Godwin v. McGehee

19 Ala. 468
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJune 15, 1851
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 19 Ala. 468 (Godwin v. McGehee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Godwin v. McGehee, 19 Ala. 468 (Ala. 1851).

Opinion

CHILTON, J,

Since this cause was before ús at a previous term, (15 Ala. 232,) it has been re-tried in the court below, and is again before us upon cross assignments of errors, both ¡parties being dissatisfied with portions of the chancellor’s decree.- We will first dispose of the errors assigned by the defendants to the bill.

1. It is insisted for them that the chancellor erred in charging them with interest on the amounts ascertained to be due from them to the Rail Road Company for stock.

According to the previsions of the charter of the company, if the defendants to the bill had failed to pay within sixty days after the stock was called for, the company could have sued for and collected it. The right to 'declare the stock forfeited was clearly but a cumulative remedy given by the charter to the company against defaulting stockholders, If, then, a call had been made, and these defendants had made default, and suits bad been instituted by the company, we apprehend there would be no question but that they would be bound to pay interest on [474]*474their bonds from the time they were payable,, namely, from the-expiration of‘the sixty days from the date of the call. The complainants,, however, by their bill, have acquired a lien upon this stock, so that the company cannot control it, and the defendants would'be bound, at their peril,, to disregard any call which the company might make, after this lien attached. The company and its debtors having been brought before the Chancery Court,, that court became the rightful’repository of the fund until the controversy concerning it was endéd, when by its final decreer the same would be ordered to be paid out according to the equitable rights of the respective parties.

The fund being-called'for in the Court of'Chancery", if was the cbvious duty of the defendants who desired'to rid themselves of the payment of interest upon their unpaid bonds, to have tendered the money in court, and, if "instead of doing so, they engage in a protracted,, expensive, but fruitless litigation concerning it, and hold on to it until obtained at' the extremity of the law, it is but equitable and right that they should be required to pay interest. The parties knew, or might' have known, the amount of their indebtedness. They were likewise hound to know that after the service of the bill' upon them, no demand which they might- acquire should be allowed to defeat the right of the complainants to a condemnation of the amounts due from them to the company to the payment of the complainants’ judgments. In other words,, that the state of'the accounts existing 'between them and!the company at the time tile Bill was served upon them, which brought actual knowledge t'o them of the’ pen-dency of the chancery proceeding, must be that upon which tbfe court would determine their liability.. And knowing this, their • efforts to obtain credit for demands against the company, which were acquired by them after they knew of the pendency of this ■ suit,, instead of furnishing a reason- for exonerating them from • the payment of interest, constitutes a strong inducement forcharging them with it..

It is, moreover, manifest that this-ease is readily distinguishable from.-those in. which if is necessary to go into a protracted,. intricate accounting, .in order to ascertain the true balance between the parties.

In T. & J. Kirkman et al. v. Vanlier et al., (7 Ala. 217,) if-wa's held by our predecessors, and we think very correctly, that [475]*475Where a bill is filed fox' the purpose of subjecting a sum1 of money in the hands of a third' person, to the payment of a debt due the complainant,' if su'ch- person, though enjoined from using it, does not offer to bring it into court, but insists upon his right to retain it, both as against the complainant and his debtors, he will be charged with interest.- This decision is well sustained by thé authorities cited in it, and as the case before us is clearly brought within its influence, We deenv it unnecessary to cite further authority to the points

But it is supposed that the frame of this bill will not justify a decree for interest, as'it contains no specific'prayer for the same. In general, a court will not decree interest on a balance, unless .it is specially asked’ for in the bill, but this rule applies to interest due at the time the bill was filed.- Where the interest ac - crues subsequently, it is the practice of the eourt, upon further directions, to order the interest to be computed, although there is no prayer in the bill t’o that effect. In Turner v. Turner, (1 Jacobs' So Walker, 43,) Sir Thomas Plumer, Master of the Rolls, said, ct for although the bill does not pray for interest, and there is nothing on the fa’ce of the pleadings to affect the executors with it, yet, it is,-1-think, now open to the' court to charge it against them.” And as to bringing-'the money into court, he Says; “ It was urged that no application was made for the payment of the balance into court, but the defendants should have brought it in without any.” See also Loyd v. Jones, 12 Simons, 491, and Daniel’s Ch. Pr. 439; ib. 1507.

Having disposed of this objection to the decree, which is taken-by all the defendants,-let us turn'to the alleged error, which is severally assigned.- We have carefully • examined the additional proof taken by the register upon’ the last reference as to the bond of the company N-o.- 78,- which Mr. Cowles insists should be allowed as a* Credit upon' his stock. The testimony of Mr .-Gilmer tends to weaken to some éxtent the evidence adduced against-hiitf as to the'time he'acquired this bond, but his memory'is unaided by any memorandum-in writing made at the time,* and" besides,-he cannot identify this as the bond deposited by Cowles with Bell to be credited on his stock. Without stating the testimony previously taken, which will be found in 15 Ala. 240, We feel constrained to hold that the proof clearly preponderates in favor of- the master’s report,- and shows that- this bend-'w?¿'> [476]*476purchased from Wm. Knox on the 28th day of June, 1841, nearly one month after the bill was served upon the defendant Cowles. Consequently, the Chancellor very properly refused to allow it as a credit upon the amount due from him for stock.

This disposes of the errors assigned by the defendants to the bill, and shows that the Chancellor did not err in the matter of their objections to his decree.

Next we come to consider the question raised by the assignment of errors on the part of Allen et ah, the complainants in the court below.

It appears that the subpoena in the cause was executed on Abner McGehee on the 26th day of May, 1841, and the register reports that said McGehee became the owner of three of the bonds insisted on as credits by him, two of them for $1,000 each, and one for $100, on the first day of June, 1841. According to this report these bonds could not have been allowed as sets-off against McGehec’s indebtedness, but it was excepted to as to these items, and the chancellor sustained the exception and allowed McGehee the benefit of them..

The evidence in regard to these two items shows that on the 5th day ox November, 1840, William McGehee, being tbe owner of these bonds, with other demands against the company, amounting in all, with interest to 1st November, 1840, to the sum of $6,701, and being indebted to Daniel Moseley in the sum of $3,000, to John Chaney in the sum of $900, to T.

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Bluebook (online)
19 Ala. 468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/godwin-v-mcgehee-ala-1851.