Goins v. Coffelt

2024 Ohio 908

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 12, 2024
• Docket: CT2023-0074
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Goins v. Coffelt, 2024-Ohio-908.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DONALD GOINS JUDGES: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. John W. Wise, J. Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- Case No. CT2023-0074 JAMES COFFELT, et al.

Defendants-Appellees OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CH 2020-0228

JUDGMENT: Dismissed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees

JOHN A. YAKLEVICH ROBERT P. LYNCH, JR. MOORE & YAKLEVICH H. MICHAEL BRITT 33 South Grant Avenue GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI Columbus, Ohio 43215 41 South High Street Suite 2495 CHARLES A. KOENIG Columbus, Ohio 43215 KOENIG & OWEN, LLC 5354 North High Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 2

Wise, J.

{¶1} Appellant Donald Goins appeals the September 29, 2023, decision by the

Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas appointing arbitrators.

{¶2} Appellees are Tri-State Environmental Solutions LLC, Sandy Marceaux,

James Coffelt and JSC Management Enterprises, LLC.

{¶3} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App.R. 11.1, which

governs accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part:

“(E) Determination and judgment on appeal. The appeal will be

determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance

with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court's decision as

to each error to be in brief and conclusory form. The decision may be by

judgment entry in which case it will not be published in any form.”

{¶4} One of the important purposes of accelerated calendar is to enable an

appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case on

the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated.

Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶5} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

{¶6} On June 3, 2019, Donald Goins, R. James Coffelt (as the managing

member of JSC Management Enterprises LLC), and Sandy Marceaux formed Tri-State

Environmental Trucking LLC, an Ohio Limited Liability Company.

{¶7} Tri-State Environmental Trucking LLC's business involved "picking up and

hauling oil and gas well brine water, processing and removing, as necessary, solid Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 3

materials from that brine water at an osmosis-based separating facility, and pumping its

customers' processed brine into an injection well to be owned by Trucking."

{¶8} The LLC Members' rights and obligations to one another and the Company

are defined in the Company's June 3, 2019, Operating Agreement. Section 6.81 of the

Agreement, titled "Resolution of Disputes," recites that any dispute or claim concerning

the Operating Agreement or its breach will be submitted first to mediation. If the parties

cannot agree on a mediator, each side is to appoint a delegate and the two delegates

must agree on an arbitrator within two weeks.

{¶9} Appellant Donald Goins alleges that Marceaux, Coffelt, and JSC

Management diverted funds from Tri-State Environmental Trucking LLC to Tri-State

Environmental Solutions, LLC.

{¶10} On August 18, 2020, pursuant to the First Operating Agreement, JSC

Management Enterprises, LLC, and Sandy Marceaux (each own 33.33% membership

interests in Tri-State Environmental Trucking LLC) voted to immediately suspend all

operations of Tri-State Environmental Trucking LLC.

{¶11} On August 26, 2020, Appellant Goins filed a Complaint against Appellees

Tri-State Environmental Solutions LLC, Sandy Marceaux, James Coffelt and JSC

Management Enterprises, LLC. alleging breach of contract and tort claims. Goins claims

that he is owed no less than $837,000.

{¶12} On October 21, 2021, Defendants-Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss or

Stay Pending Arbitration. The trial court never formally ruled on this motion.

1 (Note: the Agreement contains two (2) consecutive Section 6.8s). Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 4

{¶13} On January 24, 2023, all of the parties filed a "Joint Motion To Stay

Proceedings And Compel Arbitration."

{¶14} On February 14, 2023, the trial court granted the motion to stay proceedings

pending arbitration.

{¶15} On May 9, 2023, Appellant Goins filed a Motion to Reactive Case to Appoint

Mediator and Arbitrator, Frank Ray.

{¶16} On May 15, 2023, the trial court granted Goins' motion and appointed Frank

Ray as the mediator/arbitrator.

{¶17} On May 17, 2023, Defendants-Appellees filed a Motion to Reconsider

Goins' Motion, arguing that any response to the Motion was not due until May 19, 2023.

{¶18} On August 14, 2023, Goins filed another Motion to Reactivate Case for

Limited Purpose of Appointing Arbitrator to appoint Tim Merkle as the parties' arbitrator.

{¶19} On August 16, 2023, the trial court granted Goins' motion and appointed

Tim Merkel as the arbitrator.

{¶20} On August 24, 2023, Defendants-Appellees filed another Motion for

Reconsideration, arguing that under Civ.R. 6, Defendants-Appellees had until August 24,

2023 to file a response.

{¶21} The trial court scheduled a status conference for September 25, 2023.

During this status conference, the trial court instructed all parties to present their

nomination for the arbitrator.

{¶22} On September 28, 2023, Defendants-Appellees filed their Notice of Filing

Arbitrator Selection and selected Lisa Messner for their nomination for the arbitrator. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 5

{¶23} On September 29, 2023, the trial court appointed Tim Merkel as Goins'

selection for the arbitrator and Lisa Messner for Defendants-Appellees' selection. In the

trial court's entry, it explained how pursuant to the Section 6.8 of Tri-State Trucking's

Operating Agreement, each party will select an arbitrator, and then these two arbitrators

will choose the arbitrator who will decide the matter.

{¶24} Appellant Goins now appeals from the trial court’s September 29, 2023,

entry, raising the following assignment of error for review:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶25} “I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER ITS

ORDER APPOINTING THE CASE ARBITRATOR AND ITS SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

ORDER APPOINTING THREE (3) ARBITRATORS VIOLATED OHIO REV. CODE

2711.02(C), VIOLATED THE PARTIES' LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING

AGREEMENT, VIOLATED OHIO REVISED CODE 2711.04, AND IS VOID AND

ERRONEOUS.”

{¶26} On February 16, 2024, Appellant filed a reply brief. Because this matter is

set on the accelerated calendar, no reply briefs are permitted to be filed unless ordered

by the Court pursuant to App.R.11.1(C). No such order has been issued in this case;

therefore, we strike Appellant's reply brief.

I.

{¶27} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, challenges the trial court’s

decision appointing arbitrators. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 6

Final Appealable Order Analysis

{¶28} As an initial matter, we first determine whether this is a final, appealable

order capable of invoking this Court's jurisdiction. Appellees argue in their brief that the

trial court's order appointing the arbitrators is not a final appealable order, and that

therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed. Because the Ohio Constitution, Section

3(B)(2), Article IV, limits our jurisdiction to the review of final judgments of lower courts,

we must first resolve this issue before addressing the merits of the appeal. Germ v.

Fuerst, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-116, 2003-Ohio-6241, ¶ 3.

{¶29} We must determine if we have jurisdiction to review the merits of this case

by deciding whether the requirements of R.C. §2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B) have been

satisfied. Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 541 N.E.2d 64

(1989).

R.C. §2505.02

{¶30} When determining whether a judgment or order is final and appealable, an

appellate court must first determine whether the order is final within the requirements of

R.C. §2505.02. Then, if the order satisfies R.C. § 2505.02, the court must determine

whether Civ.R. 54(B) applies and, if so, whether the order contains a certification that

there is no just reason for delay. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d

17, 21, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989). “ ‘Civ.R. 54(B) does not alter the requirement that an order

must be final before it is appealable.’ ” Id., quoting Douthitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio App.3d

254, 255, 44 N.E.2d 1068 (9th Dist.1981).

{¶31} R.C. §2505.02(B) lists orders that are final and may be reviewed upon

appeal: Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 7

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified,

or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect

determines the action and prevents a judgment;

***

{¶32} A “substantial right” for purposes of R.C. §2505.02 is a legal right enforced

and protected by law. State ex rel. Hughes v. Celeste, 67 Ohio St.3d 429, 430, 619 N.E.2d

412 (1993); Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989). Alternatively,

a “substantial right” is defined as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio

Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce

or protect.” R.C. §2505.02(A)(1). An order affects a substantial right if, in the absence of

an immediate appeal, one of the parties would be foreclosed from appropriate relief in the

future. Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993).

{¶33} Relevant to the instant matter, R.C. §2505.02(B)(1) defines a final,

appealable order as one “that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect

determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” In examining the “prevents a judgment”

requirement of the statute, id., we conclude that the trial court's appointment of the

delegates/arbitrators in this matter is not a final, appealable order because it does not

prevent a judgment; rather, it allows the matter to proceed to judgment. An order is

deemed to prevent a judgment if the trial court's ruling disposes of the merits of the claim.

See Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v.

Professionals Guild of Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 8

{¶34} Here, the trial court's ruling did not resolve the Appellant’s underlying

breach of contract and tort claims relating to funds Appellant claims are owed to him.

These claims will proceed to a hearing before an arbitrator chosen by the two

delegates/arbitrators selected by the parties, after which the arbitrator will make an award.

After the award has been made, the Revised Code provides a mechanism by which

Appellant may petition the common pleas court to vacate or modify the award. R.C.

§2711.13. At that time, Appellant may raise arguments concerning the arbitrator, and

other procedural or substantive issues. R.C. §2711.10 (stating that the common pleas

court shall vacate an award if the petitioner can demonstrate impropriety on the part of

the arbitrator, such as fraud, corruption, or partiality). Once the common pleas court has

entered a judgment confirming, vacating, or modifying the arbitrator's award, R.C.

§2711.12, Appellant may appeal that ruling. R.C. §2711.15.

Civ.R. 54

{¶35} Civ.R. 54(B) provides that “[w]hen more than one claim for relief is

presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,”

or when the action involves multiple parties, “the court may enter final judgment as to one

or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination

that there is no just reason for delay.”

{¶36} “Thus, in multiple-claim or multiple-party actions, if the court enters

judgment as to some, but not all, of the claims and/or parties, the judgment is a final

appealable order only upon the express determination that there is no just reason for

delay.” In re Estate of L.P.B., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-81, 2011-Ohio-4656, ¶ 9. While

inserting the language of “no just reason for delay” in an entry is not a “mystical incantation Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0074 9

which transforms a nonfinal order into a final appealable order,” the language can

“transform a final order into a final appealable order.” Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut

Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 352, 354, 617 N.E.2d 1136 (1993), citing Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent

State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989).

{¶37} In this case, the decision of the lower court appointing the

delegates/arbitrators does not contain the Civ.R. 54 “no just reason for delay” language.

{¶38} Based on the facts presented in this appeal, we find that the trial court's

ruling is not a final, appealable order because it does not operate to prevent a judgment

and does not contain Civ.R. 54 “no just reason for delay” language.

{¶39} Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant's assignment of error not well-

taken and hereby overrule same.

Conclusion

{¶40} The order from which Appellant has appealed is not a final, appealable

order. Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the assignment of error and must

dismiss the appeal.

{¶41} Accordingly, this appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,

Muskingum County, is dismissed.

By: Wise, J. Delaney, P. J., and Baldwin, J., concur.

JWW/kw 0306