24-1827-cv Goldman v. Trinity Sch. Med.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of April, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ JACK GOLDMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 24-1827-cv
TRINITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, THROUGH ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, DOE DEFENDANTS 1–20, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
Defendants-Appellees. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR APPELLANT: KEITH ALTMAN, The Law Office of Keith Altman, Farmington Hills, MI
FOR APPELLEES: JACQUELINE VORONOV, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Kiyo A. Matsumoto, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jack Goldman appeals from a June 7, 2024 judgment of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Matsumoto, J.) dismissing his claims against Defendants-Appellees Trinity
School of Medicine and twenty unnamed employees of Trinity for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Goldman
is a citizen of New York who attended Trinity, a Caribbean medical school
located in Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, beginning in 2016. He
brought claims under New York General Business Law § 349, for breach of
contract, and for breach of express warranty based on allegedly false statements
made during his recruitment interview and improper tuition charges. We
2 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior
proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to
affirm.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
“We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction.” Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 122,
126 (2d Cir. 2008). In diversity cases such as this one, personal jurisdiction is
governed by the law of the forum State — here, New York — and the
requirements of due process. See D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95,
104 (2d Cir. 2006). New York’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within
the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction under the
statute, a “defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted
business in the state, and . . . the claims must arise from the transactions.” Al
Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 28 N.Y.3d 316, 323 (2016); see also Daou v. BLC Bank, S.A.L.,
42 F.4th 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2022).
Goldman argues that, contrary to the District Court’s ruling, Trinity had
3 enough contacts with New York to establish personal jurisdiction under its long-
arm statute. Goldman alleges several facts to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction: (1) Trinity’s recruiting visits to New York, including Goldman’s own
interview with Trinity’s Director of Admissions in New York; (2) a past
contractual relationship between Trinity and an Illinois-based company that
placed Trinity students in clinical rotations at New York hospitals; (3) Trinity’s
marketing efforts directed to New York residents; and (4) that about seven
percent of Trinity’s student body hails from New York.
None of these alleged contacts singly or together meet the “overriding
criterion” for establishing a transaction of business, which is “some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within New York.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 61
(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508 (2007)). First,
although Trinity conducted a handful of recruiting interviews in New York
between 2016 and 2018, including Goldman’s interview, these limited contacts
were part of a nationwide recruitment effort and not specifically targeted at New
York. Goldman did not allege that the school maintains any offices or
employees in New York, and it has not conducted any in-person interviews in
4 the state since 2018. The “transitory presence of a corporate official” in New
York is insufficient to support jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). See Licci, 673 F.3d
at 62.
Second, Trinity’s contract with the Illinois company terminated in October
2015, well before Goldman’s April 2016 recruitment interview, Goldman never
participated in any New York clinical rotations, and the alleged
misrepresentations about residency opportunities and the disputed tuition
charges occurred years after Trinity had ceased all New York clinical placements.
Indeed, the Illinois company, not Trinity, had a direct relationship with New
York hospitals. Goldman has thus failed to show “a relatedness between the
transaction[s] [involving the Illinois company] and the legal claim such that the
latter is not completely unmoored from the former.” Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank,
SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339 (2012). Because there is no “articulable nexus” between
the contract and Goldman’s claims, McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272 (1981),
it cannot serve as a basis for specific jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm
statute.
Third, Trinity’s general marketing efforts, including its website and email
campaigns, were not specifically targeted at New York residents and therefore
5 do not establish purposeful availment. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d
239, 250–52 (2d Cir. 2007). Finally, without additional evidence that Trinity
specifically targeted New York residents or tailored its educational offerings to
the New York market, Trinity’s enrollment statistics reflect the school’s general
recruitment strategy, not purposeful engagement with New York specifically.
See Apicella v. Valley Forge Mil. Acad. & Junior Coll., 478 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665–66 (2d
Dep’t 1984); Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 24 N.Y.3d 370, 380–81 (2014).
II. Leave to Amend
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24-1827-cv Goldman v. Trinity Sch. Med.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of April, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ JACK GOLDMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 24-1827-cv
TRINITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, THROUGH ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, DOE DEFENDANTS 1–20, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
Defendants-Appellees. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR APPELLANT: KEITH ALTMAN, The Law Office of Keith Altman, Farmington Hills, MI
FOR APPELLEES: JACQUELINE VORONOV, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Kiyo A. Matsumoto, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jack Goldman appeals from a June 7, 2024 judgment of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Matsumoto, J.) dismissing his claims against Defendants-Appellees Trinity
School of Medicine and twenty unnamed employees of Trinity for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Goldman
is a citizen of New York who attended Trinity, a Caribbean medical school
located in Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, beginning in 2016. He
brought claims under New York General Business Law § 349, for breach of
contract, and for breach of express warranty based on allegedly false statements
made during his recruitment interview and improper tuition charges. We
2 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior
proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to
affirm.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
“We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction.” Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 122,
126 (2d Cir. 2008). In diversity cases such as this one, personal jurisdiction is
governed by the law of the forum State — here, New York — and the
requirements of due process. See D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95,
104 (2d Cir. 2006). New York’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within
the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction under the
statute, a “defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted
business in the state, and . . . the claims must arise from the transactions.” Al
Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 28 N.Y.3d 316, 323 (2016); see also Daou v. BLC Bank, S.A.L.,
42 F.4th 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2022).
Goldman argues that, contrary to the District Court’s ruling, Trinity had
3 enough contacts with New York to establish personal jurisdiction under its long-
arm statute. Goldman alleges several facts to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction: (1) Trinity’s recruiting visits to New York, including Goldman’s own
interview with Trinity’s Director of Admissions in New York; (2) a past
contractual relationship between Trinity and an Illinois-based company that
placed Trinity students in clinical rotations at New York hospitals; (3) Trinity’s
marketing efforts directed to New York residents; and (4) that about seven
percent of Trinity’s student body hails from New York.
None of these alleged contacts singly or together meet the “overriding
criterion” for establishing a transaction of business, which is “some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within New York.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 61
(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508 (2007)). First,
although Trinity conducted a handful of recruiting interviews in New York
between 2016 and 2018, including Goldman’s interview, these limited contacts
were part of a nationwide recruitment effort and not specifically targeted at New
York. Goldman did not allege that the school maintains any offices or
employees in New York, and it has not conducted any in-person interviews in
4 the state since 2018. The “transitory presence of a corporate official” in New
York is insufficient to support jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). See Licci, 673 F.3d
at 62.
Second, Trinity’s contract with the Illinois company terminated in October
2015, well before Goldman’s April 2016 recruitment interview, Goldman never
participated in any New York clinical rotations, and the alleged
misrepresentations about residency opportunities and the disputed tuition
charges occurred years after Trinity had ceased all New York clinical placements.
Indeed, the Illinois company, not Trinity, had a direct relationship with New
York hospitals. Goldman has thus failed to show “a relatedness between the
transaction[s] [involving the Illinois company] and the legal claim such that the
latter is not completely unmoored from the former.” Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank,
SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339 (2012). Because there is no “articulable nexus” between
the contract and Goldman’s claims, McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272 (1981),
it cannot serve as a basis for specific jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm
statute.
Third, Trinity’s general marketing efforts, including its website and email
campaigns, were not specifically targeted at New York residents and therefore
5 do not establish purposeful availment. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d
239, 250–52 (2d Cir. 2007). Finally, without additional evidence that Trinity
specifically targeted New York residents or tailored its educational offerings to
the New York market, Trinity’s enrollment statistics reflect the school’s general
recruitment strategy, not purposeful engagement with New York specifically.
See Apicella v. Valley Forge Mil. Acad. & Junior Coll., 478 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665–66 (2d
Dep’t 1984); Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 24 N.Y.3d 370, 380–81 (2014).
II. Leave to Amend
Goldman also contends that the District Court erred by denying him leave
to amend his complaint. “We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend
a complaint for abuse of discretion.” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493
F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir. 2007). But where “denial was based on an interpretation of
law, such as futility, . . . we review the legal conclusion de novo.” Panther
Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012).
The District Court granted Goldman the opportunity to engage in
jurisdictional discovery, but Goldman failed to adduce any evidence that
established personal jurisdiction over Trinity in New York. In his opposition to
Trinity’s motion to dismiss, for example, Goldman did not proffer any additional
6 facts that might support jurisdiction in an amended complaint. Under these
circumstances, we agree with the District Court’s determination that amendment
would be futile. See Panther Partners, 681 F.3d at 119.
Goldman also argues that the District Court should have transferred the
case to Georgia rather than dismissing it. But Goldman never requested a
transfer of venue in the District Court, and we decline to consider this argument,
which is raised for the first time on appeal. See Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470
F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Goldman’s remaining arguments and conclude that
they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court