Goitom Seged v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

S.D. California

Goitom Seged v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

DecidedMay 27, 2026

Docket3:26-cv-02564

StatusUnknown

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Goitom Seged v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al., (S.D. Cal. 2026).

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1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 GOITOM SEGED, No. 3:26-cv-02564-BTM-DEB

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior- Warden Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 15 al.,

16 Respondents.

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Pending before the Court is Goitom Seged’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 A. Background 3 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, entered the United States on September 4 7, 2025. Petitioner was determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 5 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), placed in expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 6 1225(b)(1), and taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody pursuant to 8 7 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B). Petitioner was interviewed by an asylum officer. Petitioner 8 received a negative credible fear determination by the asylum officer. An immigration 9 judge (IJ), however, vacated that determination. On October 6, 2025, Petitioner was 10 issued a Notice to Appear (NTA). The filing of the NTA initiated removal proceedings, 11 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, against Petitioner, and those proceedings remain ongoing. 12 Petitioner claims that his detention has become unreasonably prolonged and that, 13 accordingly, he is entitled to a bond hearing. The Government contends that this Court 14 lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), that Petitioner is mandatorily detained under 15 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), and that his detention is not unreasonably prolonged. 16 B. Discussion 17 Because Petitioner is raising a constitutional challenge to the length of his 18 detention without a bond hearing, this Court has habeas jurisdiction. Nielsen v. Preap, 19 586 U.S. 392, 401-02 (2019) (maintaining jurisdiction on appeal following district court 20 decisions to review legal challenge to decision to deny bond hearings). This Court has 21 jurisdiction because Petitioner is not challenging his removal, the execution of a removal 22 order, or a discretionary decision by the Attorney General. See id.; see also Arce v. 23 United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have limited [1252(g)]’s 24 jurisdiction-stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary 25 decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”). 26 The Court holds that Petitioner’s continued detention—lasting almost nine 27 months—is unreasonably prolonged and, without a bond hearing, violates the Due 28 Process Clause. To assess that issue, courts in this district look to the following six 1 factors: (1) total length of detention to date; (2) likely duration of future detention; (3) 2 conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 3 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that 4 the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. 5 Supp. 3d 768, 773-74 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 6 Petitioner has been detained for about nine months, and if he loses his immigration 7 case, he plans to appeal to the BIA and the Ninth Circuit. His detention could thus 8 continue for an additional year or two. Further, the conditions of Petitioner’s 9 confinement are akin to imprisonment. See Mingzhi Gao v. Larose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 10 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2025) (explaining that “the conditions of confinement at 11 Otay Mesa Detention Center are not dissimilar to criminal confinement”). The remaining 12 factors are neutral. 13 Petitioner’s continued detention is unreasonably prolonged and, without a bond 14 hearing, is inconsistent with the right to due process. See Hamideh Sadeqi v. Larose, 809 15 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“[T]he Court finds that Petitioner’s detention 16 for over 11 months without a bond hearing under the circumstances of this case—and 17 absent meaningful rebuttal by Respondents of Petitioner’s analysis—has become 18 unreasonable and violates due process.”); Masood v. Barr, No. 19-cv-07623-JD, 2020 19 WL 95633 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (granting bond hearing for a petitioner detained for 20 nearly nine months); Cabral v. Decker, 331 F. Supp. 3d 255, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (seven 21 months); Perez v. Decker, No. 18-cv-5279, 2018 WL 3991497 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) 22 (nine months); Brissett v. Decker, 324 F. Supp. 3d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (nine 23 months). 24 Last, the Court finds unpersuasive the Government’s reliance on Department of 25 Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), and Shaughnessy v. United 26 States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In Thuraissigiam, the Court held that the 27 respondent, a noncitizen apprehended near the border shortly after unlawfully entering 28 the country, had “only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by 1 statute.” 591 U.S. at 107. The Court’s holding applied to the noncitizen’s “rights 2 regarding admission.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, however, Petitioner is raising a 3 constitutional claim regarding his prolonged detention; because Petitioner’s challenge 4 does not relate to his admission, Thuraissigiam is inapposite. See Mingzhi Gao, 805 F. 5 Supp. 3d at 1110 (“This Court likewise agrees with those district courts that interpret 6 Thuraissigiam as circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to admission, 7 rather than limiting that person’s ability to challenge detention.”). 8 In Mezei, the Court held that Mezei, a noncitizen “on the threshold of initial entry,” 9 was properly excluded from the United States. But the Mezei court was faced with “the 10 special circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney 11 General that Mezei presented a threat to national security.” Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 12 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003). Mezei has no application here. 13 C. Conclusion 14 For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted. On or 15 before June 9, 2026, unless Petitioner requests a continuance, the Government is ordered 16 to grant Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before a fair, neutral, and open-minded 17 IJ. The IJ shall consider where the Petitioner will reside, who any surety may be, the 18 appropriateness of non-financial conditions, the nine factors for an IJ to consider in an 19 individualized bond hearing as set forth in Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775 (9th Cir.

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1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 GOITOM SEGED, No. 3:26-cv-02564-BTM-DEB

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior- Warden Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 15 al.,

16 Respondents.

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Pending before the Court is Goitom Seged’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 A. Background 3 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, entered the United States on September 4 7, 2025. Petitioner was determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 5 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), placed in expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 6 1225(b)(1), and taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody pursuant to 8 7 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B). Petitioner was interviewed by an asylum officer. Petitioner 8 received a negative credible fear determination by the asylum officer. An immigration 9 judge (IJ), however, vacated that determination. On October 6, 2025, Petitioner was 10 issued a Notice to Appear (NTA). The filing of the NTA initiated removal proceedings, 11 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, against Petitioner, and those proceedings remain ongoing. 12 Petitioner claims that his detention has become unreasonably prolonged and that, 13 accordingly, he is entitled to a bond hearing. The Government contends that this Court 14 lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), that Petitioner is mandatorily detained under 15 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), and that his detention is not unreasonably prolonged. 16 B. Discussion 17 Because Petitioner is raising a constitutional challenge to the length of his 18 detention without a bond hearing, this Court has habeas jurisdiction. Nielsen v. Preap, 19 586 U.S. 392, 401-02 (2019) (maintaining jurisdiction on appeal following district court 20 decisions to review legal challenge to decision to deny bond hearings). This Court has 21 jurisdiction because Petitioner is not challenging his removal, the execution of a removal 22 order, or a discretionary decision by the Attorney General. See id.; see also Arce v. 23 United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have limited [1252(g)]’s 24 jurisdiction-stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary 25 decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”). 26 The Court holds that Petitioner’s continued detention—lasting almost nine 27 months—is unreasonably prolonged and, without a bond hearing, violates the Due 28 Process Clause. To assess that issue, courts in this district look to the following six 1 factors: (1) total length of detention to date; (2) likely duration of future detention; (3) 2 conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 3 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that 4 the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. 5 Supp. 3d 768, 773-74 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 6 Petitioner has been detained for about nine months, and if he loses his immigration 7 case, he plans to appeal to the BIA and the Ninth Circuit. His detention could thus 8 continue for an additional year or two. Further, the conditions of Petitioner’s 9 confinement are akin to imprisonment. See Mingzhi Gao v. Larose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 10 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2025) (explaining that “the conditions of confinement at 11 Otay Mesa Detention Center are not dissimilar to criminal confinement”). The remaining 12 factors are neutral. 13 Petitioner’s continued detention is unreasonably prolonged and, without a bond 14 hearing, is inconsistent with the right to due process. See Hamideh Sadeqi v. Larose, 809 15 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“[T]he Court finds that Petitioner’s detention 16 for over 11 months without a bond hearing under the circumstances of this case—and 17 absent meaningful rebuttal by Respondents of Petitioner’s analysis—has become 18 unreasonable and violates due process.”); Masood v. Barr, No. 19-cv-07623-JD, 2020 19 WL 95633 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (granting bond hearing for a petitioner detained for 20 nearly nine months); Cabral v. Decker, 331 F. Supp. 3d 255, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (seven 21 months); Perez v. Decker, No. 18-cv-5279, 2018 WL 3991497 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) 22 (nine months); Brissett v. Decker, 324 F. Supp. 3d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (nine 23 months). 24 Last, the Court finds unpersuasive the Government’s reliance on Department of 25 Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), and Shaughnessy v. United 26 States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In Thuraissigiam, the Court held that the 27 respondent, a noncitizen apprehended near the border shortly after unlawfully entering 28 the country, had “only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by 1 statute.” 591 U.S. at 107. The Court’s holding applied to the noncitizen’s “rights 2 regarding admission.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, however, Petitioner is raising a 3 constitutional claim regarding his prolonged detention; because Petitioner’s challenge 4 does not relate to his admission, Thuraissigiam is inapposite. See Mingzhi Gao, 805 F. 5 Supp. 3d at 1110 (“This Court likewise agrees with those district courts that interpret 6 Thuraissigiam as circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to admission, 7 rather than limiting that person’s ability to challenge detention.”). 8 In Mezei, the Court held that Mezei, a noncitizen “on the threshold of initial entry,” 9 was properly excluded from the United States. But the Mezei court was faced with “the 10 special circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney 11 General that Mezei presented a threat to national security.” Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 12 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003). Mezei has no application here. 13 C. Conclusion 14 For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted. On or 15 before June 9, 2026, unless Petitioner requests a continuance, the Government is ordered 16 to grant Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before a fair, neutral, and open-minded 17 IJ. The IJ shall consider where the Petitioner will reside, who any surety may be, the 18 appropriateness of non-financial conditions, the nine factors for an IJ to consider in an 19 individualized bond hearing as set forth in Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775 (9th Cir. 20 2024): (1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length 21 of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family ties in the United States, and 22 whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the 23 future; (4) the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance in court; 24 (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the 25 recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of 26 immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution or otherwise 27 escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of entry to the United States, and any 28 other factors the IJ deems relevant in this particular case. See also Matter of Guerra, 24 1 | I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). The burden is on the Government, by clear and convincing 2 | evidence, to establish that the Petitioner is a danger to the community or a risk of flight 3 | for which there are no conditions available to him that will deter such risk. 4 If the IJ denies bond, the judge must make specific findings as to why Petitioner is 5 | a danger to the community or a flight risk, and the Government must make the audio of 6 | the hearing available to Petitioner’s counsel. If the Government fails to comply with this 7 | writ, Petitioner can apply to this Court for relief. The parties are ordered to provide a 8 | joint status report within forty-eight (48) hours of the bond hearing. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: May 26, 2026 ‘

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowit 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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