Gobert v. Butterfield

136 P. 516, 23 Cal. App. 1, 1913 Cal. App. LEXIS 195
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 1, 1913
DocketCiv. No. 1111.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 136 P. 516 (Gobert v. Butterfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gobert v. Butterfield, 136 P. 516, 23 Cal. App. 1, 1913 Cal. App. LEXIS 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913).

Opinion

CHIPMAN, P. J.

Plaintiff brings the action to determine his title to a certain quartz mining claim situated in Plumas County, and alleging, among other things, that defendants had wrongfully entered upon said claim and were removing ore therefrom, and praying for an injunction to prevent the said trespass. Defendants denied plaintiff’s ownership and claimed ownership in defendant Butterfield. The controversy relates to a triangular parcel of land situated at the easterly end of the so-called Old .Harry Quartz claim, herein referred to as the Old Harry, claimed by plaintiff, and the westerly end of the so called Old Harry Extension quartz claim, hereinafter referred to as the Old Harry Extension, claimed by defendant Butterfield and under lease to defendants Shinn and Smith. The ownership of the respective claims as alleged in the pleading is not disputed except as to the small piece of land in controversy, and the question here concerns only the location of the boundary line between the two claims. This triangular piece of land is 248.7 feet wide at the northerly boundary line of the two claims, and tapers close to a common point marking the southeasterly corner of plaintiff’s claim and the southwesterly corner of defendants’ claim.

The court found that defendant Butterfield is the owner of the disputed land and defendants Shinn and Smith lessees *3 thereof with an option to purchase. The restraining order was accordingly discharged and judgment passed for defendants. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and brings here the judgment-roll and a duly certified transcript of the proceedings at the trial.

A motion was made by plaintiff to have the cause submitted on briefs on file, under rules II and V, [160 Cal. xlii, xlvi, 119 Pac. ix, x], because of respondents ’ failure to file their reply brief in time. Respondents made no appearance at the hearing of the motion and have filed no brief. The cause was submitted for decision in accordance with said motion.

It appeared that, on December 11, 1899, plaintiff posted on his claim a preliminary notice and, on July 11,' 1900, his final notice of location. These notices stated that the land was in Plumas township, Plumas County, on surveyed land of the United States, “and particularly described as follows: Beginning 700 ft. east of notice posted at point of discovery and running westerly 1500 ft. together with 300 ft. of surface ground on each side of the lode or vein. The exterior boundaries are definitely marked so as to be readily traced.” On July 31, 1912, plaintiff posted an “amended notice of quartz location” in which his former location was extended easterly to definitely include the disputed piece of land and he declared in his notice that it was “for the purpose of amending” the said preliminary and final notices of 1899 and 1900.

On August 10, 1912, he posted another amended notice of location in which he declared his purpose to be to amend his preliminary and final notices of said claims made in 1899 and 1900, and- also to amend his amended location posted on July 31, 1912. Plaintiff’s amended complaint describes his claim so as definitely to include the disputed land.

Defendants introduced evidence of the location of the Old Harry Extension posted on the claim January 1, 1912, by Robert MeAuley; also a quitclaim deed by McAuley of said mining claim to F. L. Butterfield, dated July 16, 1912; also a notice of location by Butterfield which declared that it “was for the purpose of amending and perfecting the description of the Old Harry Extension quartz claim, the notice of the location of which is recorded in vol. 10 of Quartz Claims, Plumas Co. records, ’ ’ the notice of location posted and recorded *4 by McAuley. This amended location was posted on the claim August 2, 1912.

Plaintiff’s amended location and the McAuley location and ' Butterfield’s location embraced the disputed land.

Appellant states certain propositions which may not be controverted: That a locator cannot be deprived of his inchoate rights by the tortious acts of others; nor can an intruder ' and trespasser initiate any rights which will defeat those of a prior discoverer (Ehrhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527, [28 L. Ed. 1113, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560]); that where the object is to cure obvious defects, and there is no attempt to include new ground, the amended certificate will relate back to the original, notwithstanding intervening locations (Lindley on Mines, p. 719); that a location in excess of the statutory limit, where it injures no one when made, if made in good faith, is voidable only as to the excess (Lindley on Mines, p. 664); that a locator may amend his location, if it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others (Id. 984); that where the claim is once sufficiently marked on the ground, and all necessary acts of location are performed, a right vests in the locator, which cannot be divested by the subsequent obliteration of the marks or removal of the stakes without the fault of the locator. If the evidence shows that the boundaries were originally marked, the fact that the stakes then set could not in later years be found raises no presumption against the validity of the original marking (Id. 691, 692); that a claim may be marked at any time prior to the acquisition of an intervening right, regardless of the question as to whether the time within which such marking was made is reasonable or not (Id. pp. 597, 679).

The ease turns largely on the fact whether the plaintiff originally placed a stake at the point now claimed as his northeast comer, being the point at which he placed a stake when he surveyed and posted his amended location, in 1912, and whether he claimed originally his easterly end boundary to be on a line leading from said northeast corner to the point originally and now claimed to be his southeast corner, which is substantially Butterfield’s southwest corner. Plaintiff was the only witness to his having placed a stake for his northeast corner at the point above referred to. He testified that it was the same as the stake at the other corners^ that it was pulled *5 up and thrown away about two or three months later and he never replaced it for the- reason, as he testified: “I got a witness tree marked; I think the witness tree show my post was there.” He testified that he marked the lines by blazing the trees between the Corners, and that these blazed trees plainly marked his line and were as near to it as he could find them. He testified that, without compass or chain, he stepped off the distances from corner to corner, commencing at the southwest corner of his claim and endeavored to mark out a piece of ground whose sides were of equal length and the ends parallel, as near as he could. When his survey was made, it appeared that his north boundary line, as he then claimed it, was about one hundred and sixty feet longer than his south boundary line, while the two end lines were within a few feet of the same length. His explanation of the difference between the north and south lines was shown not to be satisfactory. Witness Barbee, who surveyed plaintiff’s claim, commencing August 22, 1912, testified that he located the corners and lines under plaintiff’s direction, he himself having no knowledge of them except as imparted by plaintiff; that he found no comer at the point claimed as plaintiff’s northeast comer, but found the other corners.

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Bluebook (online)
136 P. 516, 23 Cal. App. 1, 1913 Cal. App. LEXIS 195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gobert-v-butterfield-calctapp-1913.