Golden Flake, Inc. v. State

229 So. 2d 815, 45 Ala. App. 315, 1969 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 58
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
DecidedDecember 15, 1969
Docket6 Div. 22
StatusPublished

This text of 229 So. 2d 815 (Golden Flake, Inc. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Golden Flake, Inc. v. State, 229 So. 2d 815, 45 Ala. App. 315, 1969 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 58 (Ala. Ct. App. 1969).

Opinion

WRIGHT, Judge.

The Tax Assessor of Jefferson County, Alabama, on July 11, 1968, made an “escape assessment” against improvements located on Lot 2, Lyric Building Corporation Resurvey, the property of appellant, Golden Flake, Inc. This lot had been purchased by appellant in 1961; and assessed as vacant property.

During the year 1963, construction was begun on appellant’s Lot 2 and the resulting building occupied in September 1964. Appellant did not assess this building with the tax assessor, and had not assessed it, when the escape assessment was made and notice given to the taxpayer in July, 1968. Escape assessment was made for tax years 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968, at a value of $126,700 each year and a 10% penalty added. The total assessment for the four years was in the amount of $557,480, with taxes due thereon of $20,609.28.

It was agreed that the valuation placed on the improvements was fair, with protest of the escape assessment being filed with the Board of Equalization of Jefferson County. The protest was denied and appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County.

The tax, including penalty, was paid under protest, and the appeal was heard in circuit court on agreed statement of facts, solely on the question of the validity of the escape assessment.

The circuit court found against the taxpayer, from which order this appeal was taken.

There were six assignments of error, all of which are, in essence, the same. The question raised is whether or not assessments for improvements on real estate, assessed as. vacant property, and on which taxes, as assessed, have been paid, can be made as “escape assessments” by the assessor for each prior year, up to a total of five, together with a 10% penalty for each year.

The “escape assessment” made by the assessor in this case was under authority of Title 51, Section 53, Code of Alabama 1940, as amended in 1953. The pertinent part of the statute is as follows:

“Whenever the tax assessor shall discover that any property, in chiding any [317]*317improvements on real estate assessed as vacant property, has escaped taxation in any assessment within five years next preceding the current year, he shall list, return and value said property for assessment for the years during which same has escaped taxation, and shall also endorse on such returns the year or years for which the property has escaped taxation, and the accrual of a penalty of ten percent of the taxes assessed thereon for each year. * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

Title 51, Section 53 was, prior to the 1953 amendment, a general escape statute applicable to “any property” which had escaped taxation by failure of assessment. The 1953 amendment added only to the first sentence the phrase underlined in the above quotation.

Appellant relies on the case of State v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of New York, 224 Ala. 406, 140 So. 365, as the controlling case and the authority upon which error is insisted.

State v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of New York was decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1932. There was involved a statute applicable to counties of 300,000 population and above. This statute was approved June-10, 1931, and authorized the deputy tax assessor to “list for assessment and taxation any escaped improvements on real property subject to taxation in Alabama which improvements are not entered on any tax return made to the County Tax Assessors * * *.”

The agreed statement of facts in that case was that the property had been assessed as vacant property for the years 1929 and 1930. A house was constructed thereon in September 1928. On June 15, 1931, escape assessment on the property for the value of the improvement was made by the deputy assessor under authority of the 1931 Act.

The question presented on appeal was as to the validity of the escape assessment for the years 1929 and 1930, prior to the-passage of the Act of 1931.

Justice Bouldin, in his learned opinion,, recited the law as it existed prior to the passage of the Act. He pointed out that though the law required the separate listing of land and improvements on the tax return, this did not constitute them separate-items of property, subject to separate and distinct tax liens. The effective statutes defined real estate as inclusive of all structures which would pass by a conveyance of the land. “ ‘It is a principle of taxation that, where the state has once proceeded by its duly constituted agencies to the assessment and valuation of property, the determination is judicial in its nature, and conclusive in its results, unless impeached for fraud or want of jurisdiction, or reversed and set aside by some tribunal having authority to review. 37 Cyc. 1071.' Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 185 Ala. 482, 487, 64 So. 110, 111; State v. Doster-Northington Drug Co., 196 Ala. 447, 71 So. 427 * * *.

From these authorities it is unquestioned law that a valid assessment, though irregular, and subject to correction through the various agencies set up to secure a fair and full assessment to the • end that all taxable property shall bear its share of the public burden, when it becomes final and taxes are paid accordingly, the proceedings are binding on the state as well as upon the property owner, the tax lien is satisfied, the abstractor may so regard it. The property, and no part of it, can be regarded as an escape, or the property be reassessed as an escape.”

There is no question that the law was as Justice Bouldin proclaimed it. However, in relation to the statute under consideration, (for all practical purposes, identical to that here) he stated the following: “This statute must be held, therefore, to create a new class of escapes. Otherwise there would have been no occasion for it. A statute intended to meet defects of substantive law, to remedy evils growing ortt of the state of the law, is not a remedial stat[318]*318ute within the rule of construction under ■discussion. We must hold this is not a remedial statute, hut one of substantive law, making that an escape which theretofore was not an escape. To apply it to cases where taxes had been assessed upon the realty of which the improvements were a part and the tax lien fully discharged is to create a new charge and a new tax lien not theretofore known to the law.”

Appellant, in his brief, adopts the opinion ■of Justice Bouldin as to the status of the law then existing, but ignores the finding that the applicable statute is “one of substantive law, making that an escape which theretofore was not an escape * * * [and] is to create a new charge and a new tax lien not theretofore known to the law.”

The import of State v. Mortgage-Bond ■Co. of New York, supra, is clear. The statute created a new charge and a new lien on real estate, and was substantive and not remedial. It therefore could have no retroactive effect for the years prior to its passage.

Appellant contends that if the statute under consideration here means what it says, there can be no certainty as to possible liens in real estate transactions. It is insisted that abstractors check the tax collectors records and if they indicate taxes are paid, they certify satisfaction of tax liens. Such may be true, but in view of Title 51, Section 53, as amended 1953, the abstractor would be advised to go further and check the assessors’ records to determine if improvements are assessed.

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Related

Graves v. McDonough
88 So. 2d 371 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1956)
State v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of New York
140 So. 365 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1932)
Anniston City Land Co. v. State
64 So. 110 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1913)
State v. Doster-Northington Drug Co.
71 So. 427 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1916)

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Bluebook (online)
229 So. 2d 815, 45 Ala. App. 315, 1969 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 58, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/golden-flake-inc-v-state-alacivapp-1969.