Goff v. Goff

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Goff v. Goff

368 S.E.2d 419, 90 N.C. App. 388, 1988 N.C. App. LEXIS 533

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedMay 31, 1988

Docket8726DC1019

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 368 S.E.2d 419 (Goff v. Goff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Goff v. Goff, 368 S.E.2d 419, 90 N.C. App. 388, 1988 N.C. App. LEXIS 533 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

*393 ARNOLD, Judge.

Plaintiff correctly argues that the trial court erred in ordering a refund to defendant of a payment which was made pursuant to the provisions of a prior consent order.

While this Court has some doubt that the provisions of paragraph 3 were properly carried out according to the consent order as it is worded, defendant stipulated that the provisions were literally followed in determining the disbursement of the tax escrow account. Why defendant made such a stipulation involving the crux of her case is not a matter for this Court.

The public policy of this state is to promote certainty and finality in domestic dispute resolutions. Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 345 S.E. 2d 460 (1986). Generally, courts are reluctant to allow collateral attacks on consent judgments. Id. Therefore, only property divisions which have not been satisfied may be modified. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E. 2d 338 (1983). Since the provisions of the consent order concerning the division of property had been fully executed and satisfied, the trial court was without authority to order plaintiff to reimburse defendant.

Reversed.

Judges Becton and Parker concur.

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*393 ARNOLD, Judge.

Plaintiff correctly argues that the trial court erred in ordering a refund to defendant of a payment which was made pursuant to the provisions of a prior consent order.

While this Court has some doubt that the provisions of paragraph 3 were properly carried out according to the consent order as it is worded, defendant stipulated that the provisions were literally followed in determining the disbursement of the tax escrow account. Why defendant made such a stipulation involving the crux of her case is not a matter for this Court.

The public policy of this state is to promote certainty and finality in domestic dispute resolutions. Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 345 S.E. 2d 460 (1986). Generally, courts are reluctant to allow collateral attacks on consent judgments. Id. Therefore, only property divisions which have not been satisfied may be modified. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E. 2d 338 (1983). Since the provisions of the consent order concerning the division of property had been fully executed and satisfied, the trial court was without authority to order plaintiff to reimburse defendant.

Reversed.

Judges Becton and Parker concur.

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Bluebook (online)

368 S.E.2d 419, 90 N.C. App. 388, 1988 N.C. App. LEXIS 533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goff-v-goff-ncctapp-1988.

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