Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company v. R. Susan Woods.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: February 13, 2023
• Docket: 21-P-0561
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-561

GOLDMAN SACHS MORTGAGE COMPANY

vs.

R. SUSAN WOODS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This is a consolidated appeal from (1) a Land Court

judgment dismissing an action to remove a cloud from title and

(2) a procedural order of a single justice of this court. The

plaintiff, Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company (Goldman Sachs),

conducted a foreclosure sale of property owned by the defendant,

R. Susan Woods, and purchased the property as the highest

bidder. Woods then recorded an affidavit at the registry of

deeds contesting the sale, Goldman Sachs brought this action in

Land Court to remove the resulting cloud on its title, and Woods

counterclaimed for declaratory relief. While the action was

pending, Woods filed for bankruptcy and listed the property as

an asset.1 Goldman Sachs sold its interest in the property to

1 Woods states that she designated the property as exempt from the bankruptcy proceedings but that the exemption was denied. the bankruptcy trustee. Then, in the bankruptcy proceedings,

the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to sell the property free

and clear of liens, and the motion was allowed. Due to the

changed circumstances, Goldman Sachs moved to dismiss the Land

Court action, and the motion was allowed.

Woods now appeals from the judgment of dismissal. She also

appeals from a single justice order dated December 28, 2021,

denying her request for leave to file a motion in Land Court,

pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), to

reopen the case and expand the record. We affirm both the

judgment and the order.2

1. Land Court judgment. Woods argues, in summary, that

the foreclosure sale was void; that Goldman Sachs did not have

title to convey to the bankruptcy trustee; that it was incumbent

on the Land Court to decide matters of title; and that, for a

variety of reasons, the Land Court judge who decided the motion

to dismiss erred in relying on what occurred in the bankruptcy

proceedings. Woods's arguments fail to take into account the

effect of the bankruptcy proceedings on Goldman Sachs's claim to

remove a cloud on title and on Woods's counterclaim for

declaratory relief.

2 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by Dawn Thompson.

2 We turn first to Goldman Sachs's claim. Once Goldman Sachs

conveyed its interest in the property to the bankruptcy trustee,

Goldman Sachs no longer had any claim of title and thus had no

stake in whether Woods's affidavit created a cloud on title. As

stated in its motion to dismiss, Goldman Sachs had "no skin in

the game[,] because of its conveyance to the [t]rustee."

"Litigation ordinarily is considered moot when the party

claiming to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in its

outcome." Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 403 Mass. 370,

380 (1988). "The general rule is that courts ordinarily will

not decide moot questions." Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 409 Mass.

116, 121 (1991). Accordingly, the Land Court judge was correct

in ruling that Goldman Sachs's claim was moot and should be

dismissed.

Turning next to Woods's counterclaim, Woods requested a

declaratory judgment against Goldman Sachs that her recorded

affidavit should "stand," that various mortgage assignments were

invalid, that the foreclosure sale was void, and that she

therefore had a clear title.3 As a result of Woods's filing for

bankruptcy, Woods's interest in the property became part of the

bankruptcy estate, and she no longer held title regardless of

3 The counterclaim also alluded to, but expressly declined to press at that time, a claim of a violation of G. L. c. 93A. Woods never further amended the counterclaim to raise a chapter 93A issue.

3 whether the mortgage assignments were invalid or whether the

foreclosure sale was void. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). At that

point, the actual controversy between the parties, Woods and

Goldman Sachs, ceased to exist. Even if we assume for purposes

of argument that Woods retained some legally cognizable interest

in the requested declarations, Goldman Sachs, after its

conveyance to the trustee, no longer had any such interest. The

status of Woods's affidavit, the mortgage assignments, the

foreclosure sale, and Woods's title was of no continuing concern

to Goldman Sachs.4 Thus, Wood's counterclaim for declaratory

relief against Goldman Sachs was moot, and dismissal on that

ground was proper.5

2. Single justice order. Separately, Woods argues that a

single justice of this court abused his discretion in denying

her motion for leave to file, in the Land Court, a rule 60 (b)

motion supported by an affidavit regarding alleged illegalities

affecting her mortgage. We are unpersuaded. Woods's motion to

the single justice offered no good reason why she had not filed

her affidavit in the Land Court at an earlier stage -- either in

4 If Woods had any argument as to Goldman Sachs's continuing interest, it has been waived by her failure adequately to argue it, either to the judge or in this appeal. 5 We recognize Woods's underlying claims that she was a victim of

predatory and discriminatory lending, and that her property was taken from her illegally. Nonetheless, our review is limited to the issues that are properly before us -- in particular, whether the case between these parties was correctly dismissed as moot.

4 opposition to Goldman Sachs's motion to dismiss or else in

support of a postjudgment motion prior to the appeal being

docketed in this court. See Garland v. Beverly Hosp. Corp., 48

Mass. App. Ct. 913, 915 n.5 (1999). Woods's single justice

motion asserted that the affidavit was not filed previously

"because [she] was denied the evidentiary hearing she sought."

But the absence of an evidentiary hearing does not explain why

Woods could not have filed the affidavit in response to the

motion to dismiss. Although Woods was self-represented, she was

able to file a detailed written opposition (with attachments) to

that motion, as well as a written supplement to that opposition.

Moreover, and in any event, it would have been futile for Woods

to seek relief based on that affidavit where, as discussed, the

Land Court no longer had jurisdiction of either Goldman Sachs's

quiet title claim or Woods's declaratory judgment counterclaim.

5 In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in the single

justice's order.6

Judgment affirmed.

Single justice order dated December 28, 2021, affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Sacks & Walsh, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: February 13, 2023.

6 Woods's reply brief argues that the single justice should have recused himself due to a conflict of interest allegedly created by his ownership of stock in a bank that is not a party hereto. Woods acknowledges that she made no recusal request to the single justice. Therefore, the argument is waived. See Albert v. Municipal Court of Boston, 388 Mass. 491, 493-494 (1983). On this record, any decision by the single justice not to recuse himself sua sponte from ruling on Woods's motion for leave provides no basis for relief from the denial of that motion. Cf. Matter of Moore, 449 Mass. 1009, 1010 n.1 (2007) (summarily rejecting recusal claim raised for first time on appeal); Commonwealth v. Armand, 411 Mass. 167, 175–176 (1991) (same). Were the motion for leave before us de novo, we would deny it. 7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.