Goins v. Winkel

District Court, N.D. Ohio·Decided July 19, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-00653·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

JUSTIN GOINS, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-00653 ) Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese ) v. ) Magistrate Judge ) James E. Grimes, Jr. CORPORAL WINKEL, ) ) Defendant. ) )

JUSTIN GOINS, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-01448 ) Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese ) v. ) Magistrate Judge ) Jonathan D. Greenberg CORPORAL WILLIAM WINKEL, ) et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Justin Goins seeks to consolidate these cases and amend the complaint. For the reasons explained below, based on the motion, for good cause, and without objection from Defendants, the Court GRANTS the motion and consolidates Case No. 1:24-cv-00653 and Case No. 1:25-cv-01448. Further, for good cause shown, and without objection from Defendants, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. Also, based on the parties’ status report, the Court sets the case management plan and scheduling order. BACKGROUND On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff Justin Goins filed suit without a lawyer against Defendant Corporal William Winkel, alleging civil rights violations under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments. Goins v. Winkel, 1:24-cv-00653 (N.D. Ohio) (“Goins I”). On February 14, 2025, the Court entered a default judgment as to liability. (Goins I, ECF No. 21.) On April 28, 2025, the Magistrate Judge entered a report and recommendation that the Court vacate the default judgment. (Goins I, ECF No. 27.) On May 22, 2025, the Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. (Goins I, ECF No. 32.)

According to Plaintiff’s counsel, he had difficulty getting in contact with Plaintiff because the correctional institution did not notify Plaintiff that his new counsel was attempting to contact him. (Goins I, ECF No. 35, PageID #159.) On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff and his counsel spoke on the phone. (Id.) However, Plaintiff had already filed a new action against Corporal Winkel and Defendant Cuyahoga County Correctional Center, which included additional allegations. Goins v. Winkel et al., 1:25-cv-01448 (N.D. Ohio) (“Goins II”).

On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to consolidate both cases and to file an amended complaint. (Goins I, ECF No. 35; Goins II, ECF No. 3.) Also, the parties filed a joint status report, indicating that the parties conferred on July 15, 2025 regarding plans for discovery and proposing a case schedule. (Goins I, ECF No. 34.) ANALYSIS I. Consolidation Rule 42(a) governs motions to consolidate and provides that courts may

consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2); see also, e.g., Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1010–11 (6th Cir. 1993). “Whether cases involving the same factual and legal questions should be consolidated for trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” Cantrell, 999 F.3d at 1011 (citing Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1965)). In deciding whether to consolidate, a district court first considers whether a common question of law or fact exists in both actions. See Weir-Cove Moving &

Storage Co. v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, Nos. 1:18-cv-74 & 1:17-cv-1413, 2019 WL 266422, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2019) (noting that this determination is a “threshold requirement” for consolidation). If a common question exists, then the court balances the factors identified in Cantrell: the risks of prejudice and possible confusion, weighed against “the risk of inconsistent adjudications,” the burden on the parties, “witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits,” the time

required to conclude multiple suits as opposed to just one, and the expense to “all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives.” 999 F.3d at 1011 (quotation omitted) (citing Hendrix. v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing consolidation of asbestos cases)). “Thus, the decision to consolidate is one that must be made thoughtfully, with specific reference to the factors above.” Innovation Ventures, L.L.C. v. Custom Nutrition Labs., L.L.C., 451 F. Supp. 2d 769, 793–94 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citation and quotation omitted). Based on a review of the complaints in each matter, it is clear that these cases present common questions of law and fact. (Compare Goins I, ECF No. 1, with Goins II, ECF No. 1.) Each action claims excess force in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. Similarly, each case involves the same operative facts. (See id.) In Goins II, the primary additions involve (1) a claim that the same incident allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment in addition to those under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) additional allegations that Mr. Goins was placed in a restraint chair for two hours following the mace incident; and (3) the addition of a Defendant, the Cuyahoga County Correctional Center. (Goins II, ECF No. 1.)

Beyond this commonality, the factors Cantrell sets forth favor consolidation. The risk of inconsistent adjudications outweighs any prejudice or possible confusion. Each case involves similar claims. With little, if any, risk of confusion or prejudice the efficiencies of consolidation for the parties and the Court carry the day and will simplify these proceedings. For these reasons, and after careful consideration of the factors identified in Cantrell, the Court GRANTS the motion to consolidate (Goins I, ECF No. 35; Goins

II, ECF No. 3) and ORDERS that the action styled as Goins v. Winkel, No. 1:25-cv- 01448 be CONSOLIDATED into the earlier filed case, Goins v. Winkel, No. 1:24-cv- 00653. II. Motion to Amend Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs courts to give leave to amend freely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). District courts, “‘generally speaking, [have] considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant’ a Rule 15(a)(2) motion.” Stark v. Mars, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Leisure Caviar, LLC v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010)). “A motion to amend a complaint should be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for

dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile.” Id. (quoting Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 294 (6th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff filed his complaints in both actions without a lawyer. (Goins I, ECF No. 1; Goins II, ECF No. 1.) In the first action, the Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. (Goins I, ECF No. 32.) Plaintiff requests leave to file an amended complaint to clarify the allegations and claims that he assertsand to bring a Monell

claim. (Goins I, ECF No. 35; Goins II, ECF No. 3.) For good cause shown, and without objection from Defendants, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. (Goins I, ECF No. 35; Goins II, ECF No. 3.) The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies with this Order and its Civil Standing Order no later than August 8, 2025. III.

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