judgment in favor of Defendants shall follow. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 17 || Dated: August 17, 2020
EDWARD J. DAVILA 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 a Case No.: 5:18-cv-04191-EJD 28 || ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT