Goforth v. State

883 S.W.2d 251, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 1427, 1994 WL 263886
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 16, 1994
DocketNo. 11-93-033-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 883 S.W.2d 251 (Goforth v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goforth v. State, 883 S.W.2d 251, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 1427, 1994 WL 263886 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

Opinion

McCLOUD, Chief Justice.

The trial court found appellant guilty of aggravated manufacture of amphetamine and assessed punishment at confinement for 99 years and a $75,000 fine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.-113(e) & (d)(2) (Vernon 1992). We affirm.

In his sole point of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of guilt, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).

On October 4, 1989, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a rural residence in Stephens County. Appellant was arrested inside the house. The officers discovered a laboratory in a barn behind the house. The officers found two 22,000 milliliter triple-neck flasks and 11 Mason jars, each containing a brown liquid. Each of the 22,-000 milliliter flasks was set inside a rheostat-controlled heating mantle, and glass condenser tubes attached to water hoses extended vertically from each flask. They also found two boxes containing round-bottom, single-neck flasks (commonly used in converting amphetamine from a liquid to a powder); three cases of Mason jars; four cans labeled “ether” (used to take moisture out of wet amphetamine powder); duet tape; numerous bottles of what appeared to be rubbing alcohol; and two triple-beam scales.

Officer Frank Cleveland, Commander of the West Central Texas Interlocal Crime Task Force, delivered the two flasks and the 11 Mason jars to Eddie Lee Dickie, a chemist for the Texas Department of Public Safety, for analysis of the contents. Dickie testified that the two 22,000 milliliter flasks contained phenylacetone, which is an immediate precursor to amphetamine.1 As to the 11 Mason jars, Dickie testified that he first determined that each jar contained the same substance. He then combined the contents of all the jars. The combined substance weighed 10 [253]*253pounds and .75 ounces. Dickie testified that the substance contained 34 percent pure amphetamine, which worked out to be “approximately 1550 grams of pure amphetamine.”

Appellant first contends that, although the substance in the jars contained 34 percent pure amphetamine, the amphetamine present was not the final product ready for distribution as amphetamine, but was instead a liquid containing a mixture of amphetamine and other unanalyzed substances. Therefore, appellant argues that the substance was not “manufactured” amphetamine but, rather, that it was a “compound, mixture, or substance” containing amphetamine, which was not alleged.

As authority for this argument appellant relies on a footnote in Judge Clinton’s concurring opinion in Dowling v. State, 885 S.W.2d 103, 112-13 n. 7 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (motion for rehearing granted, ease under submission), which states in part:

[M]any foregoing cases indicate that practitioners are having difficulty analyzing operative facts to determine the appropriate aggravated offense denounced by the Texas Controlled Substances Act. Charging instruments allege criminal conduct pertaining to amphetamine ranging from simple “possession,” “possession with intent to manufacture” to actual “manufacture,” yet both prosecution and defense overlook that the facts reveal no more than suspects in or around a ‘dab” engaged in the process of “manufacturing” what is expected will turn out to be, but as the chemist here explained is not, a product “ready for distribution as amphetamine.” In short, there is no “manufactured” amphetamine in the “cooking” flask. (Emphasis added)

Judge Clinton then suggests that in such cases the proper offense to be charged is a preparatory offense, citing Baxter v. State, 718 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1986, pet’n ref'd) (attempted aggravated manufacture of methamphetamine).

We disagree with appellant’s argument that the seized substance was not “manufactured” amphetamine and that appellant could only be convicted of a preparatory offense. The Code defines “manufacture” as:

[T]he production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance ... directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis.

TEX.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.002(25) (Vernon 1992). There is no requirement that, in order to have been “manufactured,” the controlled substance must be in the form in which it will be distributed as a final product. The evidence shows that appellant produced, prepared, propagated, compounded, converted, or processed the controlled substance amphetamine by means of chemical synthesis. Therefore, the State proved that appellant “manufactured” amphetamine.

Appellant next contends that the State did not meet the requirements of Cawthon v. State, 849 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), because the State failed to produce evidence regarding the identity of the remaining substances in the jars. In Cawthon, the appellant was charged with possession with intent to deliver amphetamine having an aggregate weight, including any adulterants and dilutants, of between 28 and 400 grams. The weight of the total substance was 128.76 grams, but the substance contained only 25.-752 grams of amphetamine. The conviction was reversed because the State did not establish that the remainder of the substance was an adulterant or dilutant. The court held:

[W]hen adulterants and dilutants constitute a part of the weight utilized to increase punishment, the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the named illegal substance, (2) that the added remainder (adulterants and/or dilutants) has not affected the chemical activity of the named illegal substance, (3) that the remainder (adulterants and/or dilutants) was added to the named illegal substance with the intent to increase the bulk or quantity of the final product, (4) the weight of the illegal substance, including any adulterants and/or dilutants.

[254]*254Cawthon v. State, supra at 348-49; see also Thorpe v. State, 863 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Reeves v. State, 806 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), cert. den’d, 499 U.S. 984, 111 S.Ct. 1641, 113 L.Ed.2d 736 (1991); Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Sloan v. State, 750 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); McGlothlin v. State,

Related

Alfred Delbert McCloy v. Milton Messner
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006
Terry Glenn Honeycutt v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
883 S.W.2d 251, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 1427, 1994 WL 263886, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goforth-v-state-texapp-1994.