Goldwire v. Youngs
This text of 82 Misc. 2d 351 (Goldwire v. Youngs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The sole question presented by defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s personal injury action is whether two bills incurred by plaintiff for physical therapy should be included in the computation of the $500 threshold to meet the test of "serious injury” under New York’s no-fault auto insurance law (Insurance Law, § 670 et seq.).
"Physical therapy” is not among the categories of services set forth in Insurance Law (§ 671, subd 4, par [b]) as includable in the computation of the $500 threshold. The question is whether it was deliberately excluded. Construing paragraph (b) of subdivision 4 of section 671 in light of its statutory context (see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, §97), particularly paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 of section 671, which defines "basic economic loss,” the conclusion is inescapable that the exclusion of "physical therapy” was deliberate and that such services were not to be impliedly included as "medical” or "hospital” services under paragraph (b) of subdivision 4 of section 671.2
Fundamental principles of statutory construction dictate this result. "Physical, therapy” services were expressly included by the Legislature in clause (ii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 of section 671, as a component of "basic economic loss.” Certain other services were listed specifically in clause (i) of paragraph (a). Only those services set forth in clause (i) of paragraph (a) are named in section 671 (subd 4, par [b]) as expenses includable in the computation of the $500 threshold for "serious injury. ” The maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius” could not be more applicable than it is in this instance. See McKinney’s Statutes (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, § 240)3 and cases cited therein, especially People v Lewis (29 NY2d 923, 924).
The answer to plaintiffs argument that the Legislature intended to exclude only nonmedical or "informal” physiother[353]*353apy treatment — as distinguished from those prescribed by a physician or rendered in a hospital — is simple. There is no such distinction in the statute. In fact, the language of the statute suggests the opposite, since among the services included in section 671 (subd 1, par [a], cl [ii]) but omitted from paragraph (b) of subdivision 4 is "psychiatric” therapy — treatment which is normally, if not exclusively, rendered as a formal medical service by doctors of medicine duly licensed as psychiatrists. Thus, section 671 (subd 1, par [a], cl [ii]) cannot, as plaintiff suggests, be interpreted as referring merely to "non-medical” services. In this court’s opinion all services in the category listed therein — whether or not rendered by duly licensed physicians or in a hospital — were intended to be included in section 671 (subd 1, par [a], cl [ii]) and, by the same token, excluded from the threshold computation, in view of the Legislature’s failure to name them in paragraph (b) of subdivision 4 of section 671.
This court holds that expenses for physical therapy services are not allowable in computing medical costs under section 671 (subd 4, par [b]).4 Since plaintiff’s expenses do not meet the $500 threshold for "serious injury,” the statute denies him a cause of action. Motion granted.
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82 Misc. 2d 351, 369 N.Y.S.2d 285, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2636, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goldwire-v-youngs-nysupct-1975.