3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 VICTORIA-JOY GODWIN, Case No. 2:17-cv-02178-MMD-DJA
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 SENIOR GARDEN APARTMENTS, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 I. SUMMARY 13 Pro se Plaintiff Victoria-Joy Godwin filed an 87-page Fourth Amended Complaint 14 alleging numerous defendants violated the Fair Housing Act, operated a racketeering 15 scheme, and engaged in a civil conspiracy using state court personnel to intimidate 16 Plaintiff. (ECF No. 87 (“FAC”).) Plaintiff alleges Defendants Elizabeth Brown, Steve 17 Grierson, Betty Foley, and Collin Jayne (collectively, “Defendants”)—all state court 18 employees—engaged in acts in their official and individual capacities to cause Plaintiff 19 harm. (Id.) Before the Court are Brown’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 91) and Grierson, 20 Foley, and Jayne’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 131). Plaintiff opposes both dismissal 21 motions. (ECF Nos. 96, 138.)1 22 As further explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The 23 Court finds Defendants enjoy quasi-judicial immunity and are entitled to Eleventh 24
25 1ECF No. 138 is titled Plaintiff’s “motion for striking defendants’ motion to dismiss.” The Court construes the motion as a response to Grierson, Foley, and Jayne’s dismissal 26 motion (ECF No. 131). Nevertheless, if the Court accepted the motion as a motion to strike, it would be denied as Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. 27 Plaintiff additionally names Brown in ECF No. 138 as one of the defendants that 28 filed ECF No. 131. This may be the result of a docketing error that has since been corrected. Brown is identified as a defendant in ECF No. 91 and not a defendant in ECF 2 prejudice. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 The following allegations are adapted from Plaintiff’s FAC.2 In June 2017, Plaintiff’s 5 landlord filed an eviction action against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 87 at 18.) The landlord 6 additionally filed a second eviction action against Plaintiff (“Second Action”). (Id. at 21- 7 22.) On September 27, 2017, Plaintiff received a notice to vacate due to a court order 8 granting the landlord summary eviction. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff thereafter appeared at a court 9 hearing, and the court refused to re-address the grant of summary eviction in the Second 10 Action. (Id. at 25.) 11 Plaintiff filed an injunction and appealed in the Second Action. (Id. at 26.) Court 12 employee Collin Jayne ignored the merits of Plaintiff’s injunction, thus demonstrating 13 Jayne’s “willingness to join the conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff and obstruct justice.” (Id. at 14 27.) After court hearings on Plaintiff’s case, Jayne and court employee Betty Foley were 15 induced to engage in actions resulting in a court order they “knew was designed to 16 prevent, impede, and constrain” the judgment of a higher court. (Id. 27-28.) Foley and 17 Jayne furthermore sent Plaintiff fraudulent decisions. (Id. at 30.) During this litigation 18 period, Plaintiff mailed conditional acceptances to Foley, Jayne, and court clerk Steve 19 Grierson, but they “refused to resolve the issue as to the roles of the [research attorneys] 20 as checks and balances preserving justice.” (Id. at 31.) 21 At some point, Plaintiff appealed two summary judgment decisions to the Nevada 22 Court of Appeals. (Id. at 31-32.) According to Plaintiff, court employee Elizabeth Brown 23 engaged in mail fraud, refused to properly train research attorneys, prevented Plaintiff 24 from questioning and investigating public employees’ performance, encouraged bribery, 25 and withheld documents. (Id. at 33-34.) Brown and Grierson failed to produce training 26
27 2The Court again finds it difficult to decipher Plaintiff's allegations and her factual basis for her claims is somewhat confusing. Although the Court has raised the issue of 28 clarity before (see ECF Nos. 42 at 2, 36 at 3), Plaintiff's claims require the Court to construe them as stated above. 2 engaged in acts for the “purpose of obstructing the enforcement of a court order” that 3 remanded a summary eviction action to the lower court. (Id. at 41.) 4 Plaintiff states she suffers from severe and enduring emotional distress as a result 5 of Defendants’ acts or failures to act. (Id. at 48.) Plaintiff alleges seven claims for relief: 6 (1) quid pro quo sexual harassment; (2) hostile environment sexual harassment; (3) 7 intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) 8 defamation; (6) racketeering; and (7) civil conspiracy. (Id. at 42-86.) Plaintiff seeks 9 compensatory and punitive damages in addition to other prayers for relief. (Id. at 86-87.) 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which 12 relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must provide 13 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While 15 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and 16 conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations 18 must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to 19 survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a 20 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 21 U.S. at 570). 22 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to 23 apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all 24 well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not 25 entitled to the assumption of truth. See id. at 678. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause 26 of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. See id. Second, a 27 district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a 28 plausible claim for relief. See id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s 2 defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. at 678. Where the complaint does 3 not permit the Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 4 has “alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is insufficient. 6 When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, 7 the complaint must be dismissed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 8 IV. DISCUSSION 9 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 12(b)(6) on the following grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars Defendants from 11 being sued in their official capacities; (2) Defendants have quasi-judicial immunity; (3) 12 Plaintiff’s tort claims are implausible; (4) there is no evidence Defendants participated in 13 racketeering; and (5) Plaintiff is unable to establish Defendants engaged in civil 14 conspiracy.3 (ECF Nos. 91, 131.) The Court will address Defendants’ quasi-judicial 15 immunity and Eleventh Amendment arguments in turn as they prove to be dispositive in 16 resolving the dismissal motions. 17 A.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 VICTORIA-JOY GODWIN, Case No. 2:17-cv-02178-MMD-DJA
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 SENIOR GARDEN APARTMENTS, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 I. SUMMARY 13 Pro se Plaintiff Victoria-Joy Godwin filed an 87-page Fourth Amended Complaint 14 alleging numerous defendants violated the Fair Housing Act, operated a racketeering 15 scheme, and engaged in a civil conspiracy using state court personnel to intimidate 16 Plaintiff. (ECF No. 87 (“FAC”).) Plaintiff alleges Defendants Elizabeth Brown, Steve 17 Grierson, Betty Foley, and Collin Jayne (collectively, “Defendants”)—all state court 18 employees—engaged in acts in their official and individual capacities to cause Plaintiff 19 harm. (Id.) Before the Court are Brown’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 91) and Grierson, 20 Foley, and Jayne’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 131). Plaintiff opposes both dismissal 21 motions. (ECF Nos. 96, 138.)1 22 As further explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The 23 Court finds Defendants enjoy quasi-judicial immunity and are entitled to Eleventh 24
25 1ECF No. 138 is titled Plaintiff’s “motion for striking defendants’ motion to dismiss.” The Court construes the motion as a response to Grierson, Foley, and Jayne’s dismissal 26 motion (ECF No. 131). Nevertheless, if the Court accepted the motion as a motion to strike, it would be denied as Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. 27 Plaintiff additionally names Brown in ECF No. 138 as one of the defendants that 28 filed ECF No. 131. This may be the result of a docketing error that has since been corrected. Brown is identified as a defendant in ECF No. 91 and not a defendant in ECF 2 prejudice. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 The following allegations are adapted from Plaintiff’s FAC.2 In June 2017, Plaintiff’s 5 landlord filed an eviction action against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 87 at 18.) The landlord 6 additionally filed a second eviction action against Plaintiff (“Second Action”). (Id. at 21- 7 22.) On September 27, 2017, Plaintiff received a notice to vacate due to a court order 8 granting the landlord summary eviction. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff thereafter appeared at a court 9 hearing, and the court refused to re-address the grant of summary eviction in the Second 10 Action. (Id. at 25.) 11 Plaintiff filed an injunction and appealed in the Second Action. (Id. at 26.) Court 12 employee Collin Jayne ignored the merits of Plaintiff’s injunction, thus demonstrating 13 Jayne’s “willingness to join the conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff and obstruct justice.” (Id. at 14 27.) After court hearings on Plaintiff’s case, Jayne and court employee Betty Foley were 15 induced to engage in actions resulting in a court order they “knew was designed to 16 prevent, impede, and constrain” the judgment of a higher court. (Id. 27-28.) Foley and 17 Jayne furthermore sent Plaintiff fraudulent decisions. (Id. at 30.) During this litigation 18 period, Plaintiff mailed conditional acceptances to Foley, Jayne, and court clerk Steve 19 Grierson, but they “refused to resolve the issue as to the roles of the [research attorneys] 20 as checks and balances preserving justice.” (Id. at 31.) 21 At some point, Plaintiff appealed two summary judgment decisions to the Nevada 22 Court of Appeals. (Id. at 31-32.) According to Plaintiff, court employee Elizabeth Brown 23 engaged in mail fraud, refused to properly train research attorneys, prevented Plaintiff 24 from questioning and investigating public employees’ performance, encouraged bribery, 25 and withheld documents. (Id. at 33-34.) Brown and Grierson failed to produce training 26
27 2The Court again finds it difficult to decipher Plaintiff's allegations and her factual basis for her claims is somewhat confusing. Although the Court has raised the issue of 28 clarity before (see ECF Nos. 42 at 2, 36 at 3), Plaintiff's claims require the Court to construe them as stated above. 2 engaged in acts for the “purpose of obstructing the enforcement of a court order” that 3 remanded a summary eviction action to the lower court. (Id. at 41.) 4 Plaintiff states she suffers from severe and enduring emotional distress as a result 5 of Defendants’ acts or failures to act. (Id. at 48.) Plaintiff alleges seven claims for relief: 6 (1) quid pro quo sexual harassment; (2) hostile environment sexual harassment; (3) 7 intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) 8 defamation; (6) racketeering; and (7) civil conspiracy. (Id. at 42-86.) Plaintiff seeks 9 compensatory and punitive damages in addition to other prayers for relief. (Id. at 86-87.) 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which 12 relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must provide 13 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While 15 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and 16 conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations 18 must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to 19 survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a 20 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 21 U.S. at 570). 22 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to 23 apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all 24 well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not 25 entitled to the assumption of truth. See id. at 678. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause 26 of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. See id. Second, a 27 district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a 28 plausible claim for relief. See id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s 2 defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. at 678. Where the complaint does 3 not permit the Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 4 has “alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is insufficient. 6 When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, 7 the complaint must be dismissed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 8 IV. DISCUSSION 9 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 12(b)(6) on the following grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars Defendants from 11 being sued in their official capacities; (2) Defendants have quasi-judicial immunity; (3) 12 Plaintiff’s tort claims are implausible; (4) there is no evidence Defendants participated in 13 racketeering; and (5) Plaintiff is unable to establish Defendants engaged in civil 14 conspiracy.3 (ECF Nos. 91, 131.) The Court will address Defendants’ quasi-judicial 15 immunity and Eleventh Amendment arguments in turn as they prove to be dispositive in 16 resolving the dismissal motions. 17 A. QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 18 Defendants argue that they have quasi-judicial immunity against Plaintiff’s claims. 19 (ECF Nos. 91 at 4, 131 at 6, 10-11.) Plaintiff appears to counter that immunity does not 20 extend to Defendants as clerks and research attorneys. (ECF No. 96 at 3, 5-9.)4 The 21 Court disagrees with Plaintiff. 22 “A seemingly impregnable fortress in American Jurisprudence is the absolute 23 immunity of judges from civil liability for acts done by them within their judicial jurisdiction.” 24
25 3Plaintiff’s FAC fails to provide sufficient factual allegations against Defendants and merely asserts conclusory statements. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court agrees 26 with Defendants on Grounds 3, 4, 5. Further discussion is unnecessary and unwarranted as it does not affect the outcome of Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 27 4Plaintiff makes this argument in her opposition (ECF No. 96) to Brown’s motion to 28 dismiss (ECF No. 96), but the argument is general to state court employees as to also apply to Grierson, Foley, and Jayne’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 131). 2 547, 554 (1967)). This immunity extends to shield court clerks. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. 3 Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial 4 immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an 5 integral part of the judicial process . . . unless [the] acts were done in the clear absence 6 of all jurisdiction.”). Quasi-judicial immunity extends to individuals performing functions 7 “closely associated with the judicial process.” Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 8 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996)). 9 Brown is the Clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court and Grierson is the Clerk of the 10 Eighth Judicial District Court. (ECF Nos. 91 at 1, 131 at 1.) Foley and Jayne are law clerks 11 for the Eighth Judicial District Court. (ECF No. 131 at 1.) Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, 12 the Court infers that Brown and Grierson had a responsibility to train court staff, manage 13 cases, provide information to litigants, and mail court decisions. Foley and Jayne were 14 responsible for legal research, drafting court documents, and assisting judges. Even if the 15 Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendants’ actions were conclusively 16 “integral part[s] of the judicial process” and were not performed in the “clear absence of 17 all jurisdiction.” Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390-91; see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356- 18 57 (1978); see also Moore, 96 F.3d at 1243-45 (affirming a district court dismissal of 19 claims against a clerk and law clerk on the ground of judicial immunity). The Court 20 therefore agrees that Defendants are immune from liability on Plaintiff’s claims. 21 B. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BAR 22 Defendants argue the Eleventh Amendment prevents Plaintiff from bringing state 23 tort claims against Defendants in their official capacities. (ECF Nos. 91 at 3-4, 131 at 5.) 24 Plaintiff appears to counter that Defendants remain liable as the Eleventh Amendment 25 bar civil rights actions and not tort claims. (ECF No. 96 at 7, 12.)5 The Court does not find 26 Plaintiff’s argument persuasive. 27
28 5See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 2 jurisdiction to entertain suits seeking civil damages against a state.” Prod. & Leasing, Ltd. 3 v. Hotel Conquistador, Inc., 709 F.2d 21, 21 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 4 U.S. 332, 337 (1979)). “Where the state is in fact the real party in interest this bar cannot 5 be circumvented by naming an individual state official or state agency as a nominal 6 defendant.” Id. (quoting Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1981)). While 7 a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to a suit, Nevada has not done so. 8 See id. (citing O’Connor v. Nevada, 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Eleventh 9 Amendment immunity extends to actions against state officers sued in their official 10 capacities.” Id. at 22 (quoting Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982)). 11 Here, Plaintiff sued Defendants in their official capacities for defamation, and 12 intentional and negligent inflictions of emotional distress. (ECF No. 87 at 45-54.) The 13 Eleventh Amendment, however, bars Plaintiff’s tort claims as Nevada has not waived 14 immunity. See NRS § 41.031(3) (“The State of Nevada does not waive its immunity from 15 suit conferred by Amendment XI of the Constitution of the United States.”). Moreover, 16 despite Plaintiff’s unsupported argument, the Eleventh Amendment does in fact bar state 17 tort claims. See Gunn v. Skolnik, Case No. 2:09-cv-02195-LDG (VCF), 2014 WL 18 3592296, *6 (D. Nev. July 18, 2014) (emphasis added) (“Defendants acting in their official 19 capacity for the State are immune from a state tort claim because the State did not waive 20 its Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). The Court therefore agrees with Defendants. 21 In sum, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection. Defendants 22 also have quasi-official immunity. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are therefore 23 dismissed with prejudice. 24 V. CONCLUSION 25 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 26 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 27 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 28 motions before the Court. 1 It is therefore ordered that Defendant Elizabeth Brown’s motion to dismiss (ECF 2 || No. 91) is granted. All claims against Brown are dismissed with prejudice. 3 It is further ordered that Defendants Steve Grierson, Betty Foley, and Collin 4 || Jayne’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 131) is granted. All claims against Grierson, Foley, 5 || and Jayne are dismissed with prejudice. 6 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's motion to strike (ECF No. 138), which the Court 7 || construes as a response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 131), is denied. 8 DATED THIS 10" Day of December 2020. 9 —~ 10 {Gin 11 MIRANDA H_DU—————— CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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