Glynn v. Zabriskie

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Glynn v. Zabriskie

36 A. 3, 19 R.I. 215, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 94

DecidedSeptember 27, 1895

StatusPublished

This text of 36 A. 3 (Glynn v. Zabriskie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Glynn v. Zabriskie, 36 A. 3, 19 R.I. 215, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 94 (R.I. 1895).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

The notice of intention to claim a lien, served on the respondent, a copy of which is recorded in the office of the City Olerk of Newport, omits several matters which it is customary and desirable, if not essential, that such a notice should contain, viz., it does not state what the materials were which had been furnished, nor that they had been furnished within sixty days prior to the giving of notice, nor against whose estate in the land it is intended to claim the lien.

It is not necessary, however, for us to determine whether the notice is insufficient on account of these omissions, or any or either of them, for it is fatally defective in that it states that the lien intended to be claimed is created by Pub. Stat. cap. 177, § 5, as amended by Public Laws, cap. 696, of March 21, 1888. ‘ The.lien for materials furnished is given, not by § 5, referred to in the notice, but by § 1 of cap. 177 of the Public Statutes as amended by Pub. Laws, cap. 696, § 1. Section 5 merely limits the period for the commencement of *216 legal process to enforce the lien created by § 1, as amended, and for the notice to he given to the owner of the property of an intention to claim the lien. The statute being in derogation of the common law, a strict compliance with its requirements is necessary. Dodge v. Walsham, 16 R. I. 705.

Charles Acton Ives, for petitioner. Samuel B. Honey, for respondents.

Petition denied and dismissed.

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Per Curiam.

The notice of intention to claim a lien, served on the respondent, a copy of which is recorded in the office of the City Olerk of Newport, omits several matters which it is customary and desirable, if not essential, that such a notice should contain, viz., it does not state what the materials were which had been furnished, nor that they had been furnished within sixty days prior to the giving of notice, nor against whose estate in the land it is intended to claim the lien.

It is not necessary, however, for us to determine whether the notice is insufficient on account of these omissions, or any or either of them, for it is fatally defective in that it states that the lien intended to be claimed is created by Pub. Stat. cap. 177, § 5, as amended by Public Laws, cap. 696, of March 21, 1888. ‘ The.lien for materials furnished is given, not by § 5, referred to in the notice, but by § 1 of cap. 177 of the Public Statutes as amended by Pub. Laws, cap. 696, § 1. Section 5 merely limits the period for the commencement of *216 legal process to enforce the lien created by § 1, as amended, and for the notice to he given to the owner of the property of an intention to claim the lien. The statute being in derogation of the common law, a strict compliance with its requirements is necessary. Dodge v. Walsham, 16 R. I. 705.

Charles Acton Ives, for petitioner. Samuel B. Honey, for respondents.

Petition denied and dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

36 A. 3, 19 R.I. 215, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 94, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glynn-v-zabriskie-ri-1895.