Gold Star Feed and Grain, LLC v. Ulster Dairy, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 22, 2024
Docket4:23-cv-01942
StatusUnknown

This text of Gold Star Feed and Grain, LLC v. Ulster Dairy, LLC (Gold Star Feed and Grain, LLC v. Ulster Dairy, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gold Star Feed and Grain, LLC v. Ulster Dairy, LLC, (M.D. Pa. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GOLD STAR FEED AND GRAIN, No. 4:23-CV-01942 LLC, (Chief Judge Brann) Plaintiff,

v.

ULSTER DAIRY, LLC, CASHELL’S CATTLE COMPANY, BEN CASHELL, and ELIZABETH CASHELL,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 22, 2024 I. BACKGROUND This case was initially filed by Plaintiff, Gold Star Feed and Grain, LLC (“GSFG”), against Defendants Ulster Dairy, LLC (“Ulster”), Cashell’s Cattle Company, Ben Cashell, and Elizabeth Cashell (collectively “Cashell”) on November 22, 2023.1 Since then, the Defendants have failed to appear before this Court at all. After Plaintiff moved for entry of default, the Clerk of Court entered default on January 12, 2024.2 GSFG has now moved for default judgment.3 Still, the Defendants have refused to respond, and therefore the motion is now ripe for

1 See Doc. 1 (Compl.). 2 See Doc. 6 (Clerk’s Entry of Default). disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. DISCUSSION A. Default Judgment is Warranted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 allows the District Court to enter default judgment upon application by a party.4 “Generally, the entry of a default judgment

is disfavored, and a court is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in deciding whether to enter default judgment.”5 “This element of discretion makes it clear that the party making the request is not entitled to a default judgment as of

right, even when [the] defendant is technically in default and that fact has been noted under Rule 55(a).”6 The Court must consider three factors in deciding whether to grant default

judgment: “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether [the] defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct.”7 “But when a defendant has failed to appear or respond in any fashion to the complaint, this analysis is necessarily one-sided;

entry of default judgment is typically appropriate in such circumstances at least

4 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). 5 Kibbie v. BP/Citibank, No. 3:CV-08-1804, 2010 WL 2573845, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2010) (Vanaskie, J.). 6 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2685 (Apr. 2020 Update). 7 Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). until the defendant comes forward with a motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule 55(c).”8 In cases where a defendant fails to appear, this Court may enter

default judgment “based solely on the fact that the default has occurred.”9 The Court nevertheless considers those factors for the sake of completeness; in this case, they favor the grant of default judgment. First, Plaintiff would be

prejudiced by their “current inability to proceed with [their] action due to [the] Defendant[s’] failure to defend.”10 Their decision to not appear before this Court prevents GSFG from recovering any damages. Similarly, the second factor points in Plaintiff’s favor. The “Defendants [have] not responded to the allegations and,

thereby, [have] failed to assert a defense.”11 Finally, there does not seem to be any excuse for the Defendants’ failure to appear. Service was accepted on behalf of the Defendants on December 7, 2023.12 Having received service, the Defendants have

yet to respond. Because the Defendants have offered no explanation for their failure to engage, the Court finds that the Defendants are culpable.13 Therefore, default judgment is appropriate.

8 Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Strunz, Civ. No. 1:12-CV-01678, 2013 WL 122644, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2013) (Kane, J.). 9 Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990). 10 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Kujo Long, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00449, 2014 WL 4059711, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2014) (Kane, J.). 11 Pesotski v. Summa & Lezzi, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00221, 2017 WL 3310951, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013) (Kane, J.). 12 See Doc. 4 (Affidavit of Service). 13 See Laborers Local Union 158 v. Shaffer, Civ. No. 1:CV-10-1524, 2011 WL 1397107 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2011)(Kane, J.). A finding that default judgment is warranted, however, “is not the end of the inquiry.”14 First, the Court must consider whether the “unchallenged facts

constitute a legitimate cause of action.”15 Although the defaulting party does not concede conclusions of law, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”16 Plaintiff’s complaint

asserts breach of contract claims against the Defendants and, in the alternative, claims for breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment.17 The Court now considers whether the allegations in the complaint, taken as true, state a claim under those causes of action.

B. Facts Alleged in the Complaint GSFG, a limited liability company, provides dairy feed and other commodities to farmers and agricultural businesses.18 After a customer receives and accepts the products they ordered, Plaintiff sends them an invoice.19 “The

invoices reference the terms and conditions governing the transaction, including terms and conditions located on [J.D. Heiskell Holdings, LLC’s (“JDH”)] website,”20 the sole member of GSFG.21 These terms and conditions provide “(1)

14 Martin v. Nat’l Check Recovery Servs., LLC, Civ. No. 1:12-CV-1230, 2016 WL 3670849, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2016) (Caldwell, J.). 15 Broad Music, Inc. v. Spring Mount Area Bavarian Resort, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 16 Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). 17 See Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 45-88. 18 See id. ¶¶ 1, 13. 19 See id. ¶ 15. 20 Id. ¶ 16. that all purchases on credit were due and payable in accordance with the corresponding invoice; (2) that amounts unpaid by customers would accrue interest

at 1.5% per month or 18% per annum (compounded monthly); and (3) that defaults for non-payment do not require notice from GSFG to constitute a breach.”22 The JDH website further outlined that “GSFG may suspend product shipments” or

credit and “collect[] amounts owed via lawsuit” when faced with a default by a customer.23 Ulster, a limited liability company, began to order products from GSFG in February 2022 for use in its dairy operations.24 The invoices sent to Ulster

“incorporate by reference the terms and conditions on JDH’s website.”25 For several months Ulster paid for its deliveries.26 In December 2022, GSFG “continued to deliver” products followed by an invoice “in accordance with the prior course of dealing, but Ulster failed to timely pay the invoices.”27 Ulster has

accumulated an overdue balance “of at least $145,170.94.”28

21 See id. ¶ 2. 22 Id. ¶ 17. 23 Id. ¶¶ 18-19. 24 See id. ¶¶ 4, 20. 25 Id. ¶ 21. 26 See id. ¶ 24. 27 Id. ¶ 25. 28 Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff sent two demand letters to Ulster requesting payment on this overdue balance but has received no response.29 Ulster’s overdue balance has been

incurring a monthly interest charge of 1.5% “since at least January 31, 2023.”30 In February 2022, Cashell’s Cattle Company, an unincorporated entity, began to order products from Plaintiff to use in its dairy operations.31 The invoices

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Gold Star Feed and Grain, LLC v. Ulster Dairy, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gold-star-feed-and-grain-llc-v-ulster-dairy-llc-pamd-2024.